Th e I r a n i z a t i o n o f I s l a m
47
Since raiding was a vital component of the Arab economy, the uni-
fication of the Arab tribes forced them to extend their forays beyond
the peninsula. In this they were spectacularly successful, thanks to their
fighting skills and sense of common purpose. The fact that the Byzantine
and Sasanian empires had been weakened through long wars against
each other as well as by their own internal struggles surely helped the
Arab cause, as did the fact that defeated troops often defected to them.
Because the Arabs’
motives were largely economic, they focused
their energies on conquering established trade routes and commer-
cial centers. The empire they built was initially an urban one; the
Islamization of the countryside took centuries. When entering a town,
the Arabs’ first act was generally to appoint their own supervisor of the
central market (Pers.
bazaar
), which was the heart of urban activity
and the principal source of revenue for the state. All business transac-
tions were henceforth supposed to follow Islamic norms. This favored
Muslim businessmen and served as motivation for non-Muslim mer-
chants to convert.
An additional factor aiding the Arabs’
success was that the inhabi-
tants of many towns—especially in Syria and Mesopotamia—welcomed
them without a struggle. This is not so hard to understand as these
lands were inhabited mainly by Semitic peoples, akin to the Arabs, who
had been subjected to more than a thousand years of abuses by Persians
and Greeks. The taxes levied by the Arabs were less onerous than those
extracted by their predecessors, at least at first, and the Arabs did not
interfere with local affairs as long as their sovereignty was acknowl-
edged. There was little attempt to impose Arab culture—including
their religion—during this early period.
On the contrary, it was the
Arabs who were increasingly overwhelmed by pressure from their sub-
jects to allow them to join the ruling class, which they accomplished
by becoming clients (Ar.
mawali
) of Arab patrons and accepting their
new religion.
The attempt by Iranian bureaucrats and businessmen to preserve
their positions by insinuating themselves into the new hierarchy was met
with suspicion by many among the Arab elites. The Umayyad Caliph
Mu‘awiyah wrote in a letter to his governor in Iraq: “Be watchful of
Iranian Muslims and never treat them as equals of Arabs. . . . As far as
possible they are to be given lesser pensions and lowly jobs.”
2
Although they
mistrusted their new subjects, the Arabs’ policy
of not reinventing the wheel when it came to administering their new
empire was base on pragmatism. They had no experience in running
a large, unified state and wisely contented themselves with allowing
I r a n i n Wo r l d H i s t o r y
48
things to continue as before provided their nominal overlordship was
respected. In Syria, where the ruling Umayyad family established their
imperial capital at Damascus, the prior Byzantine administration was
left largely intact. (In fact, later Muslim
writers criticize the Arab
Umayyads for quickly lapsing into decadent Roman lifestyles.) Within
the former Sasanian Empire the same held true, and Iranian institu-
tions remained for the most part untouched. Syrian and Persian offi-
cials could hold onto their jobs by finding Arab patrons, with whom
they cemented ties by marrying each other’s daughters, attending the
mosque together, and entering into business partnerships.
Both the merchant and artisanal classes, which had been relegated
to the lowest status in Sasanian society—lower
even than farmers, since
cultivation is seen as a beneficent activity in Zoroastrianism—were rel-
atively quick to seek integration into the new order. Within a matter of
decades, so many non-Arabs had taken on Arab patronage that they
came to outnumber the Arabs themselves. (This demographic shift
within the Muslim community probably occurred early in the eighth
century.) The emerging majority of non-Arab client/converts, the
mawali
, were resentful that their reliance on the ongoing support of
their patrons made them second-class citizens.
Furthermore, historic rivalries and inequalities persisted among the
Arab clans themselves. A small number of Arab families were favored
by the Umayyad government with plum jobs and business deals, while
others, less fortunate, got sent off to staff lonely garrisons in remote
provinces. Since the Qur’an differentiates
among humans only in regard
to the sincerity of their faith, not only
mawali
converts but large num-
bers of marginalized Arabs as well came to see Umayyad despotism as
fundamentally un-Islamic. The collective dissatisfaction of these dis-
possessed groups grew into a mass movement that ultimately changed
the course of Islamic history forever.
For anyone disaffected by Umayyad rule, a potent rallying force
was the emerging but still unformed ideology of Shi‘ism. This belief
emerged from the conviction that Muhammad’s chosen successor, his
cousin Ali who was also married to Muhammad’s daughter Fatima,
had been unjustly deprived of the caliphate following the Prophet’s
death; the Umayyads were therefore usurpers. (The term “Shi‘ism”
derives from
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