Department of International Relations, University of World Economy and Diplomacy

Asadbek Abduqahhorov

Department of International Relations, University of World Economy and Diplomacy.

Geopolitics.

Firdavs Kobilov, teaching assistant.

April 7, 2022.

Question number 3.

Analyze the main theoretical narratives – and their applications – that have shaped and are shaping geopolitical debate from the 19th to the 21st centuries.

Abstract: In this essay, I will attempt to analyze the main theoretical narratives that have shaped and are shaping geopolitical debates from the 19th to the 21st century, and their application. The essay consists of two parts in addition to the introduction and the conclusion. These parts classical geopolitical theory and modern geopolitical theory.

Key word: political geography, geopolitics, geostrategy, model, vision.

Introduction: Defining geopolitics being a notoriously difficult task, it is proposed to use two working definitions as a starting point. The first definition proposed by the political geographers Van der Wusten and Dijkink (2002, p. 20) is threefold, since the term geopolitics can be used for "a type of analysis using data concerning the international position of a country at the light of its geographical features; "a set of rules applicable in the conduct of the art based on these analyses"; and "a discourse, a sustained argument, which describes and evaluates the position of a country in the world, possibly on the basis of such analyzes and the application of such rules. xiv) makes an interesting distinction between the geopolitical, the strategic and the geostrategic: "Geopolitics reflects the combination of geographical and political factors determining the condition of a state or region, and emphasizing the influence of geography on politics, strategic refers to the whole and the "planned application of measures to achieve a central objective or vital assets of military importance; and geostrategy merges consideration with geopolitics. These definitions provide some clarity, but fall far short of fully accounting for the diversity of meanings given to geopolitics.

The spatial analysis of political phenomena is the object of study of political geography and geopolitics. The 19th century was a formative period for the modern social sciences and it was in its latter part that political geography gradually established itself as a branch of the academic discipline of geography. The publication by the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel of his great classic Politische Geographie (1897), in this respect, is universally recognized as the first systematic treatment of the subject. However, political geography has remained a minor genre within geography as a whole, and within human geography in particular. The word Geopolitik was originally coined, in Swedish, by political scientist Rudolf Kjellen in 1899, in an article on his country's geography. The use of this new term was a way of distinguishing what he saw as an entirely legitimate branch of political science from geography and anthropology (Holdar, 1992; Tunander, 2001). Kjellen's intention was “to construct an objective way of analyzing the evolution of state power and to examine how this process has affected interstate relations” (Holdar, 1992, p. 307). , using an organic analogy, saw it as “the study of the state as an organism or geographical phenomenon in space; that is, as a land, territory, region or, above all, as a country” (Kjellen, 1917, p. 46). An analytical framework envisaged the study of the location of a state in relation to other states (Topopolitik), the shape of its territory (Morphopolitik), as well as its size/area (Physiopolitik) (Holdar, 1992, p. 312) . It should be emphasized that Geopolitik was only one of the five dimensions of the study of the state, along with Demopolitik, Oekopolitik, Sociopolitik and Kratopolitik. In turn, the study of the state was part of a much larger and far more ambitious intellectual project, developing an all-encompassing systematic approach to political science, the ultimate goal of which was to provide a Linnaean system (Holdar, 1992 , p.309).

Geopolitics has long suffered, and still suffers to some extent, from being associated with both the German school of geopolitics, itself associated with Nazi barbarism.

