Japan and the International Economic Institutions

Conclusions
Japan may well be the prime beneficiary of the liberal postwar economic order. Yet its ability to influence that order has been constrained by US dominance, lingering suspicion of Japan in the rest of Asia, and Japan's own internal politics. However, Asia has been shaken by its experience during the financial crisis. Among other things, this has led to a reappraisal of its relationship with the US government and the Washington-based multilateral economic institutions. There is a sense of disappointment in both the aspects of Washington, and this, together with US initiatives that are likely to encounter opposition in Asia, has created an unprecedented opportunity for Japanese diplomacy. This opening could be widened by an economic slowdown and an accompanying rise in protectionism in the United States.36
In such an environment, it would be understandable if Asians intensified efforts at regional cooperation as an alternative, either as a complement to, or a substitute for, multilateral cooperation. Yet Japan's ability to lead such an effort is uncertain. Ironically, one of the reasons that the United States is so influential in setting the agenda in Asia is that collectively, the Asian economies remain dependent on the US market as the ultimate destination of a significant part of their output, even if this dependence could be expected to lessen over time (Noland, 1994). If Japan wants to wield more influence in the region, it will have to learn to import more, and establish better political and economic relations throughout the region, most importantly with China, the region's second largest economy.37
Such an effort, in turn, is impeded by lingering distrust of Japan in the region, especially in China. For its part, Japan remains understandably wary of China, particularly in light of its authoritarian political system. The kind of political exigencies that fueled the rapprochement between France and Germany after the Second World War appear to be missing in Asia, and will continue to hamper regional cooperation, at least in the medium run.
Surmounting these obstacles is a hard task. From a Japanese perspective, remaining under the US security umbrella, continuing to export to the United States, and maintaining a focus on the WTO-centered global trade system is a path of less resistance. There is no guarantee that Japan will continue along in this manner, but it would take major domestic and international political and military changes to move Japan onto a significantly different trajectory.