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1.
1920-1936 Limited Engagement
Engagement of the Jewish militias by the British was limited in scope in this
period due to the limited and localized operations of the Haganah militia. British policy
vis-à-vis the Haganah militia is succinctly described by Winston Churchill who told
Chaim Weizmann, the leader of the Jewish Agency, in July 1921: “we don’t mind it, but
don’t speak of it.”
219
Until 1936, officials in Palestine were reluctant to recognize any
security element other than British security forces. The considered, but ultimately
abandoned, the idea of establishing a mixed defense force, concluding that it would lead
to civil war after they witnessed a number of clashes between Arabs and Haganah in May
1921.
220
In addition, the security situation was generally so calm in 1921, that the British
were able to drastically reduce the number of soldiers deployed to Palestine from 25,000
to 7,000 during the disturbances of 1921, and then to a garrison of 2,800 and one para-
military unit of British Gendarmerie by the end of the year. Control of the forces was
also transferred from the British War Office to the Air Ministry at that time. However,
by 1926 it had become clear that British defense forces had been reduced so much that
they could barely provide security for themselves, let alone the civilian population.
Reduced troop levels and continuing unwillingness of British decision-makers to
cooperate with Jewish militias led to a major outbreak of violence and instability of 1929.
Established after World War I from a group known as Hashomer (Watchmen), the
Haganah evolved as a defense force to protect Jewish settlements in Palestine. Prior to
218
Van Creveld, 60, 77. He also assumed the role as the Prime Minister of Israel that same day.
219
Bernard Wasserstein,
The British in Palestine: The Mandatory Government and the Arab-Jewish
Conflict 1917-1929
, Vol. 10 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1978), 136.
220
Wasserstein, 136-137.
74
the Arab uprising in 1929 the Haganah consisted of small unorganized pockets of local
civilians brought together with the intent of protecting their families and neighborhoods
in a relatively stable environment.
221
The Arab uprising of 1929 convinced the Jewish
Agency that it needed a more professional security force, since British security forces had
been unable to provide adequate protection to the Jewish settlements. At this time
Haganah quietly began acquiring military equipment and providing professional training
to its volunteers.
222
Ben-Gurion recounts how the Haganah evolved in the face of
security threats posed by local Arabs.
Unlike Hashomer, the Haganah was based not on professional watchmen
but on
volunteers
who trained intermittingly and were subject to less strict
discipline than was the case in Hashomer. The Haganah groups acted as
local defense forces when necessary, rather than as units subordinate to a
central authority. As Arab terror increased, the Haganah steadily
developed into a more centralized body, with a National Command
responsible for the coordination of defense needs on a countrywide
basis.
223
The British response to the initial transformation of the Haganah was slow, not
taking form until the second round of violence starting in 1936. From 1929 to 1936 the
British remained indecisive with how to engage the Haganah and continued to turn a
blind eye towards the formation, training and development of Jewish militias and their
need to protect their communities. Since the British were unwilling to engage the
Haganah, they were unaware that the creation of a more radical militia, the Irgun Beth,
that would later serve as the foundation for the Irgun after their formation in 1937. This
evidence suggests that more radical Jewish militias could have either been prevented or
marginalized if the British had taken a more active role with the engagement of Jewish
militias during this seven year period of Palestinian occupation.
221
Bernard Wasserstein,
The British in Palestine: The Mandatory Government and the Arab-Jewish
Conflict 1917-1929
, Vol. 10 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1978), 140.
222
Wasserstein, 159.
223
David Ben-Gurion,
Israel; A Personal History,
(New York: Funk & Wagnalls; distributed by T.
Y. Crowell Co, 1971), 62.
75
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