Ethical issues in moral and social enhancement

CHAPTER 1. What is moral enhancement 
1.1.
 
Introduction 
This introductory chapter addresses the question of what ‘moral enhancement’ can 
be interpreted to be as well as outline possible uses MB can be put to. To explore 
the various ways in which we can understand what ‘moral enhancement’ mean, the 
first section address three senses in which ‘moral’ can be understood, and suggest 
that although those three meanings can be overlapping, they can also diverge. The 
second section addressed the concept of enhancement in the context of the 
treatment enhancement distinction. Given the arguments against the ethical force 
and utility of the treatment-enhancement distinction, the further arguments will 
proceed with understanding ‘enhancement’ to refer to ‘improvement’. Further, I 
argue that the group of beneficial interventions in the morally-relevant sphere is 
ethically interesting and needs to be examined further. This is because the prospect 
of modifying the underpinnings of morality carries with it a possibility of 
prudentially beneficial interventions (‘enhancements’) that would make agents 
worse moral agents (moral dis-enhancements). Finally, I argue that moral 
bioenhancment might not be ‘moral’ in the sense of being all-things-considered 
morally desirable or ethically permissible and thus warrants careful ethical 
attention. 
1.2.
 
Three senses of ‘moral’ 
In this section I explore what we mean by ‘moral enhancement’. I suggest some 
distinctions that might help us to avoid confusion when talking about the matter and 
propose that ‘moral’ can have three meanings in this context. As such, moral 
enhancement can be understood as an ethically desirable enhancement of any 
capacity, an ethically desirable enhancement in the moral sphere, or an enhancing 
intervention affecting the moral sphere that brings an overall benefit to the subject 
of enhancement.