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Framework

Framework – internet surveillance debates good

Internet surveillance research is vital to the future of communication, war, peace, wealth, and poverty

Lyon, 15 - director of the Surveillance Studies Centre, Surveillance Research Chair, Professor Sociology and Law at Queen’s University (David, The Snowden Stakes: Challenges for Understanding Surveillance Today. Surveillance & Society 13(2): 139-152. http://www.surveillance-and-society.org
Any field of study, including that of surveillance, is obliged to review from time-to-time the main forcefields that shape the object of analysis. Today the internet is bound up with surveillance at many levels and thus deserves special attention. This section argues that the research direction for Surveillance Studies should be strongly inflected by issues of information and the internet. The kinds of surveillance that have developed over several decades are heavily dependent on the digital—and, increasingly, on what is now labelled Big Data—but also extend beyond it. As Greenwald indicates, the Snowden revelations raise as a key issue the future of the internet. While it is true that modern societies have been ‘information societies’—and thus ‘surveillance societies’—from their inception (Lyon 2005), today information and its central conduits have become an unprecedented arena of political struggle, centred on surveillance. This suggests that both analytically, in terms of research directions, and politically, in terms of practice and policy, the internet and surveillance are bound in a mutually-informing relation.

The use of internet for surveillance is not new but its scope has never been greater. For many, such as Greenwald and Snowden himself, this is a great betrayal of the initial wave of optimism about its democratic potential with which the internet was born. The hoped-for human benefit pre-dated the commercialization of the internet but versions of it were also woven-into many corporate aspirations in Silicon Valley and elsewhere from the 1990s onwards. Some popular and prescient writers such as Ithiel de Sola Pool (1983) foresaw the development of what we now call the internet, arguing that it was a key carrier of technological freedom. He insisted that free speech would become a vital issue. How regulation and access were organized would determine whether or not the new communications would enhance democracy as the political platform and the printing press had done before.

What happened to those utopian dreams of the ‘information revolution’ pundits of the 1980s? After all, they had correctly noted the emancipatory and democratizing possibilities offered by the new technologies. But Ithiel de Sola Pool and others of his ilk perhaps paid insufficient attention to the already-existing political economy informing information technologies—not to mention the over-arching cultural belief in the power of Technology. Together, they led to a failure to note that the new technologies might be deemed efficacious despite evidence to the contrary, and to see the flaws in the analysis that sees knowledge as a new and independent factor of production. Following Karl Polanyi (1944, 2001), one might think of informational knowledge as in fact a ‘fictitious commodity’ that has been cut off from its social origins in creative labour as an ‘independent’ form in expert systems or virtual services (Hayles 1999), integrated into an economic system of general commodification where profit is the bottom line, and is allocated through the market, where reciprocity or social justice have little or no say (Jessop 2007; also Schiller 1988). The commodification of the internet in 1995 was a critical moment in the more general development of information as a fictitious commodity.

However, De Sola Pool’s thirty-year-old comments on freedom of speech came home dramatically as documents were released by Snowden. By this time matters had become polarized. Right on the heels of the news about the NSA’s access to Verizon telephone subscriber data came the disclosures about the PRISM program that directly implicated major internet companies such as Microsoft, Yahoo!, Google and Facebook. Urgent exchanges occurred, some of which involved some puzzlement on the part of the companies: yes, they had parted with some data but the revelations seemed to suggest that far greater quantities were involved than they had themselves authorized. As it transpired, beyond the FISAauthorized access to data held by internet companies, the NSA had also found ways to intercept upstream in the data flow, using systems such as Muscular, developed by the NSA along with Five Eyes partner the UK GCHQ (Gellman and Soltani 2013).

As Steven Levy noted in a Wired article (Levy 2014), the Snowden ‘revelations’ exposed a “…seemingly irresolvable conflict. While Silicon Valley must be transparent in many regards, spy agencies operate under a cloak of obfuscation.”

