Hcss report

40
STRATEGIC MONITOR 2014
Diplomacy: Factual Evidence
Most examples of diplomatic assertiveness found for Russia are assessed as
 
negative
, according to our coding scheme. Many are caused by 
vetoes
on UN 
resolutions e.g. in 1999 against military action in Yugoslavia; in 2003 against military 
action in Iraq,
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and, jointly with China, in 2012 against military action in Syria (the 
different occasions were mentioned in the previous section). This has always been a 
way for Russia to express assertive positions as a great power: between 1945 and 
2013 the USSR (then Russia) cast nearly half (128) of all the vetoes in the UN’s 68-year 
history. 
Perspectives in the Russian Language Domain
The word ‘assertiveness’ is rarely (if at all) used by Russia as far as foreign policy 
matters are concerned. There is also no translation, or even contextual translation, 
which can be expressed with a word or a phrase. In the Russian language, it usually 
reflects individual behavioral characteristics. There is some Russian academic literature 
that investigates major global actors’ assertiveness, but it is quite scant. 
Kireeva analyzes the reasons behind the emergence of great powers. According to 
this author, this was the reaction to the “inability of the US, as a global leader, to meet 
international challenges and threats in different parts of the world”. As a result, self-
confident, autonomous, and active players emerged, and the importance of relations 
at the regional level (as compared to bilateral and global) increased in international 
relations. Summarizing Kireeva’s point, the role of great powers in their respective 
regions is becoming ever more important.
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Blank characterizes Russian foreign policy as quite assertive, by particularly looking at 
Latin America. In 2008 Russia tried to become an influential regional actor by 
establishing bilateral ties and making trade deals. After a few years, the destabilizing 
effect of Russia’s way of doing business (e.g., selling weapons to Venezuela) became 
obvious to other regional players. Blank suggests an official explanation for such policy 
– Medvedev’s theses about expanding markets while fighting economic hardship – 
but posits that Russian foreign policy in Latin America is rather reflected by geopolitical 
acts against the US. The economic dimension is present, but is not the main driver of 
Russian foreign policy’s strategic orientation.
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According to Kireeva, each great power has its ways of implementing assertive 
measures in its 
geographical
region, while Blank suggests an understanding of region 
as a “region of interests”.

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