From Third World to First The Singapore Story pdfdrive com

Part I
Getting the Basics Right

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1. Going It Alone
There are books to teach you how to build a house, how to repair engines, how
to write a book. But I have not seen a book on how to build a nation out of a
disparate collection of immigrants from China, British India and the Dutch East
Indies, or how to make a living for its people when its former economic role as
the entrepôt of the region is becoming defunct.
Never had I expected that in 1965, at 42, I would be in charge of an
independent Singapore, responsible for the lives of its two million people. From
1959, when I was 35, I was prime minister of a self-governing state of
Singapore. We joined the Federation of Malaysia in September 1963. There
were fundamental disagreements over policies between Singapore and the
federal government. All of a sudden, on 9 August 1965, we were out on our own
as an independent nation. We had been asked to leave Malaysia and go our own
way with no signposts to our next destination.
We faced tremendous odds with an improbable chance of survival.
Singapore was not a natural country but man-made, a trading post the British had
developed into a nodal point in their world-wide maritime empire. We inherited
the island without its hinterland, a heart without a body.
Foreign press comments immediately after independence, all predicting
doom, added to my gloom. One writer compared Britain’s withdrawal from its
colonies to the decline of the Roman empire when law and order collapsed as the
Roman legions withdrew and barbarian hordes took over. Denis Warner wrote in
the 
Sydney Morning Herald
(10 August 1965), “An independent Singapore was
not regarded as viable three years ago. Nothing in the current situation suggests
that it is more viable today.” In the London 
Sunday Times
(22 August 1965),
Richard Hughes wrote, “Singapore’s economy would collapse if the British
bases – costing more than 100 million pounds sterling – were closed.” I shared
these fears but did not express them: my duty was to give the people hope, not
demoralise them.
Indeed one question uppermost in my mind was how long the British would

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or could keep their bases in Singapore. Would their stay be shortened because of
the way separation had taken place? Harold Wilson was already facing
opposition from his backbenchers. The east of Suez policy was costly and did
not help the Labour government win votes. They needed the money for welfare
and other vote-winning programmes. The only guarantor of security and stability
in East Asia, the United States, was deeply mired in a guerrilla war in Vietnam
which was extremely unpopular with their European allies and with Afro-Asian
governments. Anti-American propaganda by the Soviets and the People’s
Republic of China was most effective in the Third World. I felt it would be
politically costly, if not impossible, for Singapore to have the Americans take
over the role of the British. Australia and New Zealand on their own would not
be credible guarantors.
I feared that slowly but inexorably British influence would decline, and
American influence expand. For my generation born and bred in empire, it was
not an easy change. I had to come to terms with American power without a
British buffer. The British had enforced their will with a certain civility. The
Americans were different, as I could see from the way they dealt with South
Vietnamese leaders, and even with Thai and Filipino leaders who were not in as
parlous a position as those in Saigon. America was a power on the ascendant,
with bulging muscles and a habit of flexing them.
There was the personal burden of tighter security. It was irksome.
Immediately after separation, the police officer in charge of my security had
warned me that I had become the No. 1 hate object in the Malaysian Malay-
language newspapers and in radio and television broadcasts then circulating and
receivable in Singapore. He advised me to move from my home in Oxley Road
until they had made certain alterations to the house. I had a thick layer of
security men instead of just one officer. He also extended discreet security cover
for my wife Choo and the children. The threat from racial fanatics was
unpredictable, unlike that from the communists who were rational and
calculating and would see no benefit in going for Choo or our children. For three
to four months Choo and I stayed at Changi Cottage, a government chalet by the
sea, near the RAF Changi airfield and inside a “protected” area. During that
time, I held cabinet meetings irregularly, for the drive to my office at City Hall
caused traffic disruption with the unaccustomed motorcycle outriders and a
security car. I took urgent decisions by telephone conference with the relevant
ministers, which gave me relief from interminable office meetings. My personal
assistants and Wong Chooi Sen, my trusted cabinet secretary, came every day to

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the cottage from where I worked. Within walking distance was a nine-hole RAF
golf course that provided a welcome break from the daily grind of papers and
minutes. I would play nine holes, sometimes with a friend, at other times on my
own, with Choo walking to keep me company.
Our three children had to attend school, so they stayed at home and put up
with the inconvenience of workmen erecting a wall of bricks set in honeycomb
pattern to screen off our front porch from the road. As a temporary measure,
until bullet-proof glass could be obtained, they also blocked our windows with
steel plates. This made the rooms feel like prisons, and the whole family felt a
tremendous sense of relief when the glass windows were finally installed months
later. When I returned to Oxley Road Gurkha policemen (recruited by the British
from Nepal) were posted as sentries. To have either Chinese policemen shooting
Malays or Malay policemen shooting Chinese would have caused widespread
repercussions. The Gurkhas on the other hand were neutral, besides having a
reputation for total discipline and loyalty. All this heightened my sense of
insecurity and underlined the urgency of building an army to protect our fragile
independence.
I had many pressing concerns: first, to get international recognition for
Singapore’s independence, including our membership of the United Nations. I
chose Sinnathamby Rajaratnam (affectionately called Raja by all of us) as
foreign minister. He was eminently suitable, with anti-colonial nationalist
credentials from his student days in London before and during the war, but no
rabid radical. Friendly, urbane, sincere, he had the right balance between
standing up for principles and the need for diplomatic compromise. He was to be
much liked and respected by all those he worked with at home and abroad. As
messages of recognition flowed in, Toh Chin Chye, the deputy prime minister,
and Raja as foreign minister set off to New York to take our seat at the UN that
September of 1965.
My next concern was to defend this piece of real estate. We had no army.
Our two battalions were under the command of a Malaysian brigadier. How
were we to build up some defence forces quickly, however rudimentary? We had
to deter and, if need be, prevent any wild move by the Malay Ultras (extremists)
in Kuala Lumpur to instigate a coup by the Malaysian forces in Singapore and
reverse the independence we had acquired. Many Malay leaders in KL believed
that Singapore should never have been allowed to leave Malaysia, but should
have been clobbered into submission. If anything were to happen to Tunku
Abdul Rahman, Tun Abdul Razak would become the prime minister and he

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could be made to reverse the Tunku’s decision by strong-minded Ultra leaders. It
was a time of great uncertainty.
While wrestling with these major concerns I had to attend to another pressing
need – keeping law and order. We feared that pro-UMNO Malays would run
amok when they realised they had been abandoned by the Malaysian
government and were once again a minority. Our policemen were mostly Malays
from the kampungs of Malaya and their loyalty would be strained if they had to
take action against Malay rioters who wanted to rejoin Malaysia. Our troops, two
battalions, were also mostly Malays from Malaya.
To my relief, Goh Keng Swee was willing and eager to take on the task of
building up the forces. I decided to have him take charge of home affairs and
defence, put together into one ministry called MID (ministry of interior and
defence). This would allow him to use the police force to help in the basic
training of army recruits. (To this day licence plates of Singapore Armed Forces
vehicles carry the letters MID.) Keng Swee’s transfer left a void in the finance
ministry. I discussed this with him and decided on Lim Kim San as finance
minister. Kim San had a practical approach to problems. Moreover he could
work closely with Keng Swee without friction, thus allowing Keng Swee to
contribute informally to policies on finance.
My third and biggest headache was the economy - how to make a living for
our people? Indonesia was “confronting” us and trade was at a standstill. The
Malaysians wanted to bypass Singapore and deal direct with all their trading