Virgin and Child, Sassoferrato, Il (Giovanni Battista Salvi) (1609–85), Musee Bonnat, Bayonne, France ©
Bridgeman Images.
One study conducted at the Rabin Medical Center in Tel Aviv showed that the
memory of labour reflected mainly the peak and end points, while the overall
duration had almost no impact at all.
16
In another research project, 2,428
Swedish women were asked to recount their memories of labour two months
after giving birth. Ninety per cent reported that the experience was either
positive or very positive. They didn’t necessarily forget the pain – 28.5 per cent
described it as the worst pain imaginable – yet it did not prevent them from
evaluating the experience as positive. The narrating self goes over our
experiences with a sharp pair of scissors and a thick black marker. It censors at
least some moments of horror, and files in the archive a story with a happy
ending.
17
Most of our critical life choices – of partners, careers, residences and holidays
– are taken by our narrating self. Suppose you can choose between two
potential holidays. You can go to Jamestown, Virginia, and visit the historic
colonial town where the first English settlement on mainland North America was
founded in 1607. Alternatively, you can realise your number one dream
vacation, whether it is trekking in Alaska, sunbathing in Florida or having an
unbridled bacchanalia of sex, drugs and gambling in Las Vegas. But there is a
caveat: if you choose your dream vacation, then just before you board the plane
home, you must take a pill which will wipe out all your memories of that vacation.
What happened in Vegas will forever remain in Vegas. Which holiday would you
choose? Most people would opt for colonial Jamestown, because most people
give their credit card to the narrating self, which cares only about stories and
has zero interest in even the most mind-blowing experiences if it cannot
remember them.
Truth be told, the experiencing self and the narrating self are not completely
separate entities but are closely intertwined. The narrating self uses our
experiences as important (but not exclusive) raw materials for its stories. These
stories, in turn, shape what the experiencing self actually feels. We experience
hunger differently when we fast on Ramadan, when we fast in preparation for a
medical examination, and when we don’t eat because we have no money. The
different meanings ascribed to our hunger by the narrating self create very
different actual experiences.
Furthermore, the experiencing self is often strong enough to sabotage the
best-laid plans of the narrating self. For example, I can make a New Year
resolution to start a diet and go to the gym every day. Such grand decisions are
the monopoly of the narrating self. But the following week when it’s gym time,
the experiencing self takes over. I don’t feel like going to the gym, and instead I
order pizza, sit on the sofa and turn on the TV.
Nevertheless, most people identify with their narrating self. When they say ‘I’,
they mean the story in their head, not the stream of experiences they undergo.
We identify with the inner system that takes the crazy chaos of life and spins out
of it seemingly logical and consistent yarns. It doesn’t matter that the plot is full
of lies and lacunas, and that it is rewritten again and again, so that today’s story
flatly contradicts yesterday’s; the important thing is that we always retain the
feeling that we have a single unchanging identity from birth to death (and
perhaps even beyond the grave). This gives rise to the questionable liberal
belief that I am an individual, and that I possess a consistent and clear inner
voice, which provides meaning for the entire universe.
18
The Meaning of Life
The narrating self is the star of Jorge Luis Borges’s story ‘A Problem’.
19
The
story deals with Don Quixote, the eponymous hero of Miguel Cervantes’s
famous novel. Don Quixote creates for himself an imaginary world in which he is
a legendary champion going forth to fight giants and save Lady Dulcinea del
Toboso. In reality, Don Quixote is Alonso Quixano, an elderly country
gentleman; the noble Dulcinea is an uncouth farm girl from a nearby village; and
the giants are windmills. What would happen, wonders Borges, if out of his
belief in these fantasies, Don Quixote attacks and kills a real person? Borges
asks a fundamental question about the human condition: what happens when
the yarns spun by our narrating self cause great harm to ourselves or those
around us? There are three main possibilities, says Borges.
