Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010 Bravo Lab China da

Link Turn – Nationalists Like Plan

China opposes US presence in Asia, US hegemony is a historical slight and affront to national pride
Sutter 2007

(Robert Sutter, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, “Does China Seek to Dominate Asia and Reduce US influence as a Regional Power?”, Carnegie Debates, April 20, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Sutter_paper.pdf)

Chinese leaders have been pretty consistent in saying that China does not seek dominance in Asia. These declarations seem self serving and disingenuous to many foreign and some Chinese observers, and so it might be more useful to assess what China opposes in Asia in order to come up with insights on what China’s rise may actually mean for the Asian order and US leadership in Asia. Here the answer is pretty clear—China has long opposed large powers establishing strong positions along the periphery of China. This opposition appears to have its roots in a wary Chinese view of international powers and competition. This perception is a result in considerable measure of the widely held and officially reinforced view of China’s having been victimized and exploited by foreign powers in the 19th and 20th centuries. Mao Zedong repeatedly confronted US and Soviet power in Asia for security and revolutionary reasons. Deng Xiaoping, while focused on pragmatic economic reform, saw opposition to Soviet dominance in Asia as China’s top foreign policy priority. In the post cold war period, China’s leaders saw opposition to US “hegemony” in Asian and world affairs as an important policy priority. They avoided costly confrontation with the United States but worked through diplomacy, rhetoric and other means to promote a “multipolar” regional and world order where US power and influence would be weaker than in the past.

Link Turn - Japan

US presence in Japan reduces domestic pressure on the PRC regime
Bandow 2007

(Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, “China: Fragile Superpower”, Antiwar.com, September 8, http://original.antiwar.com/doug-bandow/2007/09/07/china-fragile-superpower/)

Where does the U.S. go from here? As is so often the case in international relations, responsible statesmanship is necessary on both sides of the Pacific. Moreover, she adds, “only by understanding the dangers of China’s domestic fragility and incorporating this understanding into their policies can Chinese and American decision makers avoid a catastrophic war.” She advocates a series of sensible steps – focusing on Chinese international behavior, downplaying American military power, demonstrating respect for China, working in Chinese-Taiwanese relations, and not overreacting to China’s economic rise. But that’s not enough. Shirk wants to maintain “a strong military presence” in the region and opposes building up Japan as a military power. As she notes, “Preventing war with a rising China is one of the most difficult foreign policy challenges our country faces.”

US Presence Unpopular

Opposing US presence is popular, and shapes the debate over China’s policy toward Taiwan
Bandow 2007

(Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, “China: Fragile Superpower”, Antiwar.com, September 8, http://original.antiwar.com/doug-bandow/2007/09/07/china-fragile-superpower/)

China’s relations with Japan remain strained and, ironically, help push Tokyo to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy. Far more dangerous is the issue of Taiwan. The island state, largely free of mainland control for more than a century, has created a separate identity, but is viewed as a constituent part of China by most Chinese. The intensity of feeling within the PRC reflects latent nationalism mixed with government propaganda. As Shirk explains, “The roots of the Chinese fixation on Taiwan are purely domestic, related to regime security, not national security.” Americans widely underestimate the importance of Taiwan to China. One poll found that three-quarters of Chinese believe conflict between the U.S. and PRC is likely over Taiwan. Shirk warns of a serious risk of war, a “danger compounded by the volatile mixture of domestic politics and of foreign policy in China and Taiwan.” Which naturally leads to relations with the U.S., the subject of the penultimate chapter of Shirk’s book. Beijing has an incentive to maintain good relations with the U.S. – the PRC would suffer greatly from American economic sanctions let alone military hostility, and “the best way for China to rise peacefully is to behave like a responsible power and accommodate to the current superpower, the United States.” If only life was so simple. Warns Shirk: “on the other hand, inside China, other leaders, the public, and the military expect Chinese leaders to stand up to the United States. Nationalist ardor runs high, fanned by government propaganda and the commercial media and Internet. The United States, as the dominant power in the world, is the natural target of suspicion and resentment in China, just as it is in many other countries, particularly after the American invasion of Iraq. A Chinese political leader who takes a principled stand against the United States always wins more points than one who gives in to it.”

AT: Internal Collapse

“Mass Incident” numbers overestimate the danger to the regime, there is no risk of internal collapse.

Freeman 10 (Will, analyst at GaveKal Dragonomics, “The accuracy of China’s ‘mas incidents’ ” Financial Times (London), March 2, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9ee6fa64-25b5-11df-9bd3-00144feab49a,dwp_uuid=9511df10-6d6b-11da-a4df-0000779e2340.html?nclick_check=1) MKB

Readers of the international press could be forgiven for thinking that China is a cauldron of social unrest on the brink of boiling over. Reports of riots or protests invariably cite the growing number of official “mass incidents” to emphasise the point. But the accuracy of these numbers – which refer to anything from small, peaceful protests to the murderous ethnic riots that engulfed Xinjiang in 2009 – is questionable at best. Moreover, there is no evidence that social unrest poses an imminent threat to the Communist party’s grip on power. Foreign reports typically cite a figure of 80,000-100,000 “mass incidents” in China per year. Yet the definition of a mass incident is so broad and the official reporting so inconsistent that these numbers have little clear meaning. “Mass incidents” are officially defined as any kind of planned or impromptu gathering that forms because of “internal contradictions”, including mass public speeches, physical conflicts, airing of grievances or other forms of group behaviour that may disrupt social stability. In practice, there is no agreement on the definition of a “mass incident”. Police generally use a wider definition which enables them to document how effective their enforcement is; government officials tend to use a narrower definition to minimise the apparent scale of the problem. National statistics published by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) show slow growth in mass incidents from 1993 to 1997 followed by a period of much faster growth through 2004. MPS only considered these data points “estimates” – numbers were rounded to the nearest hundred or thousand – and stopped publishing the data in 2005. Journalists often cite a figure of 87,000 for 2005, which was published on the MPS website in early 2006. But this number refers to an even broader category of “public order disturbances”, that cover anything from riots and protests to participation in cults or organised crime, hacking, orgies, gambling, even insulting the national flag. In early 2007, Liu Jingguo, the vice-minister of public security, told a press conference that mass incidents fell 16.5 per cent year on year in 2006. But there were no further statements on mass incident numbers until after the Olympics in August 2008. After the Olympics passed and the media spotlight dimmed, the number of mass incidents mysteriously rose once again. Estimates by the China Academy of Social Sciences give a figure of “over 90,000” mass incidents in 2006 and further unspecified increases in 2007 and 2008. Most analysts agree that anecdotal evidence, such as a steady rise in the number of petitions submitted to the central government protesting about local government misbehaviour, supports this trend. The central government is adapting to the challenge, to some extent. Beijing used to deny the existence of social unrest or blame it on foreign conspirators, but now accepts that social frictions stem from domestic problems will inevitably intensify. But since most complaints are against local officials or businesses, the central government argues that the chief problem is petty corruption stemming from bad eggs at the local level rather than systemic flaws that would undermine the legitimacy of the regime. Indeed, the sharp rise in petitions to Beijing about local abuses testifies to a widespread belief that the central government is more a potential solution to the problem, not its ultimate source. But this belief may be changing. Anecdotal evidence over the last five years suggests a rise in “anger-venting” mass incidents – large scale, often violent, riots that erupt from seemingly minor incidents and reflect general discontent rather than specific rights violations. In June 2008, over 10,000 rioters set fire to a police station in Guizhou province when police allegedly covered up a murder perpetrated by relatives of local government officials – the latest in a string of alleged misdemeanors. The party-state is in no danger of crumbling.