Introduction to Geopolitics

American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy
,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
An in-depth and accessible discussion of US foreign policy decisions since the end of the
Cold War. The book provides a wealth of information that may be interpreted within
Modelski’s model, or used to evaluate the model.
Modelski, G. (1987) 
Long Cycles in World Politics
, Seattle, WA: University of Washington
Press.
The research manuscript that details the model used in this chapter and the historic data
used to make the case.
Taylor, P.J. (1990) 
Britain and the Cold War: 1945 as Geopolitical Transition
, London:
Pinter Publishers.
Uses Wallerstein’s world-systems framework to provide an accessible discussion of how
Great Britain, a geopolitical actor, made foreign policy choices within the geopolitical
context at the end of World War II.
Wallerstein, I. (2003) 
The Decline of American Power
, New York: The New Press.
The “world-systems” take on the trajectory of the United States.
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In this chapter we will:
■
introduce the concept of geopolitical codes;
■
define the component parts of geopolitical codes;
■
outline how geopolitical codes operate at different geographic scales;
■
interpret the changing geopolitical codes of the US within Modelski’s
model;
■
show that geopolitical actors other than countries also construct
geopolitical codes by using the example of al-Qaeda.
At the very outset of talk of war upon Iraq in 2003, there was little doubt that Great
Britain would be the United States’ most active and loyal ally. This was not a matter
of force. Tony Blair’s government certainly had the choice to play a minor role in the
conflict, or even try to use diplomacy to challenge President Bush’s plan. Yet somehow
it was “understood” that Great Britain would give political and military aid to its estab-
lished ally. Tony Blair’s decision illustrates the features of the geopolitical actions of
countries that we will discuss in this chapter: a country may choose to make particular
foreign policy decisions, these choices are limited to varying degrees, and a partial influ-
ence on the choices made is the history of allegiances and conflicts.
The previous chapter provided a means to understand the global geopolitical context.
The goal of this chapter is to focus upon countries as geopolitical agents: the manner
in which they make decisions within the global context. We continue the themes of
geographic scale and structure and agency to interpret how countries make foreign policy
decisions within regional and global contexts.
Geopolitical codes
The manner in which a country orientates itself toward the world is called a geopolitical
code. Each country in the world defines its geopolitical code, consisting of five main
calculations:
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GEOPOLITICAL CODES:
AGENTS DEFINE THEIR
GEOPOLITICAL OPTIONS
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(a) who are our current and potential allies
(b) who are our current and potential enemies
(c) how can we maintain our allies and nurture potential allies
(d) how can we counter our current enemies and emerging threats
(e) how do we justify the four calculations above to our public, and to the
global community
(Taylor and Flint, 2000, p. 62)
For example, Great Britain has defined its primary allies within the transatlantic and
trans-European institutions of NATO and the EU. Furthermore, it has tried to retain
influence across the globe through the establishment of the Commonwealth, made up
of ex-British colonies. The latter has had mixed success, for example the expulsion of
Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth for its brutal campaign against white farmers in the
face of strong criticism from Britain. The identification of enemies is also dynamic.
Almost overnight, as the Soviet Union became Russia, it quickly changed from
intractable enemy to an ally.
Attempts to maintain allies take a number of forms (Figure 3.1, for example).
Economic ties are one chief plank. The EU evolved out of relatively modest beginnings
to integrate the economies of France and Germany to cultivate a peaceful Europe after
the brutality of the two world wars. Cultural exchange is also another vehicle for main-
taining or nurturing peace. Educational scholarships such as the Rhodes, Fulbright, and
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Figure 3.1
US troops in Kosovo.