Snowden’s findings shone a spotlight on an issue of which internet companies had been all too aware for some years. Companies such as Google, Yahoo! and Twitter had struggled to hold off government attempts, through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court, to oblige them to hand over customer data. To their credit, the companies seemed to have tried to ward off such efforts9 but the combination of government power and the fact that the companies also have government contracts compromised the struggle somewhat. PRISM focused the fight, but the secrecy surrounding the NSA has made it very difficult to know exactly what is happening. They are fighting in a fog. This also presents problems for those trying to research corporate-government surveillance relations.

The details of the ongoing controversies and battles may be found on various sites10 but the theme that unites them is surveillance and the future of the internet. This has several implications for analysis and action.

One important outcome is that those studying surveillance have come to realize that those researching communications have much to offer. From Oscar Gandy’s or Joseph Turow’s pioneering work in consumer surveillance to Mark Andrejevic’s or Alice Marwick’s explorations of online surveillance (Gandy 1993, 2012; Turow 2012; Andrejevic 2007, 2013; Marwick 2013), not to mention ongoing work on communications surveillance itself, the connections are clear. Those whose surveillance background is in criminology or public policy in particular may need to strengthen their analyses by examining more closely how the internet intersects with their understanding of surveillance. Equally, those grappling with questions about internet surveillance would do well to look at the literatures of surveillance—and of privacy—more broadly conceived (e.g. Raab and Goold 2011).

A second area is to explore further the analytical possibilities for considering information as a fictitious commodity. One could argue, for example, with the strong push towards so-called Big Data, that the severing of connections between information and its social roots is now even more pronounced. In N. Katherine Hayles’ analysis, information “loses its body” dating from the time of the 1950s Macey Conferences on communication theory onward. But I would argue that now so-called personal data progressively loses its ‘person’ (Lyon 2014a). When data gathered for commercial (marketing) purposes—which already stretch the links between data and individuals—are then resignified for security goals, quite new social and legal problems appear (Amoore 2014). All too often, inappropriate talk of ‘raw data’ gives the impression that they are harmless technical means of connecting the dots through algorithms. The practices and politics of algorithms are profound but scarcely explored (but see e.g. Kitchin 2014; Morozov 2013).

A third area of concern has to do with the politics of the internet in the era of ‘mass’ surveillance. In an obvious sense, this has been a key aspect of the Snowden controversies from the outset. Governments, including the US Administration, have been obliged to respond to the continuing debates over state power and its entwinement with commercial networks, especially internet companies (see e.g. Clarke et al. 2014). But the politics of internet surveillance is also a strong current running through the internet companies themselves—they have had to distance themselves from the NSA while at the same time acknowledging that they do cooperate extensively with government. Alongside these areas of turbulence is the active resistance of numerous NGOs who are engaged with both the civil liberties and privacy dimensions of mass surveillance and, again, the future of the internet itself. The new coalitions that have formed since Snowden, between EPIC, EFF and ACLU in the US, for instance, or under the banner of OpenMedia in Canada, are making waves in fresh ways and building creatively towards consensus on each new Snowden revelation. Could this be the more concerted response to surveillance that Colin Bennett concluded was still lacking when he published his 2008 book, The Privacy Advocates?

The future of the internet still hangs in the balance as the revelations about mass surveillance continue. As Ron Deibert indicates in Black Code (2013), broad issues of enclosure, secrecy and the arms race are all implicated here. And as Jonathan Zittrain (2009) reminds us, from a different standpoint, the internet has never had a golden age. The problems as well as the potential were built-in from the outset. Analysis of the spread of surveillance has never been more significant, from the threats to individual people to the consequences for war and peace, wealth and poverty, on a global level.