One option is that nothing much happens. Don Quixote will not be bothered at
all by killing a real man. His delusions are so overpowering that he could not tell
the difference between this incident and his imaginary duel with the windmill
giants. Another option is that once he takes a real life, Don Quixote will be so
horrified that he will be shaken out of his delusions. This is akin to a young
recruit who goes to war believing that it is good to die for one’s country, only to
be completely disillusioned by the realities of warfare.
And there is a third option, much more complex and profound. As long as he
fought imaginary giants, Don Quixote was just play-acting, but once he actually
kills somebody, he will cling to his fantasies for all he is worth, because they are
the only thing giving meaning to his terrible crime. Paradoxically, the more
sacrifices we make for an imaginary story, the stronger the story becomes,
because we desperately want to give meaning to these sacrifices and to the
suffering we have caused.
In politics this is known as the ‘Our Boys Didn’t Die in Vain’ syndrome. In
1915 Italy entered the First World War on the side of the Entente powers. Italy’s
declared aim was to ‘liberate’ Trento and Trieste – two ‘Italian’ territories that
the Austro-Hungarian Empire held ‘unjustly’. Italian politicians gave fiery
speeches in parliament, vowing historical redress and promising a return to the
glories of ancient Rome. Hundreds of thousands of Italian recruits went to the
front shouting, ‘For Trento and Trieste!’ They thought it would be a walkover.
It was anything but. The Austro-Hungarian army held a strong defensive line
along the Isonzo River. The Italians hurled themselves against the line in eleven
gory battles, gaining a few kilometres at most, and never securing a
breakthrough. In the first battle they lost 15,000 men. In the second battle they
lost 40,000 men. In the third battle they lost 60,000. So it continued for more
than two dreadful years until the eleventh engagement, when the Austrians
finally counter-attacked, and in the Battle of Caporreto soundly defeated the
Italians and pushed them back almost to the gates of Venice. The glorious
adventure became a bloodbath. By the end of the war, almost 700,000 Italian
soldiers were killed, and more than a million were wounded.
20
After losing the first Isonzo battle, Italian politicians had two choices. They
could admit their mistake and sign a peace treaty. Austria–Hungary had no
claims against Italy, and would have been delighted to sign a peace treaty
because it was busy fighting for survival against the much stronger Russians.
Yet how could the politicians go to the parents, wives and children of 15,000
dead Italian soldiers, and tell them: ‘Sorry, there has been a mistake. We hope
you don’t take it too hard, but your Giovanni died in vain, and so did your
Marco.’ Alternatively they could say: ‘Giovanni and Marco were heroes! They
died so that Trieste would be Italian, and we will make sure they didn’t die in
vain. We will go on fighting until victory is ours!’ Not surprisingly, the politicians
preferred the second option. So they fought a second battle, and lost another
40,000 men. The politicians again decided it would be best to keep on fighting,
because ‘our boys didn’t die in vain’.
A few of the victims of the Isonzo battles. Was their sacrifice in vain?
© Bettmann/Corbis.
Yet you cannot blame only the politicians. The masses also kept supporting
the war. And when after the war Italy did not get all the territories it demanded,
Italian democracy placed at its head Benito Mussolini and his fascists, who
promised they would gain for Italy a proper compensation for all the sacrifices it
had made. While it’s hard for a politician to tell parents that their son died for no
good reason, it is far more difficult for parents to say this to themselves – and it
is even harder for the victims. A crippled soldier who lost his legs would rather
tell himself, ‘I sacrificed myself for the glory of the eternal Italian nation!’ than ‘I
lost my legs because I was stupid enough to believe self-serving politicians.’ It is
much easier to live with the fantasy, because the fantasy gives meaning to the
suffering.
Priests discovered this principle thousands of years ago. It underlies
numerous religious ceremonies and commandments. If you want to make
people believe in imaginary entities such as gods and nations, you should make
them sacrifice something valuable. The more painful the sacrifice, the more
convinced people are of the existence of the imaginary recipient. A poor peasant
sacrificing a priceless bull to Jupiter will become convinced that Jupiter really
exists, otherwise how can he excuse his stupidity? The peasant will sacrifice
another bull, and another, and another, just so he won’t have to admit that all the
previous bulls were wasted. For exactly the same reason, if I have sacrificed a
child to the glory of the Italian nation, or my legs to the communist revolution, it’s
enough to turn me into a zealous Italian nationalist or an enthusiastic
communist. For if Italian national myths or communist propaganda are a lie, then
I will be forced to admit that my child’s death or my own paralysis have been
completely pointless. Few people have the stomach to admit such a thing.
