From Third World to First The Singapore Story pdfdrive com

partners. Thomson was gentle and friendly in his demeanour. His sympathies
were with us. It was an unpleasant task Wilson had given him. To soften the
blow, Wilson invited me for discussions at Chequers, the official country home
of the prime minister.

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In my frustration and anger at this total disregard for undertakings given
solemnly, I said that we too could put Singapore’s interests first and foremost
and protect our sterling balances by moving them out of London. Nevertheless I
decided to go to London and see Wilson at Chequers.
Wilson changed the venue from Chequers to 10 Downing Street on a
Sunday. When I arrived at 5:30 pm, his three senior ministers were present:
Denis Healey (defence), George Brown (foreign affairs) and George Thomson
(Commonwealth relations). Wilson held out some hope by saying that the
cabinet had agreed not to take a final decision until I had met him.
I said any precipitate announcement that all British troops would be off the
mainland of Asia by 1971 would shake the confidence of investors, especially
those from Hong Kong, and make them go further afield. To restore confidence,
Singapore would have to go for massive arms expenditure to make its defence
credible. I argued that the British armed services owned valuable real estate in
Singapore, homes and barracks worth over £55 million. If the run-down took
place over three years, they would not fetch half this price on the open market.
Wilson reiterated what Healey had told me a year earlier in Singapore, that
the decision to withdraw was made on economic grounds and could not be
altered. The decision on timing, March 1971, was fairly unanimous and his
ministers present represented the cabinet view. He was anxious to discuss aid to
give real economic relief to Singapore. I replied that security was my main
concern, for without it there would be no investments, which we needed much
more than aid.
Wilson left the arguments for early withdrawal to Healey while he sat back,
sucked at his pipe and looked on sympathetically. From Wilson’s body
language, I knew it would be impossible to keep him to his original undertaking
to stay till the mid-70s.
The British ministers sympathised with my plight. The most supportive was
George Brown. Remembering his strong views when we met in Stockholm in
1966, that British forces should be out of Singapore, I was surprised when he
asked how much time I needed. I named 31 March 1973. Years later he told me
that US President Johnson had persuaded him that while the Vietnam War
continued, America could not replace British forces in the Arabian Gulf and
Singapore, and that the British contribution was politically invaluable.
At about 7:00 pm, Roy Jenkins, who had replaced Callaghan as chancellor of
the exchequer, joined us. He pitched in on a related subject, that Singapore’s
economic position stood out from those of other countries in the region. We

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were doing well. The position in Britain was quite serious. He compared British
and Singapore reserves to show that, per capita, the figure for Britain was
smaller than Singapore’s. He criticised the Singapore government for investing
its budgetary surplus elsewhere without informing the British government. He
was on the offensive. We had never taken any of our reserves out of sterling. But
we had not given any undertaking to put our budgetary surpluses into sterling.
He had scored a point, that we were not as helpful as we could have been and
could not expect special consideration now.
We talked through dinner, repeating arguments again and again as we drank
liberal glasses of claret – Jenkins’ favourite wine. We finished at 10:50 pm after
five and a half hours. Wilson, summing up, said the British government accepted
the need to help maintain confidence in Singapore. But he emphasised that there
could be no permanent security for Singapore except in the framework of a
wider regional defence agreement with other Commonwealth countries
concerned. It was inadvisable for Singapore to make hasty decisions on the
purchase of military equipment before the possibility of such an arrangement
had been explored in greater detail. His government would do all they
reasonably could, consistent with their overriding aim (total withdrawal by
1971), to help Singapore maintain security and hoped that the Singapore
government would take full account of British advice.
The next day, Monday, 15 January 1968, in the House of Commons, Healey
announced that British forces east of Suez would withdraw in 1971, but he
shifted the actual date for final withdrawal from March to December 1971. This
difference of nine months was significant because a general election would have
to be held before December 1971. In other words, the decision on the final date
of withdrawal could either be confirmed by a new Labour government or
postponed by a Conservative government. I had to be satisfied with this
concession. Defence correspondents reporting Healey’s speech noted that he had
left this opening. My trip to London had not been altogether in vain.
But Wilson knew this was the end of an era. In the debate he quoted from
Kipling’s “Recessional”:
Far-called our navies melt away
On dune and headland sinks the fire
Lo, all our pomp of yesterday
Is one with Nineveh and Tyre.

