International congress of byzantine studies belgrade, 22 27 august 2016

Nike Κoutrakou
Independent scholar, External collaborator, Institute of Historical Research /
National Hellenic Research Foundation, Athens, Greece; 
[e-mail]
Managing the Other Face of Byzantine War: 
Was there a Mode of Presenting and Accepting Defeat?
A 10
th
century Byzantine historian, depicting the Arab-Byzantine military conflict of the 
previous century, presented a Byzantine general advising the emperor on the subject of the outcome 
of a battle. The speaker pointed out to his suzerain that the outcome of a battle could be either a 
happy one or an unlucky one, that is, either victory or defeat. Only by trusting in God could anyone 
look forward to victory.
The above scene reveals a Byzantine, indeed a medieval perception concerning the expectation 
of victory. In other words, not only that, as per medieval mentality, victory depended on God’s Will, 
but also that its opposite, defeat, was equally possible. In the event of such a defeat, the Byzantine 
government and its proponents by oral and written means (imperial administration, court rhetoric, 
historiography, and literature in general), had to manage its consequences both in practical terms 
and in terms of impact on the population’s courage and spirit. They had to justify it, in order to 
minimize the impact of such an occurrence on the public opinion.
Starting with several relevant scenes from Byzantine sources, this paper will examine another 
aspect of Byzantine warfare, namely defeat, and how it was managed, both militarily and politically. 
Without avoiding comparisons with previous and later centuries, it will, nevertheless, mostly focus 
on the 11
th
-12
th
centuries, a period severely marked by the reversal of Byzantine fortunes in war. It 
will examine the wording as well as the way in which Byzantine writers presented defeat and try to 
establish a relevant typology. Obviously, their choice of words, often explaining or even justifying 
defeat, usually depended on the writers’ avowed or implied political affiliation. Victories of enemies 
could be presented as unexpected if not illogical. However, the study of words as, for instance, 
indicating shame in defeat (αἰσχρῶς ἡττήθη) or inexperience in battle and strategies (ἀτέχνως) as 
cause of defeat and, more so, attributing defeat to the workings of fate, (βασκανία) might imply a 
certain mentality that prevailed during the period under discussion (and not only that).
Furthermore, the paper will endeavour to answer some relevant questions such as, for instance: 
was a strategic defeat even envisaged? In case of defeat, what part of the justification provided was 
due to tradition (as for example giving credit for victory to the emperor while, in case of defeat, 
blaming solely the commander of the army or the unfortunate general who suffered it) and what 
part was due to a more general acceptance of an objectively observed fated reversal of fortunes? The 
relevant wording might provide a hint as to an attempt to “manage” defeat for military or political 
gain, or, in later times, indicate a defeatist change in mentality.

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