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1.
Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 556.
2.
Ibid
: Vol. 2, p. 555.
3.
Kazima was on the northern coast of the Kuwait Bay, as shown on Map 11, 5 miles
from the present Basra-Kuwait road. It was a fairly large city, over a mile in diameter, of
which nothing remains but some castle-like ruins on a tongue of land jutting into the sea.
These ruins may, however, be of a later period than Khalid's. No trace remains of Hufair
nor is there any local tradition regarding its location. According to Ibn Rusta (p. 180) it
was 18 miles from Basra on the road to Madinah. Since the old Arab mile was a little
longer than the current mile, I place it at present-day Rumaila, which is 21 miles from old
Basra. (Some later writers have confused this Hufair with Hafar-ul-Batin, which is in
Arabia, 120 miles south-west of Kazima.)
Page 3
Having written to Hormuz from Yamamah, Khalid knew that the Persian would expect
him to advance on the direct route from Yamamah to Uballa, via Kazima, and would
make his defensive plans accordingly. Khalid decided not to move on that route, but to
approach Uballa from the south-west so that he would be free to manoeuvre on two axes-
the Kazima axis and the Hufair axis-thus creating a difficult problem for the less mobile
Persians. With this design in mind he marched to, Nibbaj, dividing his army into three
groups as already explained, and took under command the 2,000 warriors of Muthanna,
who, along with their intrepid chief, were awaiting Khalid at Nibbaj.
1
From Nibbaj he
marched in the direction of Hufair, picking up the other three chiefs on the way, and
approached Hufair with 18,000 men.
Khalid was not in the least worried about the presence of the Persian Army at Kazima.
Hormuz at Kazima posed no threat to Khalid, for the Persians could not venture into the
desert to disrupt his communications, apart from the fact that a mobile force like Khalid's
operating in the desert did not present particularly vulnerable lines of communication.
Khalid made no attempt to rush through Hufair and make for Uballa, because with
Hormuz's large army on his flank his forward movement beyond Hufair might spell
serious trouble. Hormuz could fall upon his rear and cut his line of retreat. No Arab
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would ever accept interference, or even a threat of interference, with his route back into
the friendly, safe desert where he alone was master. Hence Khalid waited in front of
Hufair, while light detachments of his cavalry kept Hormuz under observation. He knew,
that his presence near Hufair would cause near-panic in the mind of Hormuz.
This is just what happened. The moment Hormuz got word of Khalid's movement
towards Hufair, he realised the grave danger in which his army was placed. The Arab was
not so simple after all! As an experienced strategist, he knew that his base was
threatened. He immediately ordered a move to Hufair, 50 miles away, and his army,
weighed down with its heavy equipment, trudged along the track. The two days' march
was tiring, but the tough and disciplined Persian soldier accepted his trials without
complaint. On arrival at Hufair, however, Hormuz found no trace of Khalid. Expecting
the Muslims to arrive soon, he deployed for battle as he had done at Kazima, chains and
all; but hardly had his men taken up their positions when his scouts came rushing to
inform him that Khalid was moving towards Kazima!
And Khalid was indeed moving towards Kazima. He had waited near, Hufair until he
heard of the hurried approach of Hormuz. Then he had withdrawn a short distance and
begun a counter-march through the desert towards Kazima, not going too far into the
desert so as not to become invisible to Persian scouts. Khalid was in no hurry. His men
were well mounted, and he took his time. He had no desire to get to Kazima first and
occupy it, for then he would have to position himself for battle and his opponent would
be free to manoeuvre. Khalid preferred to let the Persians position themselves while he
himself remained free to approach and attack as he liked, with the desert behind him.
The Persians again packed their bags and set off for Kazima, for Hormuz could not leave
the Kazima route to the Muslims. Hormuz could have fought a defensive battle closer to
Uballa; but having experienced the terrible havoc wrought by Muthanna in his district, he
was in no mood to let Khalid approach close enough to let his raiders loose in the fertile
region of Uballa. He was determined to fight and destroy Khalid at a safe distance from
the district which it was his duty to protect, and he rejoiced at the prospect of a set-piece
battle against the desert Arabs. Moreover, armies act as magnets: they attract each other.
Sometimes an area which is not otherwise strategically important becomes so through the
presence of a hostile army. Now Hormuz was drawn to Kazima not only by the
strategical importance of the place but also by the army of Khalid.
This time the forced march did not go down so well with the Persians and there was
grumbling, especially amongst the Arab auxiliaries serving under Hormuz, who cursed
the Persian for all the trouble that he was causing them. The Persians arrived at Kazima
in a state of exhaustion. Hormuz, the professional regular soldier, wasted no time and at
once deployed the army for battle in the normal formation of a centre and wings. The
generals commanding his wings were Qubaz and Anushjan. The men again linked
themselves with chains. (For a graphic illustration of march and counter-march see Map
12 below.)
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