Monitory policy in Germany Bundsbank and great inflation

1979-1983
Just prior to 1979, macroeconomics conditions in West Germany were more favorite than in the U.S. Output growth was roughly similar. While the inflation rate was still stubbornly high by West German Standards, it was well below the U.S. inflation rate. Fortunes were reversed, however, in the eight years after.
The first oil shock and the subsequent shift in U.S. monetary policy ushered in a return to tight money. The Bundesbank was committed to avoiding (what it viewed as) its earlier mistake of largely accommodating the increase in oil prices during 1973 and 1974 (Tsatoronis, 1993). In addition, the sharp rise in U.S. interest rates precipitated a sharp and steady depreciation of the mark relative to the dollar that lasted 1985.
The Bundesbank responded to these events by rising the day-to-day rate from about 3 percent in 1979 to about 12 percent in the first quarter of 1981. In terms of basis points, this increase was similar in magnitude to the rise in the U.S. funds over same period. Ex post real rates rose sharply, as they did in the U.S.
From the period of peak inflation to the beginning of 1983, the contraction in real activity in West Germany was of similar magnitude to that in the U.S. On the other hand, the drop in inflation over the same time interval was far more dramatic in the U.S. At the start of the period, the U.S. inflation rate was nearly double that in West Germany. By the end, it was roughly equal. These correspond closely to Ball’s (1994) observation that the sacrifice ration in German actually exceeds its counterpart for the U.S.
Many have found this outcome is surprising. Underlying this view is the belief that the Bundesbank’s reputation for fighting inflation should have made the transition to lower inflation for fighting inflation should have made the transition to lower inflation less painful in this country relative to other countries at the time. This in turn raise the possibility that the practical gains from establishing credibility in fighting inflation may not be substantial. Full resolving this issue is well beyond the scope of this paper, though we return to the matter later.
For the time being, we simply note two considerations. First, the sacrifice ratio could be highly nonlinear in practice, something for which the Ball calculation does not allow. This could resolve at least some of the differences in the U.S. and West German experience.
Second, and somewhat related, at the beginning of 1979, the public % of the Bundesbank commitment to reduce inflation below the 5 to 6 % range may have been more ambiguous than it is today. As we have discussed, the Bundesbank pursed a relatively lax monetary policy in the roughly four years prior to the shift to tightening. Again, we return to this issue later.