The Lucifer Effect
it myself. I remember being in that shipping container in Mosul. You know, I'd
been with a guy [an interrogated prisoner] all night long. And you just feel so iso-
lated, and morally isolated, that you felt like you could do whatever you want to
this guy, and maybe you even want to."
This young interrogator, who must live the rest of his life with the knowledge
of the evil he did as part of his service to his country, describes how violence has
a way of escalating, of feeding upon itself.
Lagouranis: "You just kept wanting to push and push and push, and see how
far you could go. And it seems like that's just part of human nature. I mean, I'm
sure you've read studies conducted in American prisons where you put a group of
people in charge of another group of people, and give them control over them,
and pretty soon it turns into cruelty and torture, you know? So it's pretty com-
mon." [Can we assume that he is referring to the prison at Stanford University? If
so, the SPE has assumed an urban-myth status as a "real prison."]
The need for strong leadership to curtail abuse is essential:
Lagouranis: "And I saw it [cruelty and abuse] in every detention facility I went
to. If there wasn't really strong, strong leadership that said, 'We're not going to
tolerate a b u s e , ' . . . in every facility there would have been abuse. And even among
people like the MPs who aren't trying to get intel—they just do it because it's
something people do there, if they're not controlled either inwardly or from
above."
After seeing even worse cases of "abuse coming out of the Force Recon
Marines in North Babel," Lagouranis couldn't take it anymore. He began writing
reports about the abuses, documenting them with photos of the wounds and
sworn prisoner statements, and then sent all this information through the Marine
chain of command. How were his charges received? As with the complaints that
Chip Frederick raised to his superiors about the dysfunctional conditions at Abu
Ghraib, no one in the Marine command responded to the complaints of this inter-
rogator.
5 5
Lagouranis: "Nobody ever came to look at that stuff; no one ever came to talk
to me about it. I just felt like I was sending these abuse reports to nowhere. And no
one was investigating them, or they had no way to investigate them, or maybe no
desire." [Such official silence adds its fecal touch to all dissent.]
Perhaps a reason for higher-ups failing to respond to this young interroga-
tor's pleas for help and redress in dealing with his assignment was the uncer-
tainty and conflict going on at top agency levels. There were disagreements about
just how far "torture" should be allowed to go in coercive interrogations.
The FBI clashed with the CIA over what it considered wrongheaded ways of
dealing with suspects, especially "high-value" ones. One such critical report of
CIA tactics is found in an FBI memo:
To FBIHQ. I entered interview rooms to find a detainee chained hand and
foot in the fetal position to the floor, with no chair, food, or water. Most
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