C H A P T E R
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Portfolio Performance Evaluation
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of portfolios
P and
Q remains unclear in the sense that the value of the timing success and
selectivity failure of Q compared with P has yet to be evaluated. The important point for
performance evaluation, however, is that expanded regressions can capture many of the
effects of portfolio composition change that would confound the more conventional mean-
variance measures.
The Potential Value of Market Timing
Suppose we define perfect market timing as the ability to tell (with certainty) at the begin-
ning of each year whether the S&P 500 portfolio will outperform the strategy of rolling
over 1-month T-bills throughout the year. Accordingly, at the beginning of each year, the
market timer shifts all funds into either cash equivalents (T-bills) or equities (the all U.S.
stock portfolio), whichever is predicted to do better. Beginning with $1 on January 1, 1927,
how would the perfect timer end an 86-year experiment on December 31, 2012, in com-
parison with investors who kept their funds in either equity or T-bills for the entire period?
Table 24.4 , columns 1–3, presents summary statistics for each of the three passive strat-
egies, computed from the historical annual returns of bills and equities. From the returns
on stocks and bills, we calculate wealth indexes of the all-bills and all-equity investments
and show terminal values for these investors at the end of 2012. The return for the perfect
timer in each year is the maximum of the return on stocks and the return on bills.
The first row in Table 24.4 tells all. The terminal value of investing $1 in bills over the
86 years (1927–2012) is $20, while the terminal value of the same initial investment in
equities is about $2,652. We saw a similar pattern for a 25-year investment in Chapter 5;
the much larger terminal values (and difference between them) when extending the hori-
zon from 25 to 86 years is just another manifestation of the power of compounding. We
argued in Chapter 5 that as impressive as the difference in terminal values is, it is best
interpreted as no more than fair compensation for the risk borne by equity investors.
Notice that the standard deviation of the all-equity investor was a hefty 20.39%. This is
also why the geometric average of stocks for the period is “only” 9.60%, compared with
the arithmetic average of 11.63%. (The difference between the two averages increases
with volatility.)
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