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Goethe fellowships encourage international understanding and long-term ties. Business
organizations such as the Rotary Club are also aimed at establishing linkages. The choice
of “good-will” visits for incoming presidents and prime ministers is indicative of which
international relationships are deemed most worthy of attention (Henrikson, 2005). For
example, it is a tradition that the incoming US president meets with his Mexican coun-
terpart at an early date.
Military connections are also seen as a means to maintain international cooperation.
NATO is perhaps the strongest case, in which it is determined that an attack upon one
member is considered an attack upon all. Another means of connecting with allies is
the sale of military equipment that is expected to tie the, normally, weaker buyer to the
more powerful seller. However, there is no guarantee of subservience. Weapons supplied
to Iraq during its war with Iran were subsequently seen as threats by the sellers, the
United States and Great Britain. Less overt, are the relationships fostered by military
training (see Box 3.1).
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Box 3.1 Power and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst
The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, the British Army’s officer training school,
has graduated officers from across the globe since the nineteenth century, and
3,500 Overseas Office Cadets have graduated since 1947, their website claims.
The goal of cementing geopolitical relationships with the military and political
elite of other countries is made quite explicit in the Academy’s literature.
Many overseas cadets have gone on to have distinguished careers in their
own country. Some have become Head of State or head of government. But
whatever their career paths, they have that brotherhood [despite the same
webpage promoting its training of women officers] and sense of comrade-
ship in arms built on the common experience of Sandhurst. The friendships
that are forged here are important in peace and, increasingly, in conflict.
Multi-national operations today draw in more countries than ever before.
There are in training today sixty-six Overseas Officer Cadets from twenty-
eight different countries. During the past five years the first cadets have
come from Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Ukraine. Who will be next?
To be Sandhurst trained is to join a club with world-wide membership.
(“Overseas Cadets” Royal Military Academy Sandhurst,
www.atra.mod.uk/rmas/courses/overseas.htm—accessed 1/14/05)
The Academy’s website at www.atra.mod.uk/atra/rmas/ makes interesting reading,
and is useful in exploring different types or expressions of power. What form 
of power can you discern from the text and images? Think especially of the
Gramscian and feminist definitions of power from Chapter 1. To answer this
question, think about what norms and values the website promotes.

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Means to counter enemies are also varied. A once dominant but now, seemingly,
outdated ingredient of the United States’, Soviet Union’s, and Great Britain’s geo-
political codes during the Cold War was appropriately named MAD, for mutually
assured destruction. Nuclear capability was strong enough to annihilate enemies many
times over. Of course, most of this weaponry remains. The belief was that as destruc-
tion was assured, no one would dare start a nuclear war and “peace” would reign. At
the other end of the spectrum is diplomacy; negotiations between governments to, at the
least, prevent hostilities and, at best, nurture more friendly relations.
Sanctions are a common non-military means to force enemies to comply with ones
wishes. An international campaign of sanctions and boycotts put pressure upon the 
South African government to end its apartheid policies. More recently, Iraq was targeted
in a failed attempt to force Saddam Hussein to allow full inspection of his arsenal.
Sanctions are often criticized for making the population suffer through lack of food 
or medical supplies rather than the politicians who formulate the policies in question.
Countries can also change their opinion on the efficacy of sanctions; the British govern-
ment under Margaret Thatcher disparaged the use of sanctions against apartheid 
South Africa, the governments of John Major and Tony Blair were strong advocates of
sanctions against Iraq.
The fifth element of a country’s geopolitical code (see Figure 3.2 and Box 3.2, for
examples) should not be underestimated. The definition of an enemy, especially when
it entails a call to arms, is something that can destabilize a government and lead to its
fall. For example, in March 2004 Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar was defeated
at the polls in the wake of his support for the United States invasion of Iraq. Tony Blair
expended political capital making arguments that support for President George W.
Bush’s War on Terrorism, and especially the invasion of Iraq, was essential for British
security. In addition, intensifying the EU in the name of European peace and prosperity
has proved equally exhausting for British governments.
Representational geopolitics is the essence of the fifth element of a geopolitical code.
If enemies are to be fought, the basis of the animosity must be clear, and the necessity
of the horrors of warfare must be justified. Enemies are portrayed as “barbaric” or 
“evil,” their politics “irrational” in the sense that they do not see the value of one’s 
own political position, and their stance “intractable,” meaning that war is the only
recourse. As we will see in the next chapter, these representations are tailored for the
immediate situation, but are based upon stories deposited in national myths that are
easily accessible to the general public.
Scales of geopolitical codes
Every country has a geopolitical code. For many countries their main, if not sole, concern
is with their immediate neighbors: are they friends or enemies, is increased trade 
or imminent invasion the issue? But some countries profess to develop a regional
geopolitical code in which they have influence beyond their immediate neighbors.
China’s calculations toward expanding influence in Southeast Asia are a good example,
as is Egypt’s role within the Arab world (Taylor and Flint, 2000, pp. 91–102).
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Finally, some countries purport to have global geopolitical codes. The world leaders
we identified in the previous chapter are the primary agents in this role. A challenge to
their authority anywhere on the globe requires a response, for their legitimacy is based
upon their global reach (Flint and Falah, 2004). On the other hand, world leadership
requires world “follow-ship.” Much diplomatic energy is spent to make sure countries
are “on-board” the world leader’s agenda. Any attempt by another country to create a
global geopolitical code is interpreted as a challenge to the world leader. The influence
of the Soviet Union within Africa, the Caribbean, Middle East, and Asia during the Cold
War is an historical example of how combat was part of two competing global
geopolitical codes (Halliday, 1983).
Though we can distinguish the power and influence of a country through designating
its geopolitical code as local, regional, or global, it is false to separate local geopolitical
codes from the global geopolitical context. Though the range of geopolitical calcula-
tions may be local, the influence of the global geopolitical context remains. For example,
Hungary’s decision to join NATO involved calculations about ethnic Hungarians in
neighboring countries, and a future threat from Russia, but was still framed within the
global authority and agenda of the United States (Oas, 2005). Hungary saw the changes
in the global geopolitical context, as the world leader exercised its authority in Europe
with the collapse of the Soviet Union, as an opportunity to advance its own security.
The same idea can be applied to the way the “stans,” the republics of Central Asia, have
utilized the War on Terrorism to obtain military aid from the US.
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Figure 3.2
British World War II propaganda poster.

