Encyclopedia of Islam

al-Qaida

  

565  J

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by coordinated suicide bombings (seen as an al-

Qaida trademark) against the American embas-

sies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, and 

against the USS Cole, a destroyer docked in the 

Yemeni port of Aden, in October 2000. After the 

U.S.-led coalition’s 2003 invasion of Iraq, young 

Sunnis from various countries were recruited to 

form the “al-Qaida in Mesopotamia Group,” a 

jihadist guerrilla organization under the leader-

ship of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (1966–2006), 

a Jordanian militant who had been marginally 

involved in the Afghan jihad. This group, though 

small in size, attacked U.S. troops and is suspected 

of having fomented Sunni-Shii conflict through a 

campaign of suicide bombings and assassinations, 

causing many civilian casualties. It also claimed 

responsibility for the bombing of a luxury hotel 

in Amman, Jordan, in 2005. Although Zarqawi 

is known to have been in communication with 

al-Zawahiri, there is no evidence of a direct chain-

of-command connection between the two organi-

zations. In addition, deadly public transportation 

bombings in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2006 

were allegedly conducted by local al-Qaida cells, 

but no direct connection has been established. 

Most likely they were carried out by individuals 

who had been inspired by al-Qaida’s propaganda. 

A group called al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghrib, 

which appears to be a spin-off from the Armed 

Islamic Group, has conducted bombings in a

lge

-

ria

 to deadly effect since 2006. Al-Qaida has also 

been linked to terrorist attacks in Indonesia and 

the Philippines.

Al-Qaida’s notoriety and continued existence 

has generated much controversy around the world 

between Muslims and non-Muslims, and among 

Muslims themselves, about the nature of its rela-

tion to Islam. Even though more is now known 

about the organization than in the past, a body of 

politicians, scholars, religious leaders, and edito-

rialists persists in equating its ideology and use of 

violence with Islam as a whole, both in the distant 

past and in the current post–cold war period. This 

understanding has had an impact on policymak-

ing, security measures, and military planning 

domestically and internationally. The chief defect 

in this line of thought is that it overlooks both 

the great diversity of forms Islam has assumed 

historically as well as the widespread rejection 

of al-Qaida’s ideology and tactics by govern-

ments of Muslim-majority countries and ordinary 

Muslims. Another group of politicians, scholars, 

religious leaders, and editorialists has persisted 

in minimizing or denying any connection with 

Islam at all. While this denial may help temporar-

ily deflect criticism and suspicion from Islam and 

Muslims, the vast majority of whom have nothing 

to do with al-Qaida and its spin-offs, it neverthe-

less fails to give serious consideration to the fact 

that al-Qaida’s leaders and membership believe 

themselves to actually be good Muslims seek-

ing to defend Islam and the wider Muslim 

umma

from their enemies. Between the two extremes of 

polemics and apologetics there are more balanced 

understandings that are conducive to a better 

assessment of the nature of Islamic radicalism, 

the actual threat al-Qaida poses, and how to best 

proceed to counteract that threat. The report of 

the 9/11 Commission, for example, found, “most 

Muslims prefer a peaceful and inclusive vision of 

their faith . . . [and] are repelled by mass murder 

and barbarism whatever their justification.” But it 

also concluded that bin Ladin and other Islamists 

“draw on a long tradition of extreme intolerance 

within one stream of Islam (a minority tradition)” 

that was “further fed by grievances stressed by 

bin Ladin and widely felt throughout the Muslim 

world.”

See also  a

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al

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ahman

, U

mar

;  a

rab

-i

sraeli

conFlicts

;  e

Urope

;  g

UlF

 W

ars

;  i

slamism

; 

Jihad

movements

; 

pan

-i

slamism

; W

ahhabism

.