From Third World to First The Singapore Story pdfdrive com

hao han bu dang bing, hao tie bu da ding
(a good lad does not become a soldier, good steel does not become nails). We set
up national cadet corps and national police cadet corps in all secondary schools
so that parents would identify the army and police with their sons and daughters.
We wanted the people to regard our soldiers as their protectors – a reversal from
the days when army and police uniforms aroused fear and resentment as symbols
of colonial coercion.
People must admire military valour. As Keng Swee said in sorrow, “The
Spartan approach to life does not come about naturally in a community that lives
by buying and selling.” I had to get people to change their attitudes. We also had
to improve the physical condition of our young by getting them to participate in
sports and physical activity of all kinds, and to develop a taste for adventure and
strenuous, thrilling activities that were not without danger to themselves.
Persuasion alone was not enough. We needed institutions, well-organised, well-
staffed and well-directed, to follow up the exhortations and stirring speeches.
The prime responsibility was that of the ministry of education. Only if we
changed people’s thinking and attitudes could we raise a large citizen army like
Switzerland’s or Israel’s. We gave ourselves a decade to accomplish this.
On the first anniversary of independence we mustered what little we had to
boost our people’s morale. We had organised the People’s Defence Force (PDF)
under the leadership of a motley collection of civil servants, MPs and ministers
who had been put through a crash officer-training course. The soldiers were
civilians, mostly Chinese-educated, recruited through the community centres.
Several PDF platoons marched on our first National Day celebrations, 9 August
1966. They put up a brave show and were cheered enthusiastically by those
behind the saluting dais and by the crowds lining the streets as they recognised
their suntanned ministers and MPs in uniform, eager in their stride if lacking in
martial bearing.
Our community leaders representing all races took part in the parade bearing
banners or slogans. Chinese, Indian, Malay and British business leaders joined
the contingent that marched past the president in front of City Hall. They were
lustily cheered. There were units from the trade unions, the PAP and the
statutory boards. The police and fire brigade were brought in to add to the
uniforms on display. The Malaysians might not have been in awe of our military

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capability, but they could not but be impressed by the determination and the
spirit with which we were building up our defence forces to protect our fledgling
state.
Keng Swee’s original plan was to build up a regular army of 12 battalions
between 1966 and 1969. Disagreeing with this plan, I proposed a small standing
army plus the capacity to mobilise the whole civilian population who should be
trained and put into reserves. Keng Swee argued that we had first to train a good
number of regular and non-commissioned officers in his 12 battalions before we
could train civilians on such a large scale.
I did not want money spent on the recurrent costs of a large army: it was
better spent on the infrastructure we needed to raise and train national service
battalions. National service would bring political and social benefits. Keng Swee
took the professional military view that an immediate threat from Malaysia had
to be countered by a solid regular fighting force raised in the next three years. I
said the Malaysians were unlikely to attack us while British and Commonwealth
forces were in Singapore. Their presence would be a deterrent even without a
defence treaty. I wanted the defence plan to aim at mobilising as large a part of
the population as possible, in order to galvanise the people in their own defence
while they had this strong feeling of patriotism as a result of their recent
experiences.
A revised plan Keng Swee put up in November 1966 would mobilise a large
section of the population and keep the regular component of the armed forces at
12 battalions. I was keen to have our women do national service as Israeli
women did, because that would reinforce the people’s will to defend themselves.
But Keng Swee did not want his new ministry to carry this extra burden. As the
other ministers in Defco were also not anxious to draft our women, I did not
press my point.
The best deterrent to any Malaysian plan to regain control over Singapore
was their knowledge that even if they could subdue our armed forces, they
would have to keep down a whole people well trained in the use of arms and
explosives. Besides integrating the people into a more united community
through equal treatment of recruits regardless of their social background or race,
we needed to attract and retain some of the best talents in the highest echelons of
the SAF. Most important of all, we had to ensure that the SAF remained
subordinate to the political leadership by keeping important functions such as
manpower and finance under civilian officers in the defence ministry. Defco
endorsed all these objectives.

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In February 1967 I tabled legislation to amend the National Service
Ordinance which had been passed by the British in 1952. Those who enlisted in
the SAF as a full-time career would be guaranteed jobs in the government,
statutory boards or private sector when they left full-time service to go into the
reserves. There was full public support when the bill was passed a month later. I
recalled the first call-up in 1954 under this same ordinance and the riots by
Chinese middle-school students. This time we had no problems getting 9,000
young men registered in the first batch. I was right about the changed public
attitude.
Meanwhile Keng Swee assembled a team and, with Israeli help, started the
build-up. He made use of police personnel, communications equipment and
other assets to kick-start the process. The assistant commissioner for police, Tan
Teck Khim, became director (general staff).
We began training a select group in August 1967, the top 10 per cent of the
batch registered. To counter the traditional prejudice against soldiery, we held
send-off ceremonies for the recruits from community centres in every
constituency. MPs, ministers and community leaders would attend and make
short speeches before the recruits mounted the military trucks that took them to
basic training camps. Over the years, we gradually broke down the resistance to
soldiering.
It was a crash programme with everybody on crash courses. There was much
confusion. Arrangements were never 100 per cent prepared and crisis
management was the order of the day, but it was an urgent and crucial task that
had to be accomplished in the shortest possible time. We had to achieve it with
men of little experience and unexceptional ability. But the