47
an opposition group to Saddam Hussein’s regime.
141
It is described by Beehner and the
Iraq Study Group as organized on sectarian lines and closely
tied to the main political
parties.
142
After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Badr Corps pledged to disarm its regional
militias. However, due to sustained violence, and the unwillingness by the Kurdish
Peshmerga to disarm, they have kept their arms but have pressed
to license their weapons
with the Iraqi government.
143
SCIRI’s current leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim is considered
one of the most influential figures in Iraq. He does not hold a position in the government,
but supports the current government and the coalition.
144
Paradoxically, the Badr Corps
supports the transition of Iraq even though their funding and training is occasionally
provided by Iran, the coalition’s regional nemesis.
145
Ironically,
this Tehran-based group
has maintained very good relations with the United States, as seen in a recent meeting
between U.S. President George Bush and SCIRI’s al-Hakim in late 2006.
146
The Badr
Corps supports the SCIRI’s quest for a separate, Shia-controlled region in the southern
141
Kenneth Katzman,
Iran’s Influence in Iraq
(Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service,
2006), 2-3. The Badr Corps history dates back to the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war. Early members
of the Badr
Corps were Iraqi Shia defectors and captured soldiers supported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.
The Badr Corps is the second largest militia in Iraq. Estimates of membership in the Corps (also known as
the Badr brigade, the Badr Reconstruction Corps, and the Badr organization) range from 10,000 to 20,000.
The Badr Corps has a large presence in the British occupied areas of southern Iraq.
142
Beehner,
Iraq: Militia Groups,
2.
143
Katzman,
Iran’s Influence in Iraq,
2.
144
“Bush Meets Iraqi
Shia Leader,” in Al Jazeera [database online]. Saudi Arabia December 4, 2006
[cited 2007]. Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/639A15E7-470E-4A37-9F72-
3DB19724A296.htm (accessed May 1, 2007).
145
Cole,
The United States and Shi ‘ite Religious Factions in Post-Ba ‘thist Iraq,
544. Current U.S.
diplomatic policy refuses to acknowledge Iran for reasons that would require analysis beyond the scope of
this thesis.
It must be noted, however that a portion of the four million dollars the U.S. distributed to
Ahmed Chalabi was intended to support the Iraqi National Congress, which was composed of SCIRI (based
then in Tehran) and two moderate Shia political groups. The Badr Corps has experienced its share of
violence and mistrust resulting in retaliation and the refusal to lay down their arms. On August 29, 2004,
their influential moderate leader, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim,
was among the SCIRI members
killed by a truck bomb in An Najaf. The death of al-Hakim and approximately one hundred others created
a massive backlash against coalition forces for failing to maintain stability. This led to a collusion of
convenience between the Badr Corps and the Mahdi Militia, both calling for immediate coalition
withdrawal.
146
Aljazeera.net,
Bush Meets Iraqi Shia Leader,
2; “President Bush Meets with His Eminence Abdul-
Aziz al Hakim, Leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq,” in Office of the Press
Secretary [database online].
Washington, D.C. December 4, 2006 [cited 2007]. Available from
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/12/20061204-7.html. (accessed May 1, 2007).