Turkey in the mediterranean during the interwar era

In the process, power at home gradually but decisively shifted in favor of President Mustafa Kemal and his allies. They consolidated their hold in power by successfully implementing a series of legislative measures that turned the army and navy into loyal institutions of the new Republican regime. First, serving military officers were barred from engaging in politics. Until 1924, officers in uniform could be elected as deputies and take part in the TBMM's activities. During and in the immediate aftermath of the War of Independence, this was an acceptable practice. After 1924, the officers were compelled to make a definitive choice between their uniforms and seats in the Parliament. Moreover, around the time when the Caliphate was abolished, the Ministry of War headed by the Chief of Staff was abolished and replaced by a civilian-led Ministry of National Defense. Similarly, the General Staff was placed on a purely military footing. These measures arguably excluded the Turkish military nominally from politics. It is doubtful, at best, if the ultimate objective was to detach military from politics or to ensure its loyalty to President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Republic.¹³⁷ This institutional reshuffling reinforced authority of Field Marshal Fevzi Çakmak as the Chief of Staff over the army. Field Marshal remained a loyal ally of President and therefore could be counted upon against the political opposition. He had already chosen his uniform over his seat in the TBMM.

In contrast, the two generals in opposition, Kazım Karabekir and Ali Fuat Cebesoy decided to retain their seats. Consequently, they were asked to relinquish their commands before resuming their positions in the TBMM. Both resigned in October 1924. This was a clear political victory for President Mustafa Kemal. Later, İsmet İnönü wrote that it marked a decisive turn of events that showed unequivocally who was in charge of the Turkish army.¹³⁸

In the power struggle, the loyalty of the army and navy turned into vital issues. In this regard, the army enjoyed a higher standing than the navy, at least in the beginning. The army's republican credentials were almost a foregone conclusion. The War of Independence experience in a way enabled the Ottoman army officer corps to acquire Republican credentials. The new regime's hold around the army was further strengthened by the large-scale purge of officers who did not see action in the War of Independence. Consequently, the veterans of the War of Independence accounted for the majority in the army's ranks.¹³⁹

In contrast to the army officer corps, the navy officers did or could not go through a comparable wholesale experience of transformation or conversion for a number of reasons. The first reason was closely related to the nature of the struggle. The Turkish War of Independence of 1919-1922 was overwhelmingly a land war in which naval operations had peripheral influence at best.¹⁴⁰ Consequently, only junior- ranking naval officers could find the opportunity to see action either in army units as infantry officers or with the small clandestine fleet that Turkish nationalists operated in the Black Sea to smuggle arms to the nationalist forces. Many senior-ranking naval officers either chose or were ordered to remain in İstanbul, then the homeport of the Ottoman navy.¹⁴¹

Another reason for navy's questionable loyalty and dependability lay in personality of the unofficial leader of political opposition. Hüseyin Rauf Orbay was a retired naval captain and a former Ottoman Minister of Marine. He was legend in his own right due to his command of the cruiser Hamidiye during the Balkan Wars. Moreover, he signed the Mudros Armistice in 1918 that formally ended hostilities between the Ottomans and the Entente powers. A year later, in 1919, he fled İstanbul to join the ranks of Turkish nationalists in Ankara. Then, he returned to İstanbul to serve as a deputy in the last Ottoman Assembly. Subsequently, the British exiled him to Malta in 1920 for his pro-nationalist stand in the Assembly. When finally released, he went to Ankara to serve as the Minister of Public Works and then as Prime Minister until 1923.¹⁴²

The bluntest and strongest expressions of navy's questionable loyalty can be found in published accounts of President Mustafa Kemal's voyage on board Hamidiye in the Black Sea in September 1924.¹⁴³ These accounts indicate the extent of the ruling elite's doubts about the navy and Rauf Orbay’s influence on the naval officer corps. Aware of such doubts the commanding officer of the cruiser and his staff decided to remove Rauf Orbay’s photograph from the officers' quarter before Mustafa Kemal arrived on board ship, as the former legendary commander of the Hamidiye had turned into an opponent of Mustafa Kemal.¹⁴⁴ Some members of his entourage boldly questioned if the navy was more inclined to associate itself with Rauf Orbay than Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Many junior officers on board Hamidiye flatly rejected such identification and vocally dissociated themselves from Rauf Orbay and other "old generation" officers.¹⁴⁵