Following Germany's defeat in World War I, Major General Karl Haushofer developed his own doctrine of geopolitics. The aim was to discredit the Treaty of Versailles, which had humiliatingly imposed a traumatic territorial amputation on Germany. Kjellen's concept of Geopolitik was thus "adopted, adapted and eventually distorted for political ends" (Mead, 1972, p. 9). Haushofer always remained vague on the definition and the theoretical foundations of Geopolitik (Heske, 1987, p. 140). It is clear, however, that a geodermal perspective underlay his geopolitical thinking, as Murphy (1997) has shown. Abdicating the scientific grounding of geography, for a pseudo-scientific approach, clearly pitted Geopolitik unequivocally against Ratzelian Politische Geography. Spatial concepts such as Lebensraum, Grossraum and Mitteleuropa were uncritically deployed and combined with "magic cartography" as means of propaganda to promote an expansionist agenda (Herb, 1989). Haushofer, without ever formally joining the National Socialist Party, was nevertheless closely associated with some of its leaders and, after 1933, became an apologist for the new regime and was rewarded with honors. (Korinman, 1990, p. 265; p.261-262) It is a fact that Geopolitik was integrated into National Socialist politics after 1933, but that does not mean that Geopolitik directly informed politics. German foreigner (Crone, 1948).
Little is known that the adjective geopolitics and the substantive geopolitics respectively appeared in the English language as early as 1902 and 1904. It was under the pen of Emil Reich, a Hungarian polymath who had settled in Great Britain (Reich, 1904, pages 8-9). For him, geopolitics was “the combined influence of geographical and political facts is one of the most decisive elements of human institutions” (Reich, 1908b, p. v). and the term Geo-Politics were quickly forgotten. Short (1935) seems to be the only one to use the term Geo-Politics, but this was in a popular book of limited interest. It was not until World War II that the term began to come into common use in English. As Germany takes control of continental Europe, the phenomenon of geopolitics is generating a lot of press interest in the United States, as it is seen as the secret to German success. At the same time, the geopolitical reasoning of British geographer and Liberal Unionist politician Sir Halford Mackinder, one of the leading figures of the new British geography at the turn of the century, was rediscovered. He, who never used the term geopolitics to describe his thinking, simply intended to use his discipline, geography, as "an aid to the art of governing".
In “The Geographical Pivot of History” (1904), he had pertinently noted a closure of the World, and sought “a formula [...] expressing certain aspects. . . geographical causality in universal history” (Mackinder, 1904, p. 421).

From then on, he ventured to carry out an analysis on a truly global scale, based on the historical opposition between continental powers and maritime powers. It was a question of developing a provocative and ambitious hypothesis by arguing that the vast continental and arctic drainage zone of Central Asia, the pivotal zone or core-earth, had long been the geographical pivot of history and remained the "pivot of world politics". Finally, offering a representation of the world divided into three strategic areas, hub or core area, inner crescent and outer crescent, it warns that control of the core could become the basis for global domination, by one or a combination of continental powers. He felt it was absolutely necessary for the maritime powers to adapt to the threat from the continental powers. In Mackinder (1919), what was initially only a “working hypothesis” became the thesis of the heart, without providing a rigorous demonstration of its theoretical validity. He warned that the triumph of the grand democratic ideal could be short-lived unless “the geographical realities that have a lasting influence on world politics” are fully taken into account; a power that controlled both Eastern Europe and the Heartland would be able to dominate the World Island (Europe, Africa, and Asia), and in turn the entire world. Accordingly, he recommended the creation of an "intermediate tier" of seven permanent, independent states between Russia and Germany.

An American school of geopolitics also suddenly appeared during World War II. For example, Yale political scientist Nicholas Spykman has proposed an analysis of the position of the United States "in terms of geography and power politics", in order to allow the formulation of a "grand strategy for war and peace based on the implications of its location in the world (Spykman, 1942, p. 8).' Spykman at the time played an influential role in reorienting American foreign policy from isolationism to ‘interventionist globalism.’ Using Mackinder as the basis for the development of his geopolitical theory, he argued that this was what which Mackinder called "Inner or Marginal Crescent", in other words the periphery rather than the heart of the country which was truly critical, which he named the Rimland (Meinig, 1956, p.554).
During the World War, Mackinder himself was asked to write an update of his geopolitical theory, which he did in "The Round World and the Winning of the Peace", published in Foreign Affairs (Mackinder, 1943).
In the immediate post-war period, the Haushofer experience left a lasting mark. As Parker (1993, p. 1072) notes, "for an entire generation, the now discredited Geopolitik tended to cast doubt on the integrity of political geography as a whole." As a result, after 1945, political geography took on a typically apolitical orientation, but also, besides electoral geography, had very little interaction with political science. The British geographer Leslie Hepple (1986, p. S23), analyzing this decline of geopolitics in Europe and the United States after the war, notes that "the general picture of the 1950s and 1960s is one of a geopolitics avoided and relegated to historical sections. of texts in both political geography and political science, and the word itself has little importance in academic or political debates. Outside of academia, geopolitics has not completely disappeared, and has survived in very specific niches, notably the military, in the United States and beyond (Sloan, 1988). Geopolitical theory appears to have been extremely influential in the 1950s and 1960s and to have informed the strategy of containment, practiced by the US government, and its correlate, the domino theory (Sloan, 1988).
In 1963, in a courageous attempt to speak truth to power, American geographer Saul Cohen offered a forceful rebuttal of the "Heartland-Rimland Thesis", claiming that: "The free world has become the victim of a myth - the myth of the inherent unity of World Island, given the unity of Heartland in combination with part of the Rimland.

