Ethical issues in moral and social enhancement

8.3.3. Is inverse akrasia any good? 
Aristotle’s akratic agents know how they ought to act, and yet are being led astray 
by their desires and passions. In this section I
 
will consider an example more suited 
to considering Persson’s and Savulescu’s proposals for MB: inverse akrasia (Arpaly 
and Schroder, 1999; Holton, 1999; Doucet, 2014). Although Aristotle did not 
outline such an option,
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it seems at least possible that akrasia could be similar to 
virtue in its actions. In this case, the akratic agent would abandon herself to 
emotions, against the dictates of 
in
correct reason. Inverse akrasia would require 
doing good while displaying the same pattern of practical reasoning as standard 
akrasia. A good example of inverse akrasia can be found in Mark Twain’s novel in 
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It is possible to define morally good actions in such a way so as to rule out akrasia, thus 
making inverse-akrasia impossible. Aristotle’s strategy seems to be to say that since 
morally right action is always rational and akrasia involves irrationality, morally right 
action cannot be akratic: “not everyone who does something because of pleasure is… 
incontinent, but only someone who does it because of a shameful pleasure.” (Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics
, 1151b24). I am not convinced by this argument, and I think that it 
makes sense to talk of inverse akrasia given the structural similarity (agents' lack of control 
and not acting on their best judgement).

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the character of Huckleberry Finn. This is how Doucet summarises the relevant 
details of Huck’s story: 
‘Huck is an uneducated boy from antebellum Missouri with many of 
the values and beliefs common to that place. He does not question the 
moral justifiability of slavery, and he believes that slaves should be 
treated as property. During the course of Twain’s story, Huck 
befriends Jim, a slave, and helps him escape. This action goes against 
Huck’s strong belief that he ought to turn Jim in, since, as a slave, Jim 
is someone’s lawful property. On two separate occasions, however, 
Huck is faced with an opportunity to turn Jim in, and on both 
occasions, he finds that he cannot, despite his belief that it would be 
the right thing to do. This causes him to feel intense regret; he berates 
himself for aiding in what he considers to be “theft,” and believes that 
he has a duty to return Jim to Miss Watson, Jim’s owner. Far from 
believing that he acted rightly, his conviction that he has repeatedly 
acted both weakly and badly convinces him that he is destined to 
remain a “bad boy”.’ (c.f. Doucet, 2014,
 
pp. 3-4) 
Twain’s description of Huck’s psychology seems coherent and can serve as an 
analogy for MB-induced inclinations. I would like to consider two plausible 
interpretations of what happens in Huck’s case, and the conclusions they offer for 
thinking about biomedical emotion modulation.
On the first interpretation Huck acts merely on the basis of unreasoned emotional 
‘pull’ of sympathy. Bennett (1974) argues that although in Huck’s case the outcome 
of his action is consistent with what is morally good, his actions cannot be 
considered to be properly ‘moral’. He emphasises that ‘
feelings 
must not be 
confused with 
moral judgments
’ (p.124). This interpretation is supported by the fact 
that Huck’s conviction that Jim is rightfully considered property and thus should be 
returned to his owner seems to be strong; moreover, Huck does not entertain 
reasons that would question this conviction. On this interpretation, a feeling of 
sympathy leads Huck to override his moral judgement. The moral review of his 
actions is preserved, yet moral control is not. 

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This appears closely analogical to Persson and Savulescu's (2008) proposals of how 
MB would look. Since Persson and Savulescu want to eliminate vice leading to 
great evils and do not mind creating permanent Ulysses’ (Savulescu and Perssons, 
2014a), it follows they would endorse creating Huck Finns – agents whose 
endorsed belief has been overridden by a strong, uncontrolled pro-social 
motivation. As such, their interest does not lie in creating virtue but rather 
substituting inverse-akrasia for vice. Although moral review may be preserved, 
both online and offline moral control would 
ideally
be diminished. If that indeed is 
the rationale for their MB project, I agree with John Harris (2011, 2014a, 2014b) 
that it would diminish freedom. Moreover, making agents act against their better 
judgement and not being able to modify their behaviour seems indeed like a recipe 
for decline in moral agency, and as such, is not desirable where MB is to aim at 
creating better moral agents.
However, the difference between Huck Finn and anti-vice MB is that Huck does act 
on an emotional pull that is both consistent with and stems from his moral 
worldview, or at least part of it. This brings us to the second interpretation of 
Huck’s case. Doucet (2014) argues that Huck’s case is better considered to be a 
case of conflict between competing moral reasons.
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The first time Huck decides to 
turn Jim in, two things Jim says cause him not to follow on his resolve: Jim calls 
Huck the best friend he ever had and ‘the only white gentleman to ever keep a 
promise to him’ (Twain, chapter 16). Huck’s emotions and attitudes are rationally 
grounded as they depend on his having a series of beliefs about Jim, friendship, 
promises, and loyalty. Doucet argues that even though Huck acts irrationally from 
his own point of view, the problem is less due to the fact that he has been overtaken 
by an uncontrollable pang of sympathy and more to do with the fact that he failed to 
consider all of the reasons he has for acting. Thus, Huck sees his judgement as a 
‘better judgement’ but in fact he fails to make an all-things-considered judgement, 
and the ignored reasons catch up with him; since Huck failed to consider 
any 
reasons for helping Jim escape when he was deliberating about what to do, yet 
those reasons came to his attention when he was about to act, he certainly did not 
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A similar argument was made in Audi (1990).