Finally, a bill introduced to the TBMM by the political opposition probably played into the ruling elites' suspicions of the navy's loyalty in 1924. The bill was about reinvigoration of the Ministry of Marine. The origins of this government post can be traced back to 1867.¹⁴⁶ Neither in the course of the Turkish War of Independence nor in the early Republican era there was any major naval activity that would justify institution of a ministry of marine. The bill for its reinstitution was tabled by a close associate of Rauf Orbay, a retired navy officer, Captain Ali Rıza. He was a former Chief of Staff of the Ottoman Ministry of Marine.¹⁴⁷ His introduction of the bill to the agenda of National Defense Commission coincided with the abolition of the Caliphate in March 1924. Around that time, the TBMM also approved funds for the reconditioning of the naval units inherited from the Ottoman Navy. The best-known among them was the battlecruiser Yavuz Sultan Selim (formerly SMS Goeben). The prospects for naval rejuvenation, symbolized by reconditioning of the Yavuz Sultan Selim, had already unleashed a campaign by the press in Istanbul. They called on the government in Ankara to reinstitute the Ministry of Marine. The scale of the task in hand, it was argued, required supervision of a politically empowered and accountable office. Captain Ali Rıza was probably motivated to capitalize on this renewed navalism at large when he made his proposal. Nevertheless, his proposal failed to attract sufficient political support and was left to hibernate by the National Defense Commission.¹⁴⁸

Turning to the navy, the purge had affected particularly the senior-ranking officers in the navy. Practically, the navy was relegated to a service staffed mostly by junior officers. However, it is difficult to argue that the elimination of politically unreliable senior ranks had enhanced the navy's republican credentials at once. In December 1924, Captain Ali Rıza’s earlier proposal for a Ministry of Marine found a new lease on life. The chain of political events suggests a link between its revival and the formation of Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası as the opposition party.¹⁴⁹ Members of the opposition party were also convinced of such linkage. They understandably questioned the sudden change of heart in the ranks of the Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası about the Ministry of Marine. The latter had regarded it as redundant a few months previously. The debates on the revived bill basically revolved around the issue of an independent naval general staff for the Ministry of Marine. The opposition party deputies were not against the idea of a Ministry of Marine per se. However, they saw a naval general staff crucial for securing the independence of the Ministry.

On the other hand, the Ministry itself could take away a portion of Chief of Staff Field Marshal Çakmak's authority over military matters. An independent naval general staff for the Ministry would surely compromise his exclusive authority. For the ruling political elite, therefore, the Ministry of Marine without an independent naval general staff was the best option to consolidate political control over the navy without alienating a key ally such as Marshal Çakmak. In the end, the proposal was adopted and the Ministry of Marine was instituted as a government post with the votes of the ruling Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası. The opposition party deputies, including Rauf Orbay himself, voted against the institution of the Ministry of Marine because it was not allowed to operate with its own naval general staff.¹⁵⁰

Ali İhsan [Eryavuz] was appointed the first Minister of Marine of the Republic. He was retired artillery major, a former İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Union and Progress Party) hardliner. He also figured prominently as an outspoken critic of Rauf Orbay.¹⁵¹ After the War of Independence, he became an ardent supporter of President Mustafa Kemal. He was among the most vocal members of the ruling Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası in the TBMM. His appointment lends further credence to the claim that the Ministry was devised to consolidate political control over the armed forces and to eliminate Rauf Orbay's influence over the navy.¹⁵²

This organizational change served the overall objective of political control of armed services well. It also marked an institutional gain for the navy, though marginal, against the army-dominated General Staff in the inter-service rivalry. Chief of General Staff Field Marshal Fevzi Çakmak was an advocate of unity of command in the armed services and scorned the idea of an independent Ministry of Marine, even with significantly crippled powers. At any rate, the Ministry provided the Navy with a semblance (or a false sense) of parity with the Army. In reality, the General Staff retained its key military decision-maker status in strategy and procurement issues.