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During those five days in London in January 1968 I worked hard to prolong
the British presence. Besides discussions with Wilson, I took my case to
Conservative Party leaders, primarily Ted Heath, Reginald Maudling and Iain
MacLeod. They were most sympathetic and supportive; if they were the
government, they would have wished to stay longer without naming a
withdrawal date. That made a difference to the actual final outcome. British
television and press gave me extensive coverage. I was able to put across a
reasoned, not an angry, case. I tugged at the heartstrings of the British people,
that our long and fruitful association should not end in an unseemly way which
would damage Singapore’s future. I had put on the best face possible. But Keng
Swee, who flew back to Singapore ahead of me, voiced his frustrations to the
press at Singapore airport: “The Labour Party has gone back on its word – a
disgraceful breach of an undertaking given to us.”
I saw no point in venting my spleen. My other colleagues, including Raja,
Chin Chye and Sui Sen, were deeply disappointed and apprehensive of the
implications for our security and economy. But they did not berate the British.
Angry words would only annoy British ministers and ruffle British service
commanders in Singapore who, after all, were loyal Britishers. I needed
goodwill and cooperation from the British to execute the withdrawal with the
minimum of friction and the maximum of goodwill, and not have military
workshops stripped bare as had happened in Guinea (West Africa) when the
French left in the 1960s.
This sudden turn of events added to the pressure on us. Our economic
problems would mount, as would unemployment. Our defence problems had
widened with the need for an air force. How were we to build up an air force
from scratch and have a squadron of fighter aircraft operational by the end of
1971? When we saw Healey a second time about buying a squadron of Hawker
Hunters, he readily agreed. He would also help build up our capability to operate
them, a total change from his attitude in October 1966, less than two years
earlier, when he had wagged his finger at us for harbouring “mischievous”
thoughts.
The British media were sympathetic but on the whole pessimistic about
Singapore’s future. Singapore would lose about 20 per cent of its GDP with the
end of British military spending, and without British military protection, they
saw the future as precarious. The chairman of the Daily Mirror Group, Cecil
King, was at my press conference on my return to Singapore from London in
January. He told my press secretary, Alex Josey, that his heart went out to me

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but the situation was hopeless. With high unemployment and no security after
the withdrawal of the British, the economy must decline. King was not alone in
holding such a pessimistic view of Singapore’s prospects.
To fill the vacuum that followed the ending of the Anglo-Malayan Defence
Agreement (AMDA), the British had proposed a Five-Power Defence
Arrangement (FPDA) that would be consultative, not a binding defence
obligation. I knew the Australians were fearful that the Indonesians would have
the wrong impression, that the five powers – the United Kingdom, Australia,
New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore – were ganging up against Indonesia. In
February 1968 Paul Hasluck, Australia’s external affairs minister, when in
Singapore, had told me that Australia would maintain its force levels till the end
of 1971, after which his government was uncertain. In other words, the
Australian forces could leave together with the British. I stressed to him that it
was necessary to make clear to everyone that it was not the intention of the
Western allies to leave a vacuum in the area after 1971, which could be filled by
either Russia or China or anybody else. He stressed that Malaysia-Singapore
cooperation was fundamental to Australian defence planning. I assured him that
we regarded any attack on Malaysia as a threat to Singapore, but I encouraged
him to make it clear to the Malaysians that any bilateral agreement with
Australia that excluded Singapore was simply not on. I described how on my trip
to Melbourne for Prime Minister Harold Holt’s memorial service in December
1967, Razak was on the same aircraft but virtually ignored me. But after
McEwen, the Australian deputy prime minister who was acting as prime minister
before John Gorton took over, had rebuffed him in blunt terms when he tried for
a bilateral agreement between Australia and Malaysia, Razak was all
reasonableness and accommodation as he spent three hours in the aircraft with
me discussing Malaysia’s defence and security. Singapore-Malaysia bilateral
relations on defence improved considerably after this.
Indeed, Razak told Kim San and Keng Swee in March 1968 that the security
of both countries was inseparable, that Malaysia could not afford heavy military
expenditure and Singapore, being a small island and very vulnerable to sneak
attacks, should concentrate on its air defence capability while Malaysia with its
long coastline would concentrate on its navy. This way we would complement
each other. “As two separate territories, we talk to one another as equals.
Wherever we can agree, we work together. If we cannot agree, well, we wait a