Framework – surveillance debates good

Debates with clash about surveillance are good—evaluating the range of opinions in surveillance literature inform us of our civil liberties as citizens

Lyon et al 12. (David, director of the Surveillance Studies Centre, Surveillance Research Chair, Professor Sociology and Law at Queen’s University. Kevin Haggerty, PhD, prof of Sociology at Alberta University specializing in surveillance studies. Kirstie Ball, PhD, professor of Organization concentrating in surveillance studies research at the Open University. Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies. Google Books. 2012.)//CB
Given that many surveillance studies scholars are alarmed by some of the more disquieting instances of surveillance, a major question concerns how citizens should respond to these developments, either individually or collectively. In surveillance studies this issue of praxis often revolves around debates about the continued relevance of official privacy regimes or data protection provisions. Although there is a wide spectrum of opinions on this topic, one can crudely break these down into those who have some faith in the existing privacy structures versus those who are suspicious or critical.

In legal terms, privacy—along with that of “data protection” in Europe especially—often seems the obvious category to wield in wars against rampant data-gathering (Reagan 1995; Bennett 1992). Advocates for a privacy approach tend to acknowledge that these regimes are limited by virtue of underfunding, scant powers of investigation and enforcement, broad exemption and outdated assumptions about the nature of privacy. At the same time, they stress that privacy discourses and structures remain the most promising avenue for restricting surveillance and point to instances where such measures have helped thwart egregious privacy violations (Bennett 2011, 2008).

At the other end of the continuum are those who tend to accentuate the limitations of privacy as both a concept and a regime. For them, proof of the failure of privacy structures is glaringly apparent in how a surveillance society has sprung up around us, notwithstanding a large and vibrant privacy bureaucracy. In essence, the unrelenting growth of intensive surveillance measures is presented as conclusive evidence that the privacy infrastructure has proven itself to be incapable of thwarting the expansion of surveillance. Scholars in this tradition tend to focus their research more on the mundane daily practices that individuals use to try and secure a private realm, such as closing blinds, shredding documents, purchasing anti-surveillance devices, or learning how to “hide in the light” (Gilliom 2001; Nippert-Eng 2010; Whitson and Haggerty 2008; Marx 2003).

Any resistance to surveillance ultimately depends upon an informed, motivated and engaged citizenry. This points to the fact that perhaps one of the greatest surprises in the field of surveillance studies has been the comparatively muted public response to developments in surveillance that seem to be self-evident threats to personal liberties. One wants to be careful here not to discount the vital efforts by anti-surveillance activists and concerned citizens, and some of the important anti-surveillance victories that they have won. At the same time, it is clear that by and large the public has enthusiastically or resignedly accepted such technologies, accepting claims that they are viable ways to secure profit, increase security, or simply as fun devices to play with (Ellerbrok, forthcoming). This muted public response, combined with a new willingness by individuals to hand over information on assorted social media applications, has challenged many assumptions that scholars have about citizen engagement and the politics of influence.

Public discussion on surveillance a pre-requisite to governmental transparency—spills up to policy solutions.

Kean and Hamilton 13. (Thomas, former Chairman of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Lee, member of the U.S. Homeland Security Advisory Council. “It's time to debate NSA program,” Politico. 7/23/13. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/07/its-time-to-debate-nsa-programs-94634.html)//CB

Every day, it seems, brings disturbing new revelations about the National Security Agency’s program to collect phone and email metadata, raising serious questions for our country. Reports indicate that the NSA is gathering metadata on millions of people in the United States and around the world, targeting diplomatic missions of both friends and foes.

The NSA’s metadata program was put into place with virtually no public debate, a worrisome precedent made worse by erecting unnecessary barriers to public understanding via denials and misleading statements from senior administration officials.

When the Congress and the courts work in secret; when massive amounts of data are collected from Americans and enterprises; when government’s power of intrusion into the lives of ordinary citizens, augmented by the awesome power of advanced technologies, is hugely expanded without public debate or discussion over seven years, then our sense of constitutional process and accountability is deeply offended.

Officials insist that the right balance has been struck between security and privacy. But how would we know, when all the decisions have been made in secret, with almost no oversight?

Much of this surveillance activity raises sharp questions: Is it necessary to collect and preserve this vast amount of data rather than pursue targeted individuals? Is the government using the least intrusive means to protect us? What are the rules for using metadata collected ostensibly for counterterrorism purposes in other contexts? Could more information about the program’s reach have been made available earlier? These and other vital questions must be debated in the open.