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Box 3.2 “Mapping the Global Future”: the definition 
of threat
In January 2005, the National Intelligence Council, a group of “analysts” who
synthesize “expert” advice and report to the head of the CIA, released a report
entitled “Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council’s
2020 Report.” This report is not a geopolitical code in itself, as it provides
scenarios based on “intelligence” rather than policy itself. However, it provides a
basis of authority, the type of power that is viewed critically from Gramscian 
and feminist perspectives, which will likely underlie the revision of the US’s
existing code.
The report is notable for its emphasis upon economic change, especially the
growth of China and India and the implications for trade and oil consumption. As
a result, perhaps we may see a return to the construction of Asia as an economic
threat to US power that was predominate in the 1990s. Furthermore, terrorism
inspired by Islamic fundamentalism is identified as a continuing threat. The US
remains the dominant superpower, according to the report, but its influence is
partially diminished as European integration solidifies and the voice of other coun-
tries in international institutions increases. Instability in the Middle East, Sub-
Saharan Africa, and Latin America is also raised as a concern.
Perhaps as interesting as the predictions the report contained was the manner
in which they were presented. The report received a lot of attention in the US
press, with syndicated reports appearing in local newspapers. Particularly striking
was the use of fictional scenarios within the report to give it urgency and acces-
sibility. Two such scenarios were a fictional text conversation between two arms
dealers and the fictional diary of the UN Secretary-General in 2020, which refers
to horrific terrorist attacks in Europe in 2010 inspiring the Europeans to enthusi-
astically back the US War on Terrorism.
Though these scenarios are within the realms of possibility, their sophisticated
artistic representation blurs the boundaries between fiction, entertainment, and
objective analysis. The scenarios may drive policy, whether a series of large
terrorist attacks occurs in Europe or not. In this document, the means of repre-
sentation and the identification of the threat are blurred into a fictional presentation
of potential threats and enemies.
The report is accessible at www.cia.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020_s2.html.
Reading the report allows for the consideration of many of the concepts we 
have discussed so far. How can this document be interpreted within Modelski’s
(1987) model? In what way does this report exemplify a focus on particular 
power relations and agents that feminists would criticize? From a Gramscian
perspective, what is “taken for granted” in this report and what are the impli-
cations? Is the representation of the report’s findings successful in justifying 
its content?

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A do-it-yourself case study: decoding the geopolitics of 
Central Asia
During the Cold War period and prior to its break-up the Caspian Sea basin and Central
Asia were firmly under the geopolitical control of the Soviet Union. However, the past
couple of decades have witnessed related changes that now make this region an arena
of geopolitical contestation (O’Lear, 2004). Oil and gas reserves in the Caspian Sea
basin are viewed as essential components of world trade, especially as economic growth
in China and India drive-up global demand (Figure 3.3). Yet, the size and accessibility
of the reserves are disputed. Moreover, there is much geopolitical dispute over pipeline
routes to transport the products through the politically volatile Trans-Caucasus region
consisting of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; the battle being over whether a route
favoring European or Russian control is built (a geopolitical concern brought to the
general public’s attention via the James Bond movie