Inaugurating a Republican Diplomatic Service
The Ottoman past stood as both an asset and a liability for the fledgling Republican diplomacy. It was an asset because the republican regime inherited a relatively established physical capacity in the form of diplomatic and consular missions scattered throughout Europe, America and Asia. Moreover, as the Ottomans had been long time players of in the European game of diplomacy, the republican diplomatic services could build on their wealth of experience and knowledge. ¹⁵³ On the other hand, too much association with the Ottoman past might also have worked against the republic's aspirations for a clean slate at home and internationally. The early republican elite, hence, had to strike a balance between various elements of continuity and change from the Ottoman era. Moreover, they had to adjust themselves to the loss of territory, population and the attendant decline in international status.

In the very beginning, the Turkish nationalists were even unsure of how to identify the government post and minister in charge of foreign affairs. Although, the post was named Ministry of Foreign Affairs in May 1920 by law, the term "Department des Affairs Etrangères" was also used in foreign correspondence. Moreover, its head was initially referred to as "Commissaire du Peuple aux Affairs Etrangères." The choice of such a title was obviously inspired by the Soviet practice.¹⁵⁴ However, it could be mistaken as a manifestation of Turkish nationalists' desire to emulate the Soviets' initial rejection of conventional diplomacy. Obviously, Turkish nationalists made a pragmatic and probably well-calculated choice. The first Foreign Minister or Commissar appointed by the TBMM, Bekir Sami [Kundun], was sent to Moscow to seek Soviet support only a week after his appointment.¹⁵⁵ Considered in light of Turkish nationalists' other overtures to the Soviets, it gave rise to the short-lived "illusion that [Mustafa] Kemal was in some way a Soviet stooge or fellow traveler... in official circles In London." ¹⁵⁶

Bekir Sami and a few others who replaced him in quick succession can be considered interim foreign ministers. Among foreign ministers with very short tenures, İsmet İnönü figures prominently. In addition to assuming the ministerial post, he headed the Turkish delegation at the Lausanne Conference. It is argued that his appointment to both posts reflected Mustafa Kemal's personal choice and was even carried out against the will of the then Prime Minister Hüseyin Rauf [Orbay].¹⁵⁷ A soldier-turned-diplomat, İnönü, firmly and stubbornly asserted Turkey's sovereign equality and refused to be treated as the representative of a defeated power in protracted negotiations.¹⁵⁸ Indeed, Davison's conclusion regarding similarities between republican and imperial diplomatic styles was probably motivated by İnönü's diplomatic performance at that conference.¹⁵⁹ With the Treaty of Lausanne signed subsequently in 1924, the Republic of Turkey became the first defeated nation to have succeeded in revising an international treaty for post-war settlement. This was the payoff for the national struggle. However, in the process, the new regime in Ankara acquired the image of a revisionist power as well. The ongoing dispute with London over oil-rich Mosul only worked to reinforce it.

As an interim foreign minister, İsmet İnönü was instrumental in setting off the transformation of Ottoman diplomatic service into a republican one. A week before the official inauguration of the Lausanne Conference, İnönü took a decision that turned the Nationalists' Representation Office in Paris into a nerve center for the former Ottoman diplomatic and consular missions abroad. They were instructed to report directly to this office. This move practically meant the nationalist takeover of the existing Ottoman diplomatic network. Moreover, İsmet İnönü deliberately addressed his instructions to the second or third in command at such missions rather than the mission heads. It was a diplomatic coup. Therefore, the process of transformation of Ottoman diplomatic corps had been set in train a few years before the transformation of military and naval officer corps.