A fundamental duty of our government is to keep the country safe. Spying and surveillance are instruments of national power that have an important place in U.S. national security, as the threat of terrorism is real and lethal. It is not the surveillance program per se that is concerning; we agree that authorized and monitored surveillance is necessary. It is the sheer magnitude of the program and the lack of debate that worry us.

In the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, security officials were galvanized by the fear of another mass casualty attack. The pendulum swung in the direction of security over privacy, giving rise to the NSA surveillance program. The terror threat has evolved over the years. We need to examine these programs and determine whether their scope is necessary today.

When the government is exercising powers that may impinge on our rights, even when justified as measures essential for national security, we must be alert. Government, once granted authority, rarely relinquishes it and often expands it. Even if its actions are well intentioned, we must consider the precedent of expansive government power to be used 10, 20 or 50 years hence, when the justification may be less compelling than safeguarding lives.

The administration says the program is tightly controlled, but unilateral executive branch action and assurances are not sufficient; we need constitutional checks and balances. The extremely low rate of denial of warrant requests and the fact that in the hearings only the government’s side is presented are troubling. The public would benefit from a better, more detailed understanding of the judiciary process.

The Congress, the courts and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, which the 9/11 Commission recommended, each have critically important roles to play. This board is essential to balancing the impact of the government’s security measures in the aftermath of Sept. 11 with our civil liberties. It has taken a decade to get the board up and running. Now that the Senate has confirmed a chairman, it is time for the board to get to work in a transparent manner on this surveillance program.

We are stronger as a nation when we understand what the government is doing. This does not mean sharing sensitive intelligence with the public. A public debate poses challenges when it involves classified information that dribbles out, obfuscated by misinformation. But there is certainly far more we can discuss openly.

President Barack Obama has rightly called for a national discussion, which his administration and Congress should convene. It is unfortunate that this conversation begins only when an unauthorized leaker divulges secrets he has agreed, under penalty of law, to keep. But the issues are now before the public. It is time to trust the American people’s judgment about where to strike the balance between what is, after all, their security and their freedom.

There’s a lack of awareness and journalism on surveillance policy in the status quo—debate is a key forum for topic education.

Naughton 13. (John, professor of the public understanding of technology at the Open University. “Edward Snowden: public indifference is the real enemy in the NSA affair,” The Guardian. 10/19/2013. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/20/public-indifference-nsa-snowden-affair)//CB

One of the most disturbing aspects of the public response to Edward Snowden's revelations about the scale of governmental surveillance is how little public disquiet there appears to be about it. A recent YouGov poll, for example, asked respondents whether the British security services have too many or too few powers to carry out surveillance on ordinary people. Forty-two per cent said that they thought the balance was "about right" and a further 22% thought that the security services did not have enough powers. In another question, respondents were asked whether they thought Snowden's revelations were a good or a bad thing; 43% thought they were bad and only 35% thought they were good.

Writing in these pages a few weeks ago, Henry Porter expressed his own frustration at this public complacency. "Today, apparently," he wrote, "we are at ease with a system of near total intrusion that would have horrified every adult Briton 25 years ago. Back then, western spies acknowledged the importance of freedom by honouring the survivors of those networks; now, they spy on their own people. We have changed, that is obvious, and, to be honest, I wonder whether I, and others who care about privacy and freedom, have been left behind by societies that accept surveillance as a part of the sophisticated world we live in."

I share Henry's bafflement. At one point I thought that the level of public complacency about the revelations was a reflection simply of ignorance. After all, most people who use the internet and mobile phones have no idea about how any of this stuff works and so may be naive about the implications of state agencies being able to scoop up everybody's email metadata, call logs, click streams, friendship networks and so on.

