Ethical issues in moral and social enhancement

8.3.2. Aristotle’s akrasia, enkrateia and virtue 
In 
Nichomean Ethics
, Aristotle discusses six moral states: heroic virtue, virtue, 
enkrateia, akrasia, vice and brutishness. In this and latter sections I will use four 
states (virtue, enkrateia, akrasia, vice) as a conceptual scaffolding to aid our 
discussion about the desirability of MB. Aristotle defines virtuous character in 
Nicomachean Ethics
as follows:
‘Excellence [of character], then, is a state concerned with choice, 
lying in a mean relative to us, this being determined by reason and 
in the way in which the man of practical wisdom would determine 
it.’ (NE, II.7) 
Aristotle thinks that appropriate inclinations are part of virtue and ascribes marked 
importance to the creation of habit: ‘moral excellence [i.e. virtue] comes about as a 
result of habit’ (NE, 1103a16-17). In the first chapter of Book II Aristotle presents 
his analogy of virtue to the arts largely in order to argue for virtues as sets of skills 
gradually developed over time through practice. By calling virtue a state of 
character, Aristotle does not mean that it is a feeling nor a capacity nor a mere 
tendency to behave in specific ways. In chapter 4 of Book II, Aristotle notes the 
incompleteness of the analogy with the arts, and argues that virtues additionally 
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‘Morally good’ in the thicker sense used in previous chapters: involving being both good 
and motivated by appropriate moral concern. 

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require a person to be in a particular internal state. While ‘it is possible to do 
something grammatical either by chance or under the guidance of another’ (NE, 
1105a22-23) virtue requires more – and that more includes the right inclinations 
and an appropriate cooperation of inclination and reason (NE, 1105a28-30). Right 
inclinations, even if sufficiently fine-tuned, are not sufficient for virtue on their 
own. As a result, MB on its own will never be able to create a virtuous person on 
Aristotle’s account, and thus ‘manufacturing virtue’, is not an option – at least as 
far as Aristotelian virtue in concerned.
However, the right habits and inclinations do contribute to virtuous character. A 
virtuous person knows the good, acts according to the good and her reason is in 
harmony with inclinations. In Aristotle's words, the non-rational part of a virtuous 
person's soul ‘speaks with the same voice’ (
homophônei,
NE
,
1102b28) as the 
rational part. In contrast to a virtuous person, an enkratic or continent person knows 
the good, acts according the good but needs to conquer the passions that nudge 
towards the bad. 
Akrasia involves acting against one's better judgement.
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An 
akratic person is someone who because of his feelings abandons himself against 
correct reason.
According to Aristotle, emotion challenges reason in three ways. In both the akratic 
and the enkratic, it competes with reason for control over action. Second, in the 
akratic, it temporarily robs reason of its full acuity, thus handicapping it as a 
competitor for control over actions – it keeps reason from fully exercising its 
power.
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Third, passion can make someone impetuous; here victory over reason is 
so powerful that the decision does not enter the arena of conscious reflection until it 
is too late to influence action.
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This is the standard view of akrasia. It is not universally shared, however. Perhaps the 
earliest philosophical discussion of akrasia is in Plato’s (1996) 
Protagoras, 
where Socrates 
argues, in effect, that akrasia is impossible, since no one ever knowingly chooses to do 
wrong. All apparent cases of akrasia are in fact cases of weakness of will. Another account 
is that of Watson (2004) who questions the clarity of the distinction between 
(blameworthy) akrasia and (blameless) compulsion.
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According to Aristotle, Socrates argued that there is no akrasia understood as weakness 
of will. A similar position was put forward by Hare (1952). 
When reason remains 
unimpaired and unclouded, its dictates will carry us all the way to action, save for practical 
obstacles. It is only the clouded judgement that makes a person akratic. I follow Aristotle in 
disagreeing with Socrates and Hare: I think that the example of OCD convincingly 
demonstrates that weak willed akrasia is possible.

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Aristotle’s emotions and appetites (
pathos
) do not necessarily translate into strong 
psychological forces: anger is a 
pathos
 
whether it is weak or strong. Aristotle 
clearly indicates that it is possible for an akratic person to be defeated by a 
weak 
pathos
– the kind that most people would easily be able to control. Thus, it is 
not the strength of emotion or inclination itself, but rather the ratio between the 
reasoned control and the behaviour resulting from passions that matters – this latter 
type of akrasia involves the passions ‘overtaking’ reason.
Aristotle’s account considers virtue, enkrateia, akrasia and vice as properties of 
character. Consistently with this, Aristotle describes an akratic individual, an 
individual who more commonly than others succumbs to passions and appetites 
instead of following reason. Following more recent discussions on akrasia, I will 
focus on those concepts as applying to 
actions
instead of 
agents
. I will often talk 
about ‘desires’ and ‘inclinations’, but the same considerations apply to 
biomedically modifiable undepinnings of action in so far as they give rise to 
desires.