An addition to the myth is that sea-based powers can only hold their position if complete control over all parts of the Eurasian coast is maintained. This is the myth that stems from Mackinder's earlier writings and Spykman's retorts (Cohen, 1963, p. 59).

Wisely taking the precaution of emphasizing that he was not "challenging the thesis that control of the World-Island by a single power would ultimately amount to control of the world", Cohen concluded that "those who accepted the Heartland-thesis Rimland also accepted the "Falling dominoes game applied to Rimland." They went into a frenzy of effort to plug every possible leak from the Rimland levee, regardless of the risks involved in making commitments or the chances of success (Cohen, 1963, p. 59). , as Cohen in his landmark treatise, Geography and Politics in a Divided World (1963), explicitly developed a framework for geopolitical analysis, the purpose of which was both the "description of geographical contexts in relation to political power" and "the establishment of spatial frameworks that encompass interacting units of political power" (Cohen, 1963, p. 25). The publication of The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution (1977), by Colin Gray, marked the revival of geopolitical theory.

One of the main proponents of contemporary geopolitical theory is Colin Gray, who, strongly influenced by the work of Mackinder and Spykman, professes his adherence to the orthodoxy of classical geopolitics (Gray, 1977, 1988, p. 2005). Defining geopolitics as "the spatial study and practice of international relations", which "explains the dynamic spatial dimension of certain persistent conflicting patterns in international relations", he considers that "geopolitics is a variant of classical realism" (Gray , 2005, pp 18, 28 and 29). Gray (1988, p.15) summarizes his views by writing that for him, “world-island-Eurasian-African control by one power would mean, in the long run, world control. […] Land power and sea power meet / clash in the Eurasian and African Rimlands and marginal seas. Control of these Rimlands and fringe seas by an island power does not mean control of the world island, but it does mean the denial of eventual world hegemony to the power of the Heartland (i.e. say the Soviet Union) (Gray, 1988, p. 15).'

Another example is the work of former United States National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who, also invoking Mackinder's legacy, produced a series of geostrategic studies. From Game plan, A Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the U.S.-Soviet Contest (1986), he regularly updates his analysis, based on the core theory, to take into account new post-Soviet realities. cold War. . Brzezinski writes (1997, p. xiii-xiv), “Since the continents began to interact politically some five hundred years ago, Eurasia has been the center of global power [...] Foreign policy . ..] must use its influence in Eurasia in a way that creates a stable continental balance, with the United States as the political arbiter [...] it is imperative that no Eurasian challenger emerge capable of dominating the Eurasia and therefore also to challenge America. The work, concerned with the politics of hegemony, has been criticized for developing a form of analysis intended to advance a specific political agenda.
However, geopolitical theory is not limited to conservative political analysis. We can cite in this regard the neo-Weberian geopolitical theory developed by the American sociologist Randall Collins, which enabled him to predict, as early as 1980, “the future decline of the Russian Empire” (Collins, 1986, 1995, 1999).

Collins explained how "in extending conflict theory, [he] decided to take seriously Max Weber's definition of the state as the monopolization of legitimate force over territory". To make this definition an explanatory theory meant to treat everything it contained as a variable; the result was a theory of the conditions that determine the geopolitical rises and falls of territorial power, as well as the consequences that flow from these shifts in power (Collins, 1995, p. 1552). The last version of his geopolitical theory, which highlighted the main principles of causal processes, includes five principles: 1) the advantage of size and resources favors territorial expansion; 2) the geopolitical advantage or “marketland” promotes territorial expansion; 3) overextension and disintegration; 4) interaction of geopolitical disadvantages; and 5) interconnected by cumulative dynamics. Using his theory, Collins made some remarkable predictions about the impending collapse of the USSR, which in retrospect seem exceptionally impressive (Collins, 1995). However, he frankly admits that: “Current [geopolitical] theory is not very precise. [...] from the evidence available in 1980, I predicted that the USSR would disintegrate within thirty to fifty years. Frankly, I was surprised that it happened so soon, but it was certainly in my forecast” (Collins, 1999, p. 64).

