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CHAPTER 2 – HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
60 
remained inclined to preserve as much of Sèvres as possible, provided the Greeks 
could preserve it.
108
The result on 2 December 1920 was a declaration expressing 
painful surprise, deploring the possible return of Constantine and reserving complete 
liberty of action, if this happened. At a practical level further financial assistance to 
Greece would be withheld, if Constantine returned, which he duly did to local 
acclaim about a fortnight later.
109
Combining the preservation of Sèvres with the 
weakening of its supposed enforcer was not a sustainable policy and so before 
January 1921 was out a conference was convened for the following month in London 
to consider revisions; to this the nationalists were also invited
110
. 
Between 9 and 11 January 1921, meanwhile, the nationalists had prevailed over a 
Greek probing attack in what was to become known as the first battle of İnönü. This 
was not a major engagement and İsmet was actually intending to retreat when he 
perceived that the Greeks had started to do the same
111
. Nonetheless the effect on 
nationalist morale of the first forced Greek retreat was significant and may have 
hastened the vote a few days later on the Law of Fundamental Organisation which 
gave a constitutional form to the resistance movement
112
. The Greeks, surprisingly, 
were not commensurately disheartened by this reverse, which they preferred to 
attribute to the limited aims and preparations of their own rather than the growing 
strength of their enemy. 
108
Llewellyn Smith 162-165 
109
Llewellyn Smith 166, 169 
110
Mango, 306 
111
Gawrych, 136-138 
112
Gawrych, 138; Mango, 300 

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CHAPTER 2 – HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
61 
The Greeks, accordingly, came to London on 21 February in an uncompromising 
mood declaring that they were in a position to sweep all before them and rejecting 
with the accompaniment of a fiery and unanimous resolution of parliament a 
proposal, conditionally accepted by the nationalist representative, for another 
commission of enquiry into the ethnic composition of Eastern Thrace and the 
Smyrna zone. A subsequently elaborated compromise for a semi-autonomous 
Smyrna zone was conditionally accepted by the Greeks and rejected by the 
nationalists. The conference thus ended on 21 March in a failure to conciliate the 
nationalists with the Greeks, who made it clear that they were bent on resolving the 
issues by military action
113
; for this course they believed, not baselessly, that they 
had the support of Lloyd George
114
. The occasion of the conference, nonetheless 
permitted developments, welcome to the nationalists and ominous for the Greeks, in 
the form of settlements between the former and the French and Italians. Although the 
settlement terms were shortly to be rejected by the assembly in Ankara, they pointed 
the way to definitive settlements that were to be agreed later in the year. In the short 
term they pushed the Greeks into immediate action by fear of the prospective 
diversion of men and materials from the front facing the French to the front facing 
themselves
115
. 
A Greek offensive, of which the nationalists had been forewarned, promptly began 
on 23 March and ended unsuccessfully with retreat to the opening positions by 14 
April. The major engagement, which began on 26 March and involved five days of 
113
Llewellyn Smith, 189-197 
114
Note especially Llewellyn Smith 193-194. 
115
Llewellyn Smith 194; Mango, 309 

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