Ethical issues in moral and social enhancement

CHAPTER 2. Hype or hope? Plausibility without techno-utopianism 
2.1.
Introduction
Nordmann (2007) criticised the ethical discourse surrounding nano-, bio- and 
neurotechnologies for what he calls an ‘
if and then syndrome’ (p. 32). He argues 
that the discourse validates the incredible and improbable future and only then 
critiques or endorses such imaginary technology. Nordmann (2007) criticises this 
discourse for squandering the scarce and
valuable resource of ethical concern, 
misleading by
casting remote possibilities or philosophical in principle thought 
experiments
as foresight about likely technical developments, in effect deflecting 
ethical consideration from present transformative technologies. In this chapter, I 
will examine the plausibility of moral modification aimed at creating better moral 
agents in the near future. I will argue that in order to engage in an ethical debate 
more in touch with the present and near and possible future, we need to reconsider 
both the goals and expectations implicitly and explicitly put on MB by Persson and 
Savulescu (2008; Savulescu and Persson, 2012b). In the first sections of this 
chapter, I argue that the prospect of effective MB is indeed implausible is we accept 
the goals of eliminating large-scale harm proposed by Persson and Savulescu 
(2008), given the context dependency and effectiveness of pharmacological 
interventions. The latter part of this chapter examines oxytocin as a trust- an 
empathy- promoting drug to see what we 
can
expect of MB.
2.2
Reconsidering our goals 
In 
The Perils of Cognitive Enhancement and the Urgent Imperative to Enhance the 
Moral Character of Humanity
, Persson and Savulescu (2008) argue that non-
traditional means of enhancement may contribute to the rising risk of considerable 
harm to a large number of people and, therefore, are ethically problematic. They 
suggest, however, that this
 
threat may in theory be offset by moral enhancement, by 
which they understand moral modification aimed at making moral agents that do 
less evil. Accordingly, in their paper MB is seen as a potential tool for eliminating 
this alleged risk of large-scale harm. Since small groups or even individuals may 

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inflict serious harm, the aim of MB is to prevent the ‘morally corrupt minority’ (p. 
162) from doing so.
Let us consider the notion of increasing empathy to illustrate some difficulties with 
this approach to MB. Increasing empathy comes to mind when we think about what 
kinds of intervention might carry out the task that Persson and Savulescu (2008) 
want MB to do. Lack of empathy is sometimes said to be correlated with criminal 
behaviour and it seems sensible to assume that increasing one’s appreciation (be it 
cognitive, affective or both) of others’ suffering will decrease the likelihood of 
behaviour that is likely to result in harm. For the purpose of this argument let us 
assume that there is an intervention that substantially increases empathy and is 
shown to be effective regardless of the measure used to assess the magnitude of that 
effect. But increasing general empathy will most likely not be enough, for several 
reasons— even when we assume that increased empathy is going to make a 
substantial difference to our motivations to act in a certain way (see: Persson and 
Savulescu, 2008; Fenton, 2010; Harris, 2011).
First, we know that moral reasons are not the only basis for action and that 
prudential reasons can override moral ones. Thus, even if increased empathy indeed 
gives rise to reasons not to harm others that are stronger than before, they may not 
be strong enough to cause us to refrain from performing a fatally harmful action. As 
a result, it is reasonable to expect that even a highly efficient intervention will not 
be sufficient to abolish the possibility of harm completely.
Second, there may be cases where an increase in empathy will increase the risk of 
large-scale harm. It is not clear that the allegedly morally corrupt minority that may 
pose a threat acts solely on the basis of non-moral reasons. This claim seems to be 
based on a conflation of two uses of ‘moral’—one to describe a 
kind 
of reason for 
action and ethical assessment of actions. Thus, when we refer to the ‘morally 
corrupt minority’ we might mean ‘those whose acts we judge as immoral’. 
However, it is possible for a terrorist’s actions to at least appear to be based on 
moral reasons, that is, reasons of a moral 
kind
. There is a long tradition of those 
who claim to be fighting for what they consider to be a better world regarding the 
infliction of harm as a necessary evil; sometimes we may support this struggle and 

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sometimes we may denounce it. We may disagree with the moral assessment that 
the terrorist has made, rejecting some or all of her reasons for action, we may 
disagree about which ends are desirable, or we may simply disagree on our 
predictions of likely consequences—chances of success and the cost of bringing 
about the desired end. On the other hand, there is also a long tradition of arguing 
against change despite the harms that result from leaving things as they are.
6
There are other reasons why MB may be unsuitable to serve the purpose Persson 
and Savulescu (2008) want it to serve. They emphasise wickedness as a cause of 
large-scale harm but, as Harris (2011) points out in his response in ‘Moral 
Enhancement and Freedom’, large-scale harm can be inflicted not only by ‘the bad’ 
but also by ‘the mad’. Moreover, it can result from incompetence, stupidity, 
negligence or miscalculation (Harris, 2011, Fenton, 2010). Thus, MB, even if 
possible and effective, is likely to be unable to offset the dangers allegedly brought 
about by cognitive enhancement and the development of science in general. If this 
is the only goal of MB, than we have little chance of achieving it.