The question of reliability of Ottoman diplomats had been raised even before the First World War. For instance, after his tour of European capitals in 1914, Kazım Karabekir concluded that the foreign spouses of Ottoman ambassadors in Europe compromised seriously diplomatic secrets of the Empire.¹⁶⁰ After the War of Independence, the Ottoman diplomats who were regarded as loyal to the old regime were purged from the diplomatic corps.¹⁶¹ Bilal Şimşir argues that the first phase in diplomatic services' transformation drew to a close by the large-scale purge of diplomats from the ranks.¹⁶² Personal accounts of those who were purged from the diplomatic service suggest, on the other hand, that the process continued until the end of the decade.¹⁶³

The level of seniority or rank obviously played a role in determining who would be purged or retained. The senior diplomats were largely laid off, whereas majority of junior ranking Ottoman diplomats could keep their commissions. At any rate, about one-third of the first ambassadors of the republic would come from among former Ottoman diplomats who survived the post-Lausanne purge. With very few exceptions, these were mostly low-ranking diplomats at the time of liquidation of the Ottoman diplomatic service. The remaining two-thirds were recruited from among the ranks of committed nationalists.¹⁶⁴ Some of those externally or politically appointed ambassadors are regarded to have gone through hands-on diplomatic training at the Lausanne Conference. Şimşir argues that the hard bargaining and protracted negotiations with the great powers at Lausanne served as a real life school of diplomacy for those inexperienced and untrained in the art.¹⁶⁵ Therefore, this view suggests a lasting influence of the Lausanne experience on the early Turkish diplomatic thinking. Hence, at the beginning the republican diplomatic corps was more like a mix that was composed of the survivors of the Ottoman school and the Lausanne school diplomats.

On the other hand, Ankara did not need to be so selective in taking over the entire physical infrastructure or the diplomatic premises of the Ottoman Empire as the successor state. This can be taken as an aspect of continuity between the Ottoman and Republican diplomacy. However, on the side of change, the most profound issue was the new regime's choice of Ankara as its capital and diplomatic center over the Empire's seat of government in İstanbul. The loss of international status had already triggered a discussion on the future status of some foreign diplomatic missions in Turkey.¹⁶⁶ London, for instance, had considered downgrading its diplomatic mission from the rank of embassy to a legation in 1921. The idea was subsequently shelved as it was assumed that İstanbul would remain the seat of the Caliphate.¹⁶⁷ In 1924, the Caliphate was abolished and the diplomatic center of gravity began to shift from İstanbul to Ankara, to the dismay of most foreign powers. Many of them dragged their feet in relocating their diplomatic missions to the new capital until the early 1930s. The consequent exodus of diplomatic missions to Ankara progressed nearly in step with gradual recognition of Turkey's viability as a new state.¹⁶⁸

Lastly, it should be added that the era of interim foreign ministers drew to a close with the appointment of Dr. Tevfik Rüştü Aras in 1925. He served uninterruptedly until President Atatürk's death in 1938. As Mustafa Kemal was a foreign policy president, Aras proved to be a reliable agent and looked to the President rather than the government for guidance and instructions in foreign policy. Consequently, President Atatürk wielded enormous influence on the formulation of foreign policy. Tevfik Rüştü Aras was a key to implementing the choices and preferences of the president in foreign policy. Therefore, Atatürk was the ultimate arbiter in early republican foreign policy-making although his authority was occasionally moderated by other strong figures as such Field-Marshal Çakmak.¹⁶⁹Shortly after Tevfik Rüştü Aras' appointment, Turkey's international isolation was deepened partly by choice. The Mosul issue reminded the Turkish political leaders that they could be pitted against a coalition of great powers any time. Such prospects in turn exacerbated the Turkish fears of European great powers and their threat to Turkey’s independence and territorial integrity.¹⁷⁰ Above all, the way in which the League handled the Mosul issue left a deep imprint in the minds of Turkish leaders. It confirmed their conviction that this new organization was conceived as a new tool of great power domination rather than a framework for international cooperation among like-minded states of lesser degrees.Drawing attention to the link between the Mosul debacle and the Turkish view of the League of Nations, Güçlü argues that “[if the League of Nations had not been dragged into the Mosul question, it is probable that Turkey would have become a League member immediately on signing the Treaty of Lausanne.”¹⁷¹ Until 1926, Ankara showed significant interest in the League-sponsored and affiliated activities and meetings. For instance, Turkish delegates were sent to the League-sponsored disarmament conferences. Moreover, upon the League’s invitation, an Association of League of Nations was founded in Istanbul with the approval of the Nationalist government in Ankara in 1922. The Turkish delegates attended all meetings of the League of Nations Union between 1922 and 1925. After the League’s Mosul decision, the Turkish Association League of Nations withdrew from the Union and was subsequently disbanded.¹⁷²

