likely to work on him again.
We became telephone buddies, sometimes spending hours on the phone
together over several days. After all, we shared similar interests: Neill loved
finding security bugs, and I loved using them. He told me that the Finnish
National Police had contacted him about my hacking into Nokia. He offered
to teach me some of his clever bug-hunting techniques, though not until I
acquired a better understanding of the “internals” of VMS—that is, the
inner workings of the operating system, the details of what was “under the
hood.” He said I had spent too much time hacking
into stuff instead of
educating myself on the internals. Amazingly, he even gave me some
exercises to work on, to learn more about this, and then he went over my
efforts and critiqued them. The VMS bug hunter training the hacker—how
ironic was that?
Later, I would intercept an email that I suspected Neill had sent to the FBI.
It read:
Kathleen,
There was only one match in the mail log from nyx:
Sep 18 23:25:49 nyxsendmail[15975]: AA15975: message-id=
<00984B0F.85F46A00.9@hicom.lut.ac.uk>
Sep
18
23:25:50
nyxsendmail[15975]:
AA15975:
from=
, size=67370, class=0
Sep
18
23:26:12
nyxsendmail[16068]:
AA15975:
to=
, delay=00:01:15, stat=Sent
Hope this helps
This log showed the dates and times when I was sending emails from
my account on Hicom to one of the accounts I had on a public-access
system in Denver called “nyx.” And who was the “Kathleen” the message
was addressed to? I figured there was a 99 percent likelihood it was, once
again, Special Agent Kathleen Carson.
The email message was clear evidence that Neill had been working with
the FBI. I wasn’t surprised; after all, I had drawn first blood and gone after
him, so maybe I deserved it. I had enjoyed our conversations and picking
his brain; it was disappointing to learn that he had just been playing along
in the hope that he might be able to help the Feds nail me. Even though I
had always exercised precautions when calling him, I decided it would be
best
to cut off all contact, to avoid giving the FBI any more leads.
In a criminal prosecution, as you probably know,
the government is
required to share its evidence with the defendant. Among the documents
later turned over to me was one that revealed both the extent of Neill’s
cooperation and its importance to the FBI. When I first read a copy of this
letter, I was surprised.
U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation
11000 Wilshire Boulevard #1700
Los Angeles, CA 90014
September 22, 1994
Mr.
Neill Clift
Loughborough University
Dear Neill:
It must be quite frustrating to sit over there and wonder if the FBI
or British law enforcement authorities are ever going to do anything
and catch our “friend,” KDM. I can only
assure you that every little
piece of information concerning Kevin which finds its way into my
hands is aggressively pursued.
In fact, I just verified the information you provided…. It certainly
appears this computer system has been accessed and compromised by
Kevin. Our dilemma, however, is that the “NYX” system administrator
is not as helpful to law enforcement as you have been; and we are
somewhat limited in our pursuit of
watching the account by the
American legal procedures.
I wanted to let you know in this letter how much your cooperation
with the FBI has been appreciated. Any telephonic contact made to
you by Kevin is very important—at least to me.
… I can report that you (and only you) are the one concrete
connection we have to Kevin outside the world of computers.
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