Ethical issues in moral and social enhancement

prima facie
desire or 
intention) is present. Although our moral praise, if at all present, is rather luke-
warm when we simply do not have a desire to kill (we rarely morally congratulate 
ourselves or others for not killing), our intuitions become different and more 
complex when a desire is present but overcome by moral considerations. Consider 
the example of Wilson, who at one time formed an intention to kill in revenge, yet 
overcame it by referring to moral considerations, his values and preferences. 
Among other evaluative attitudes we might have, we would likely see the lack of 
immoral action on his part as praiseworthy, similar to praising an addict for not 
taking heroin while a non-addict’s abstinence would not evoke similar moral praise. 
Thus, it seems that the God Machine scenario takes away the meaning of the praise 
mainly for those who might have formed the intention to do a grossly immoral act, 
yet refrained from acting on this intention or changed their minds for moral reasons. 
As important as this can be, this would probably be a small proportion of the 
population of the God Machine society.
The second doubt relates to the fact that we presently have a degree of uncertainty 
about the extent to which the apparent moral behaviours (or lack of grossly immoral 
acts) of others and ourselves are due to virtue or vice. We interpret the behaviour 
we observe in moral terms and play a guessing game to establish intention as well 
as reasons on which a person acted. Moreover, we also have good reasons to accept 
that there is a fair degree of uncertainty about our own reasons for actions. In his 
memoir, Richard P. Feynman (2010), a Nobel Prize winning physicist, describes 
some of his experience with hypnosis. Although he initially intended to uncover the 
hypnotist’s ‘phoniness’ and resolved to try hard to resist the post-hypnotic 
suggestion (to return to his seat only after going around the room three times), in 

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the end he found himself finding reasons to do exactly what the hypnotist 
suggested. It is not only with hypnosis that we sometimes are deluded or self-
deceptive about the reasons and sources of our intentions and actions. 
A long list of cognitive biases adds to the uncertainty. For example, in ‘post-
purchase rationalization’ (Aronson, 2007; Cohen and Goldberg, 1970) the 
purchaser seeks to argue 
post factum
(to others and themselves) that they have 
made a financially sound decision. Although this is typically cited as a ‘cognitive’ 
bias, it speaks powerfully to motivational states which have their roots outside of 
conscious awareness (Bos et al., 2008 ; Custers and Aarts, 2005 , 2007 , 2010 ; 
Dijksterhuis and Aarts, 2010). As a result it makes sense to accept that we do not 
have perfect insight into ours or other's reasons for action and thus cannot be sure 
whether the praise or blame given is given accurately– even without the existence 
of the God Machine. Yet the lack of certainty about the effectively motivating 
reasons for our actions is not normally a sufficient reason to stop morally praising 
or blaming. From the point of view of those living in the God Machine’s world, its 
interventions can be seen as another source of uncertainty and not a significant 
game-changer in terms of ascription of moral blame and praise. Thus, perhaps the 
issue of moral praise and blame in the God Machine world should not worry us.