After 1926, probably a seat in the League Council would have helped change the Turkish mind about the League of Nations membership.¹⁷³ Indeed, some members such as Yugoslavia urged Ankara to join the League of Nations as soon as possible. Pointing Spain’s enhanced international status through participation in the League of Nations, Yugoslav Delegate at Geneva, [Nihic] suggested to Turkish diplomat Hüseyin Ragıp [Bayur] that the benefits of the membership would exceed its costs for Turkey as well. Moreover, Ankara had to join the League before the end of 1926 so that it could get elected to one of the seats in the League Council.¹⁷⁴ The reserved Turkish attitude would begin to shift only in the early 1930s.¹⁷⁵ Even then, representation in the Council remained a consideration for Ankara.¹⁷⁶

3. TURKEY’S SECURITY DILEMMA: BUILDING A NAVY:

The early interwar years remained a true self-help environment for Turkey as the new regime had to count on its own means for security. Consequently, Turkey’s efforts to arm itself to ensure its own security initially reinforced its image as an outcast bound to challenge the post-war order in Europe. In the Turkish defense policy, air power enjoyed a distinct popularity. The army, on the other hand, maintained war-time troop levels, even after the end of the hostilities in 1924. The navy came third after the air force and the army as an instrument of national defence, but it drew more international attention than the other two services. Despite their modest scope, Turkish naval plans seemed to defy the international naval disarmament, which had gathered momentum after the Treaty of Washington in 1922. Moreover, other international outcasts or dissatisfied powers, such as Germany, the Soviet Union and Italy, figured prominently as suppliers of arms to Turkey. This pattern of arms trading emerged for a number of reasons. Part of it was related to the resilience of old links or influences. It was also due to the reluctance of other suppliers to subsidize or open credit lines for arms sales to foreign powers like Turkey.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to argue that the old links or influences featured the same degree of resilience for every traditional supplier of arms to Turkey (to the Ottoman Empire, to be precise). Britain was a case in point. Understandably, the British government had no interest whatsoever in funding or subsidizing arms for others while it was seeking ways of curbing arms expenditure at home. Moreover, London had been championing worldwide naval arms limitations, at least rhetorically. As a corollary to the foregoing, Turkey’s growing appetite particularly for naval arms seemed to contradict the enthusiasm for international disarmament which was initially focused on navies. Consequently, Turkish naval revival had to take place against an extremely unsuitable international diplomatic and naval background.

International Constraints: Naval Disarmament
In discussing international disarmament, a distinction has to be made between the attitudes of public and the government. In the 1920s, the idea of disarmament captured the popular imagination in some countries. To start with, there was strong popular sentiment in the United States that supported international disarmament. This sentiment was shared by the American press. In Britain, public sentiments and press interest in disarmament were not of a comparable degree,¹⁷⁷ although it was the public demand for ending conscription that compelled the British government to take up the issue of German and general disarmament as envisaged under the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations.¹⁷⁸

Disarmament efforts were not confined to the navies. Indeed, German disarmament under the Treaty of Versailles was supposed to be only the first step taken in the direction of a general international disarmament. The French advocated German disarmament although they were not interested in a general disarmament at all, despite both Wilson’s Fourth Point and the League Covenant’s Article 8 suggesting this was so.¹⁷⁹ The League debate on general disarmament led to the establishment of a Preparatory Commission in September 1925. It immediately became the main venue for a discussion of general disarmament, particularly in the absence of political will on the part of the major powers. However, this evident lack of political will did not end or kill the pursuit of the issue. The Preparatory Commission gradually created its own momentum as a result of the emergence of a spirit of camaraderie and an interest in finding acceptable compromises among the experts who worked on the specialized committees.¹⁸⁰