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while.”
Shortly after the race riots in Kuala Lumpur in May 1969, followed by the
suspension of the Malaysian Parliament, Razak had to represent Malaysia in
Canberra at a meeting of prime ministers of the five powers, to discuss defence
arrangements after the British pull-out in 1971. Before the conference started,
the Australian permanent secretary of defence told us that his prime minister,
John Gorton, would not be attending the conference. In a private discussion, the
permanent secretary in their external affairs department said Gorton doubted the
Malaysian government’s ability to contain the situation and believed further
racial trouble would break out and Singapore would be “sucked into” the
conflict. Gorton had totally lost confidence in Malaysia. He did not want to
commit Australia to any defence arrangement with Malaysia. The Australians
were already most unhappy that the British were leaving the region and they did
not want to be saddled with responsibility for the defence of Malaysia and
Singapore. Gorton foresaw disaster and was fearful of the electorate’s reaction to
any new commitments Australia might make for the defence of Malaysia and
Singapore.
At the last moment, however, he came to open the conference but left
immediately after his speech. He stressed the need for racial harmony in the area
and for a categorical assurance from Malaysia and Singapore that their defence
was “indivisible”. Razak and his Malaysian officials looked extremely
depressed.
That night I talked to Razak in his hotel room. I decided to set aside my
reservations and support his bid that, after 1971, the commander for the Five-
Power Defence Arrangement should be responsible to representatives of the five
powers and not just to Singapore and Malaysia as Australia proposed. This
cheered Razak. Towards the end of the conference Gordon Freeth, the Australian
external affairs minister, clarified that if Malaysia were attacked, Australian
troops could be deployed in either East or West Malaysia.
The Conservatives in Britain had been aghast at withdrawing their forces
east of Suez. In January 1970 Edward Heath, as Leader of the Opposition,
visited Singapore. I arranged for him to have discussions with all key ministers
to get a comprehensive view of our economic development and progress in our
defence build-up, and an overview of the political and social situation. I arranged
for the RAF to give him a bird’s-eye view of the island from a helicopter. He
was impressed and told the press he would “halt” Labour’s policy of withdrawal
from east of Suez. He said, “There won’t be any question of British forces

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having been withdrawn and British forces coming back. It will be a question that
British forces are still here and we as a Conservative government will halt the
withdrawal.” He added he was “immensely impressed with the really remarkable
achievements which had been brought to the island. … The basis for all of this is
confidence in the future and peace and stability in the whole area.” I hoped the
British service commanders would take note and not be too hurried in their
withdrawal.
Five months later, in June 1970, the Conservative Party won the general
election and Edward Heath became prime minister. His defence minister, Peter
Carrington, visited Singapore that same month to announce that withdrawal
would proceed as planned, but that Britain would retain some of its forces in
Singapore on an equal basis with the Australians and New Zealanders. Privately,
Carrington told me that Britain would not leave behind any fighter or transport
squadrons. There would be only four Nimrod surveillance aircraft, a flight of
Whirlwind helicopters, and a battalion would be stationed at Nee Soon, one of
their camps. There would be five frigates/destroyers stationed throughout east of
Suez and the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement would be replaced by a
“political commitment of a consultative nature”. The British made it clear they
wanted to participate, not as the leader, but as a partner “on an equal basis” in
the Five-Power Defence Arrangement being planned.
In mid-April 1971, the five prime ministers met in London to finalise the
political arrangements to replace AMDA. The operative words read, “In the
event of any form of armed attack externally organised or supported, or the
threat of such attack against Malaysia or Singapore, the governments would
immediately consult together for the purpose of deciding what measure should
be taken jointly or separately in relation to such attack or threat.” To
“immediately consult” was better than not consulting.
On 1 September 1971, the integrated air defence system was established. On
31 October 1971, the AMDA was replaced by the FPDA. The old era of
underwritten security had ended. From now on we had to be responsible for our
own security.
But security was not our only concern. We had to make a living, to persuade
investors to put their money into manufacturing plants and other businesses in
Singapore. We had to learn to survive, without the British military umbrella and
without a hinterland.

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