The same logic is at work in the economic sphere too. In 1999 the
government of Scotland decided to erect a new parliament building. According
to the original plan, the construction was supposed to take two years and cost
£40 million. In fact, it took five years and cost £400 million. Every time the
contractors encountered unexpected difficulties and expenses, they went to the
Scottish government and asked for more time and money. Every time this
happened, the government told itself: ‘Well, we’ve already sunk £40 million into
this and we’ll be completely discredited if we stop now and end up with a half-
built skeleton. Let’s authorise another £40 million.’ Six months later the same
thing happened, by which time the pressure to avoid ending up with an
unfinished building was even greater; and six months after that the story
repeated itself, and so on until the actual cost was ten times the original
estimate.
Not only governments fall into this trap. Business corporations often sink
millions into failed enterprises, while private individuals cling to dysfunctional
marriages and dead-end jobs. For the narrating self would much prefer to go on
suffering in the future, just so it won’t have to admit that our past suffering was
devoid of all meaning. Eventually, if we want to come clean about past mistakes,
our narrating self must invent some twist in the plot that will infuse these
mistakes with meaning. For example, a pacifist war veteran may tell himself,
‘Yes, I’ve lost my legs because of a mistake. But thanks to this mistake, I
understand that war is hell, and from now onwards I will dedicate my life to fight
for peace. So my injury did have some positive meaning: it taught me to value
peace.’
The Scottish Parliament building. Our sterling did not die in vain.
© Jeremy Sutton-Hibbert/Getty Images.
We see, then, that the self too is an imaginary story, just like nations, gods
and money. Each of us has a sophisticated system that throws away most of our
experiences, keeps only a few choice samples, mixes them up with bits from
movies we saw, novels we read, speeches we heard, and from our own
daydreams, and weaves out of all that jumble a seemingly coherent story about
who I am, where I came from and where I am going. This story tells me what to
love, whom to hate and what to do with myself. This story may even cause me to
sacrifice my life, if that’s what the plot requires. We all have our genre. Some
people live a tragedy, others inhabit a never-ending religious drama, some
approach life as if it were an action film, and not a few act as if in a comedy. But
in the end, they are all just stories.
What, then, is the meaning of life? Liberalism maintains that we shouldn’t expect
an external entity to provide us with some readymade meaning. Rather, each
individual voter, customer and viewer ought to use his or her free will in order to
create meaning not just for his or her life, but for the entire universe.
The life sciences undermine liberalism, arguing that the free individual is just
a fictional tale concocted by an assembly of biochemical algorithms. Every
moment, the biochemical mechanisms of the brain create a flash of experience,
which immediately disappears. Then more flashes appear and fade, appear and
fade, in quick succession. These momentary experiences do not add up to any
enduring essence. The narrating self tries to impose order on this chaos by
spinning a never-ending story, in which every such experience has its place,
and hence every experience has some lasting meaning. But, as convincing and
tempting as it may be, this story is a fiction. Medieval crusaders believed that
God and heaven provided their lives with meaning. Modern liberals believe that
individual free choices provide life with meaning. They are all equally delusional.
Doubts about the existence of free will and individuals are nothing new, of
course. Thinkers in India, China and Greece argued that ‘the individual self is an
illusion’ more than 2,000 years ago. Yet such doubts don’t really change history
unless they have a practical impact on economics, politics and day-to-day life.
Humans are masters of cognitive dissonance, and we allow ourselves to believe
one thing in the laboratory and an altogether different thing in the courthouse or
in parliament. Just as Christianity didn’t disappear the day Darwin published On
Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: |