But what is, in a way, more alarming is how relaxed many of my professional peers seem to be about it. Many of them are people who do understand how the stuff works. To them, Snowden's revelations probably just confirm what they had kind of suspected all along. And yet the discovery that in less than three decades our societies have achieved Orwellian levels of surveillance provokes, at most, a wry smile or a resigned shrug. And it is this level of passive acceptance that I find really scary.

What's even more alarming is that the one group of professionals who really ought to be alert to the danger are journalists. After all, these are the people who define news as "something that someone powerful does not want published", who pride themselves on "holding government to account" or sometimes, when they've had a few drinks, on "speaking truth to power". And yet, in their reactions to the rolling scoops published by the Guardian, the Washington Post, the New York Times and Der Spiegel, many of them seem to have succumbed either to a weird kind of spiteful envy, or to a desire to act as the unpaid stenographers to the security services and their political masters.

Framework – internet surveillance debate good

Debate is key to generate policy solutions and assert our agency in the face of imminent big data domination.

Tufekci 2014. – fellow at the Center for Information Technology Policy at Princeton University (Zeynep, “Engineering the public: Big data, surveillance and computational politics.” First Monday 19 (7). Accessed 22nd June 2015. http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/4901/4097)//RZ

On the surface, this century has ushered in new digital technologies that brought about new opportunities for participation and collective action by citizens. Social movements around the world, ranging from the Arab uprisings to the Occupy movement in the United States (Gitlin, 2012), have made use of these new technologies to organize dissent against existing local, national and global power [11]. Such effects are real and surely they are part of the story of the rise of the Internet. However, history of most technologies shows that those with power find ways to harness the power of new technologies and turn it into a means to further their own power (Spar, 2001). From the telegraph to the radio, the initial period of disruption was followed by a period of consolidation in which challengers were incorporated into transformed power structures, and disruption gave rise to entrenchment. There are reasons to think that the Internet’s trajectory may have some differences though there is little reason to think that it will escape all historical norms. The dynamics outlined in this paper for computational politics require access to expensive proprietary databases, often controlled by private platforms, and the equipment and expertise required to effectively use this data. At a minimum, this environment favors incumbents who already have troves of data, and favors entrenched and moneyed candidates within parties, as well as the data–rich among existing parties. The trends are clear. The selling of politicians — as if they were “products” — will become more expansive and improved, if more expensive. In this light, it is not a complete coincidence that the “chief data scientist” for the Obama 2012 campaign was previously employed by a supermarket to “maximize the efficiency of sales promotions.” And while the data advantage is held, for the moment, by the Democratic party in the United States, it will likely available to the highest bidder in future campaigns. A recent peek into public’s unease with algorithmic manipulation was afforded by the massive negative reaction to a study conducted by Facebook and Cornell which experimentally manipulated the emotional tenor of the hundreds of thousands of people’s newsfeed in an effort to see if emotional contagion could occur online (Kramer, et al., 2014). The authors stated their results “indicate that emotions expressed by others on Facebook influence our own emotions, constituting experimental evidence for massive–scale contagion via social networks.” While both the level of stimulus and the corresponding effect size were on the small side, the broad and negative reaction suggests that algorithmic manipulation generates discomfort exactly because it is opaque, powerful and possibly non–consensual (study authors pointed to the Facebook’s terms–of–service as indication of consent) in an environment of information asymmetry. The methods of computational politics will, and already are, also used in other spheres such as marketing, corporate campaigns, lobbying and more. The six dynamics outlined in this paper — availability of big data, shift to individual targeting, the potential and opacity of modeling, the rise of behavioral science in the service of persuasion, dynamic experimentation, and the growth of new power brokers on the Internet who control the data and algorithms — will affect many aspects of life in this century. More direct research, as well as critical and conceptual analysis, is crucial to increase both our understanding and awareness of this information environment, as well as to consider policy implications and responses. Similar to campaign finance laws, it may be that data use in elections needs regulatory oversight thanks to its effects on campaigning, governance and privacy. Starting an empirically informed, critical discussion of data politics now may be the first important step in asserting our agency with respect to big data that is generated by us and about us, but is increasingly being used at us.