Safavid and Ottoman Turkish empires and was
often controlled by local clients of these powers.
Although Najaf and Karbala prospered as centers
of Shii learning and pilgrimage, the region as a
whole continued to stagnate until the Ottomans
initiated far-reaching administrative reforms in
the 19th century.
IrAQ IN ThE 19Th AND 20Th
CENTurIES
The Ottomans divided Iraq into three provinces—
Mosul in the north, Baghdad in the center, and
Basra in the south; repaired and expanded the irri-
gation system; and legislated land tenure reforms
that promoted the settlement of Arab pastoral
tribes in the south. These changes fostered urban
growth and enhanced the status of Shii religious
authorities in their shrine cities. Ottoman rulers,
upholders of s
Unnism
, wished to placate Iraq’s Shii
Ulama
and their supporters in order to keep rival
powers at bay, including Persians and Europeans.
The ulama seized the opportunity to win the
con
-
version
of southern Iraq’s tribal population. Con-
sequently, the majority of Iraq’s population became
Shii by the early 1920s. Ottoman dominion over
Iraq ended because of their alliance with Germany
during World War I, which was defeated by the
Allied Powers, including Britain and France, in
1918. Britain ruled Iraq as a mandate territory
from 1918 to 1932 under the authority of the
secret Sykes-Picot Agreement it had made with
France during the war, later upheld at the postwar
international San Remo Conference (1920). The
Shia of southern Iraq led a tribal uprising (intifada)
that was decisively ended by the British the same
year. Attempting to legitimate their mandate, the
British installed Faysal ibn Husayn (d. 1933), the
son of the ruler of Hijaz, as monarch. In fact, they
only succeeded in creating a Sunni monarchy that
failed to win the loyalty of most Iraqis. It survived
a number of coup attempts and demonstrations
until 1958, when it was violently ended by a revolt
led by Iraqi Free Officers under the command of
Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim.
The b
aath
p
arty
, which had established a
branch in Iraq in the 1950s, first came to power
in Iraq in 1963, when it deposed Qasim’s govern-
ment and executed him. It conducted a bloody
purge of Qasim’s supporters, particularly leftists
and communists. The first Baath regime lasted
only a few months before it was in turn over-
thrown by non-Baath Arab nationalist officers. In
1968, after the stunning defeat of Arab forces by
Israel in 1967, the Baath Party returned and was
quickly able to gain nearly absolute control of the
country. One of the most prominent figures in the
new regime was s
addam
h
Usayn
(d. 2006), who
had risen through the ranks of the party, often
by violent means. He became Iraq’s president in
1979. The Baath government, composed mostly
of Sunnis, espoused a secular Arab identity. With
growing revenues from oil exports, it was able to
modernize and expand Iraq’s infrastructure and
educational system as well as its military. The cost
of this was dear, however, as the Shii majority was
denied full political participation, leftist move-
ments were eradicated, Jews were persecuted,
and Kurds were repressed. Shii political move-
ments, such as the d
aaWa
p
arty
(founded in the
late 1950s) and the Supreme Council for Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI, founded in the early
1980s), arose, but their leaders were imprisoned,
assassinated, or driven into exile. Iran’s Ayatollah
r
Uhollah
k
homeini
was granted asylum from the
shah’s security forces in 1964, but he was forced
to leave Iraq by Saddam Husayn in 1978.
Beginning in 1980, Iraq became involved in
a continuous series of g
UlF
W
ars
of national,
regional, and global scope that have continued to
afflict it in the first decades of the 21st century. In
1980, it went to war with Khomeini’s newly estab-
lished Islamic Republic of Iran to gain control of
the Shatt al-Arab and Iran’s oil fields nearby. That
conflict ended only after more than eight years
with a truce when Khomeini died in 1989. Dur-
ing the war, Iraqi forces used chemical weapons
against Iranians and against their own Kurdish
population in the north. It was a very costly
K 370
Iraq
conflict in terms of loss of life and economic
damage for both countries. Iraq then invaded
Kuwait in 1990 because of a dispute over oil,
precipitating the next major Gulf War. In 1991,
after an extended campaign of aerial bombing
that destroyed much of Iraq’s infrastructure, an
international coalition of forces led by the United
States expelled Iraq from Kuwait. Thinking they
might be able to overthrow the government, Shiis
in the south and Kurds in the north revolted. The
coalition powers allowed Iraq’s military to quell
the uprisings. However, they forced the govern-
ment to give up its high-grade weapons programs
and stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction.
A UN-sponsored embargo was also imposed to
gain Iraq’s compliance, at great cost to ordinary
Iraqis. U.S. and British warplanes enforced no-fly
zones over the northern and southern parts of the
country and periodically bombed Iraqi military
installations during the 1990s.
EArly 21ST-CENTury IrAQ
Saddam Husayn’s Baath dictatorship finally fell in
April 2003 when U.S. and British forces invaded
Iraq on the premises that Iraq was stockpiling
weapons of mass destruction and supporting radi-
cal Islamic terrorism. With the fall of Baghdad,
the army was disbanded, Baath Party members
were dismissed from their jobs, and the occupying
powers created an interim government to rule the
country. It was led by a council composed of rep-
resentatives from different sectors of Iraq’s popula-
tion. The Arab Shia and the Kurds took advantage
of the situation to maximize their political inter-
ests against those of the Arab Sunnis, who had
controlled the country since the days of Ottoman
rule. The Daawa Party and the Supreme Council
for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI; now called
the Supreme Islamic Council) returned from exile
in Iran, while many Shiis turned to the ulama in
Najaf for guidance. Three religious figures became
particularly prominent at this time—Ayatollah Ali
Sistani (b. 1930), a senior Iranian-born cleric; Abd
al-Aziz al-Hakim (b. 1950), head of SCIRI and a
cleric; and Muqtada al-Sadr (b. 1973), a militant
young cleric and member of the widely beloved
Sadr family. The U.S.-led invasion of 2003, there-
fore, helped give Iraq’s Shia a dominant position
in the government. Their position was confirmed
in the January 2005 elections, when a coalition
of Shii parties gained a parliamentary majority,
and the first two prime ministers they appointed
were members of the Daawa Party. Moreover, in
refutation of the previous Baath regime’s secular
outlook, the new Iraqi constitution stipulated that
Islam was the national religion and the basis of the
country’s laws, although freedom of religion was
also recognized.
Since the U.S. and British occupation began
in 2003, many parts of the country have seen
increasing levels of violence. Indeed, some experts
have observed that Iraq has become afflicted with
at least five wars, often overlapping with each
other. These are the war of Iraqi opposition to
U.S. occupation forces and their allies; the war
between government and Baathist militias; the war
of foreign jihadis affiliated with
al
-q
aida
against
occupation forces and the Shia (who are seen as
infidels); the war between rival Shii militias; and
the border war between Kurdish guerrillas and
Turkey. Iran is also reported to be involved in
these conflicts by providing support for Shii mili-
tias and Shii blocs in the government. According
to some estimates, more than half a million Iraqis
have lost their lives in this violence, and about
4 million have become
reFUgees
. Many observ-
ers are pessimistic about the chances for an end
to the violence in the near future. As a solution,
some recommend that the country be partitioned
into three semiautonomous states—Kurdish in
the north, Shii in the south, and Sunni in the
middle.
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