Free To Choose: a personal Statement

Who Protects the Consumer?
211
and issued standards on products varying from book matches to
bicycles, from children's toy cap guns to television receivers, from
refuse bins to miniature Christmas tree lights.
The objective of safer products is obviously a good one, but
at what cost and by what standards? "Unreasonable risk" is
hardly a scientific term capable of objective specification. What
decibel level of noise from a cap gun is an "unreasonable risk"
to a child's (or adult's) hearing? The spectacle of trained, highly
paid "experts" with ear muffs shooting cap guns as part of the
process of trying to answer that question is hardly calculated to
instill confidence in the taxpayer that his money is being spent
sensibly. A "safer" bicycle may be slower, heavier, and costlier
than a less "safe" bicycle. By what criteria can the CPSC bu-
reaucrats, in issuing their standards, decide how much speed to
sacrifice, how much weight to add, how much extra cost to im-
pose in order to achieve how much extra safety? Do "safer"
standards produce more safety? Or do they only encourage less
attention and care by the user? Most bicycle and similar accidents
are, after all, caused by human carelessness or error.
Most of these questions do not admit of objective answers—
yet they must be answered implicitly in the course of devising and
issuing standards. The answers will reflect partly the arbitrary
judgments of the civil servants involved, occasionally the judg-
ment of consumers or consumer organizations that happen to
have a special interest in the item in question, but mostly the
influence of the makers of the products. In the main, they are the
only ones who have sufficient interest and expertise to comment
knowledgeably on proposed standards. Indeed, much of the for-
mulation of standards has simply been turned over to trade asso-
ciations. You may be sure those standards will be formulated in
the interest of the members of the association, with a sharp eye
to protecting themselves from competition, both from possible
new producers at home and from foreign producers. The result
will be to strengthen the competitive position of existing domestic
manufacturers and to make innovation and the development of
new and improved products more expensive and difficult.
When products enter the marketplace in the usual course of
events, there is an opportunity for experiment, for trial and error.

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212
FREE TO CHOOSE: A Personal Statement
No doubt, shoddy products are produced, mistakes are made, un-
suspected defects turn up. But mistakes usually tend to be on a
small scale—though some are major, as in the recent case of the
Firestone 500 radial tire—and can be corrected gradually. Con-
sumers can experiment for themselves, decide what features they
like and what features they do not like.
When the government steps in through CPSC, the situation is
different. Many decisions must be made before the product has
been subjected to extensive trial and error in actual use. The
standards cannot be adjusted to different needs and tastes. They
must apply uniformly to all. Consumers will inevitably be denied
the opportunity to experiment with a range of alternatives. Mis-
takes will still be made, and when they are, they are almost sure
to be major.
Two examples from the CPSC illustrate the problem.
In August 1973, only three months after starting operation, it
"banned certain brands of aerosol spray adhesives as an immi-
nent hazard. Its decision was based primarily on the preliminary
findings of one academic researcher who claimed that they could
cause birth defects. After more thorough research failed to corro-
borate the initial report, the commission lifted the ban in March
1974."
18
That prompt admission of error is most commendable and
most unusual for a government agency. Yet it did not prevent
harm. "It seems that at least nine pregnant women who had
used the spray adhesives reacted to the news of the commission
'
s
initial decision by undergoing abortions. They decided not to
carry through their pregnancies for fear of producing babies with
birth defects."
1B
A far more serious example is the episode with respect to Tris.
The commission, when established, was assigned responsibility
for administering the "Flammable Fabrics Act," dating back to
1953, which was intended to reduce death and injuries from the
accidental burning of products, fabrics, or related materials. A
standard for children's sleepwear that had been issued in 1971
by the predecessor agency was strengthened by the CPSC in
mid-1973. At the time the cheapest way to meet this standard
was by impregnating the cloth with a flame-retardant chemical—

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