t h e s u b j e c t s o f i n t e r nat i o na l l aw
199
situations may very well vary. What is clear, however, is that the relevant
framework revolves essentially around territorial effectiveness.
The existence of a permanent population
13
is naturally required and
there is no specification of a minimum number of inhabitants, as examples
such as Nauru and Tuvalu
14
demonstrate. However, one of the issues raised
by the Falkland Islands conflict does relate to the question of an acceptable
minimum with regard to self-determination issues,
15
and it may be that
the matter needs further clarification as there exists a number of small
islands awaiting decolonisation.
16
The need for a defined territory focuses upon the requirement for a
particular territorial base upon which to operate. However, there is no
necessity in international law for defined and settled boundaries. A state
may be recognised as a legal person even though it is involved in a dispute
with its neighbours as to the precise demarcation of its frontiers, so long
as there is a consistent band of territory which is undeniably controlled by
the government of the alleged state. For this reason at least, therefore, the
‘State of Palestine’ declared in November 1988 at a conference in Algiers
cannot be regarded as a valid state. The Palestinian organisations did not
control any part of the territory they claim.
17
Albania prior to the First World War was recognised by many countries
even though its borders were in dispute.
18
More recently, Israel has been
accepted by the majority of nations as well as the United Nations as a
valid state despite the fact that its frontiers have not been finally settled
13
A nomadic population might not thus count for the purposes of territorial sovereignty,
although the International Court in the
Western Sahara
case, ICJ Reports, 1975, pp. 12,
63–5; 59 ILR, pp. 30, 80–2, held that nomadic peoples did have certain rights with regard
to the land they traversed.
14
Populations of some 12,000 and 10,000 respectively: see
Whitaker’s Almanack
, London,
2003, pp. 1010 and 1089.
15
See below, p. 251.
16
But see, as regards artificial islands,
United States
v.
Ray
51 ILR, p. 225;
Chierici and Rosa
v.
Ministry of the Merchant Navy and Harbour Office of Rimini
71 ILR, p. 283, and
Re Duchy
of Sealand
80 ILR, p. 683.
17
See
Keesing’s Record of World Events
, p. 36438 (1989). See also General Assembly reso-
lution 43/77; R. Lapidoth and K. Calvo-Goller, ‘Les ´El´ements Constitutifs de l’ ´Etat et la
D´eclaration du Conseil National Palestinien du 15 Novembre 1988’, AFDI, 1992, p. 777;
J. Crawford, ‘The Creation of the State of Palestine: Too Much Too Soon?’, 1 EJIL, 1990,
p. 307, and Crawford, ‘Israel (1948–1949) and Palestine (1998–1999): Two Studies in
the Creation of States’ in
The Reality of International Law
(eds. G. Goodwin-Gill and S.
Talmon), Oxford, 1999, p. 95. See below, p. 246, with regard to the evolution of Palestinian
autonomy in the light of the Israel–Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) Declaration
on Principles.
18
See e.g. the
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