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8.3.7. Conclusions
In this section (8.3) I have suggested that MB, insofar as it is agent-led and
embedded in appropriate reflection, can be a desirable way of contributing to
enhancing moral agency. Agent-led biomedical modifications in their inclinations
are best seen to be analogical to a set of emotion modulation mechanisms used in
everyday life, as were considered by Douglas (2014) and are best ethically assessed
in that context. MB is different from some of those mechanisms insofar as it might
involve more stable changes in inclinations than case-by-case emotion modulation,
and so this aspect resembles creating right habits and right internal states.
We often rely on our habits and there is a good reason for that – our self-control is
limited. The fact that self-control resources are limited is a good reason to look for
ways which would help to adjust inclinations so that they have to be overcome less,
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Unless one is of an opinion that most peoples’ moral beliefs are mistaken and facilitating
peoples’ autonomy would lead to more evil than good. I do not share this pessimism.
Usually facilitating individual autonomy is seen as a desirable thing, even if some morally
relevant actions are restricted or punished by law. It leaves the burden of argument on the
critic to demonstrate that their pessimism is justified.
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rather than more often. Although pharmacological means of biomedical
enhancement are blunt tools and their impact will not amount to virtue, perhaps
they could assist us in achieving the inclinations conducive to the good. In contrast
to developing habits conducive to the good, which is effortful and time-consuming,
MB would likely require less time and cognitive resources. The considerations
related to comparative cost-effectiveness of specifically biomedical interventions
discussed in Chapter 2, taken together with the fact that traditional habit change is
effortful and time consuming, make biomedical emotion modification a tool to
consider in aiding moral agency.
As discussed in chapter 2, whether or not moral modification amounts to moral
enhancement understood as making a better moral agent is context dependent and is
best assessed in reference to a particular agent and their situation. Consequently,
such moral enhancement is best pursued via the process of voluntary agent-led
moral modification. In this process, the agent deliberates from a moral standpoint
(as discussed in chapter 3) and with reference to their goals and life plans (as
discussed in Chapter 7) decides what changes in inclinations would facilitate acting
according to the good. As argued in section 8.2. of this chapter, the modifications
continue to be subject to moral review. Although we can disagree about what ends
to pursue and means to choose (see: Chapter 4), ultimately we continue to be moral
agents that have to make those choices. Agent-led biomedical modification that
facilitates the ability of moral agents to act according to their endorsed moral
beliefs would in my view constitute improvement in moral agency and thus moral
enhancement, in Harris’ words, properly so called.
Moreover, finite self-control resources limit our ability to do good enkratically,
which means that changing our inclinations to be more conducive to the good than
the unmodified ones could be considered to be a legitimate way of moral
enhancement, These considerations lower the threshold at which emotion
modulation can meaningfully aid moral agency and make for a prima facie
attractive option all-things-considered – resulting in a more modest, but also more
achievable goal for emotion modulation as applied to enhancing moral agency.
There is no ‘magic pill’ that would make people act in a more moral way and the
effects of every enhancement are going to be dependent on already held beliefs, the
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agent’s existing ability for self-control and context. This, however, is not a strong
argument against biomedical attempts at emotion modulation, once we consider it
to best be agent-led, voluntary and embedded in deliberation. Such biomedical
emotion modulation can promote self-governance and moral agency. In contrast,
compulsory MB looks much less desirable in this context. I have argued that in
many cases we act in a
de facto
weak willed way, but even in the akratically acting
agent there are ethical reasons against the compulsory use of MB. Even though the
problem of akrasia is not a specifically moral one, it is one to be considered when
we talking about pursuing moral enhancement understood as making better moral
agents. I have argued that such moral enhancement can include helping people in
circumstances similar to speculative cases of Chloe and Andrew in this chapter,
people who know the good but experience problems with making their endorsed
moral belief ‘sink in’ to the level of action. Contrary to some commentators, in
section 8.3.5 I argued that such conceived moral enhancement is a valuable addition
to our toolkit.
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