From Third World to First The Singapore Story pdfdrive com

menteri besar
(chief minister), Harun Idris. A race riot followed on 13
May. The casualty pattern in Kuala Lumpur was similar to that in Singapore for
the 1964 race riots when Singapore was under Kuala Lumpur’s control. Both
Kuala Lumpur and Singapore were at that time predominantly Chinese-
populated cities with a minority of Malays. Yet many more Chinese were killed
by this Malay minority than Malays who were killed in retaliation. The official
Kuala Lumpur casualty figures were: killed 143 Chinese, 25 Malays, 13 Indians,
15 others; wounded 439. This could not have been the case if the police and
military were impartial. One foreign correspondent who witnessed the riots
estimated the number killed at 800.
The next day the Malaysian king proclaimed a state of emergency and
suspended Parliament. The government created a National Operations Council
(NOC) with Razak as chairman to govern by decree to restore law and order.
Officially the Tunku was no longer in charge. This NOC marked the end of the
Tunku era, and these riots changed the nature of Malaysian society. From then
on Malaysia became openly a Malaydominated society.
The riots in Kuala Lumpur had caused widespread alarm among both
Chinese and Malays in Singapore, as both felt that the racial troubles would
inevitably spill into Singapore. Malaysian Chinese who had fled to Singapore
recounted stories of brutalities inflicted on their relatives there. As news spread
of Malaysian Malay atrocities and of the bias of the Malaysian armed forces in
dealing with the situation, there was anger and alarm. I was away in America,
speaking to students in Yale, when I read news of these riots. Within days of the
Kuala Lumpur riots, there were attacks on Malays by Chinese in Singapore. This
senseless retaliation against innocent Malays was stopped by strong police
action, troop deployment and the prosecution of several attackers caught in the
act. They were subsequently charged and convicted.
Four months after the riots, I called on the Tunku at his high commissioner’s
residence in Singapore. He looked depressed, showing the effects of a harrowing
experience. He had been openly attacked in a widely circulated letter by Dr
Mahathir Mohamad (later the prime minister, then a member of UMNO’s central
executive council) for having sold out the country to the Chinese. I sensed he
wanted Singapore to be friendly and to influence the Chinese in Malaysia not to
be hostile to the UMNO leaders. I wrote this note to my colleagues: “What
worries me is not whether our supporting the Tunku would lose us our non-
Malay ground, but whether it would not in fact lose the Tunku his Malay ground,

---

and so hasten his retirement.”
Kim San met Razak in Kuala Lumpur a week later and reported that this time
there was “no trace of the former big brother attitude. They are willing to receive
advice if tactfully given without a show of upmanship. … It would be worth our
while to prop them up for a little longer in what way we can.” We were fearful
that the Tunku and all his moderates would be displaced by real Ultras.
Malaysia’s international standing dropped precipitously, and Razak was
defensive. Ironically, relations between Singapore and Malaysia improved. He
needed us to help keep the Chinese in Malaysia reassured and quiescent. Our
influence from Malaysia days still prevailed.
After separation, the practice of having one newspaper put out by the same
editorial staff selling in both Singapore and Malaysia had continued. But after
the May 1969 race riots in Kuala Lumpur, the 
Utusan Melayu
became even more
pro-Malay and openly hostile towards the Singapore government, belittling our
efforts to help Singapore Malays. To stop it from propagating racist sentiments
in Singapore, we changed the regulations to require that all newspapers must be
both produced and have their editorial boards in Singapore before they could
qualify for a licence to print and sell here. The