A first form of geopolitical analysis is based on a global approach, better explained by the works of Saul Cohen (1963, 1973 and 2003) and Gérard Dussouy (2001, 2006, 2007 and 2009), but the systemic approach of Alastair Taylor (1999) is also worth mentioning. Cohen's thought on global geopolitics draws on general systems theory, "combining the concepts of the organism of Herbert Spencer, the sociologist, with those of Heinz Werner, the psychologist, and Ludwig von Bertalanffy, the psychobiologist (Cohen, 2003, p. 58) Its aim was “to identify the nature of the complex geopolitical structure of the world and the roles and capacities of its various components. It is the hope of this author that a better understanding of the geopolitical forces that shape the international system can lead to shared national strategies that promote the maintenance of global balances” (Cohen, 2003, p. 9). Cohen saw geopolitical analysis as having two main purposes, the “description of geographic frameworks in relation to political power” and the “presentation of frameworks that encompass interacting units of political power” (Cohen, 1963, p. 25) ". Its analytical framework was based on three key elements. concepts: geostrategic regions, which have global extent, their subdivisions, geopolitical regions, directly derived from geographic regions, which have only regional extent, and shatterbelts, "a large strategically located region[s] ] ] […] occupied by a number of conflicting states and is caught between the conflicting interests of neighboring great powers (Cohen, 1963, p. 83).” The initial concept of geostrategic regions evolved into that of geopolitical spheres, new concepts have been developed, such as bridge regions, definition and bridge states, “small trading states with qualified sovereignty that will emancipate themselves from existing national entities to help connect the global system” (Cohen, 1991, p. 551 ).'
Gérard Dussouy (2001, 2006, 2007, 2009) more recently presented a fascinating model, based on the analysis of the systemic geopolitical configuration, in which complexity is approached by successively looking at five spaces. Three central levels, the demographic space, the diplomatic and strategic space and the economic space, form the geopolitical infrastructure. It articulates with the physical space, while the symbolic space crowns the building. The concept of power is represented by a vertical central axis, which connects the five spaces.

Vertically, the inter-dimensional relations reflect the relations of uncertainty, dominant or not, as well as reveal the variability of the position of each actor from one dimension to another, the line connecting the different points symbolizing the power of the 'actor. This model also involves analyzing the variables of the configuration to account for the parameters of evolution both for each field but also for the overall power structure. For this purpose, there are 3 double axes of analysis: local/global; war/peace heterogeneity/homogeneity. For the first, Dussouy considering that a simple dialectical approach would not be enough to fully account for the complexity, Dussouy resorts to trialectic logic, involving 3 distinct dynamics: assimilating homogeneity, the antagonistic balance of heterogeneity as well as homogeneity adaptation.

16The revival of geopolitics, from the 1970s, was also marked by the development of empirical geopolitical analysis. Yves Lacoste attempted to combine the theoretical foundations of geography and history, and rather than developing a geopolitical theory, he focused on developing a methodology for geopolitical analysis (Claval, 2000; Hepple 2000 ). Such an approach is characterized by a number of specific features.
It is first of all the use of maps, often in the form of what Lacoste called diatopes, that is to say a type of representation formed by the superposition on the same graph of maps at different scales, who conceptually claim to belong to Geographers and to Space, whereas diachronicity belongs to Historians and to Time. Often resorting to different levels of spatial analysis, from the small to the large scale, Lacoste has developed a classification of spatial sets into eight levels of spatial analysis. The accent is clearly placed on him who frequently resorts to the use of comparisons of scales as well as to the study of the intersections of spatial sets. While there is a clear emphasis on regional issues in Lacoste's work, he has more recently been concerned with more global perspectives (Lacoste, 2006).
17A second form of geopolitical analysis based on an empirical approach can be found in the work of researchers interested in mental maps and geopolitical visions. In a pioneering study, Alan Henrikson (1980) suggested the relevance of studying the “mental maps” or “cognitive maps of foreign political decision-makers”. In National Identity and Geopolitical Visions, the Dutch political geographer Gertjan Dijkink (1996) showed how insightful a discourse-based analysis of geopolitical visions can be for understanding the national experience of place, by conducting a series of studies of very stimulating cases. Building on his definition of a geopolitical view as "any idea concerning the relationship between one's own place and others, involving feelings of (in)security or (dis)advantage (and/or) invoking ideas about a collective mission or a foreign policy strategy", Dijkink has defined an analytical framework, based on five main elements. It was therefore a question of successively studying: 1) the justification of both the “naturalness” of territorial borders and the way in which a central core continually reinforces national unity; 2) geopolitical codes, a concept borrowed from John Gaddis (1982, ix), who defined it as the "assumptions about [national] interests in the world, potential threats to them, and possible responses"; 3) choosing other countries and their foreign policy as a model to follow or reject; 4) the idea of ​​a national mission; 5) assumptions about interpersonal (even divine) forces. Although Dijkink's study focused on national identity, he pointed out that it was eminently applicable to non-state actors (Dijkink, 1996, p. 11).

In conclusion, over the last twenty years or so, geopolitical reasoning has come under sustained and continuous attack. This is notably the case of a certain number of radical geographers who, rejecting the validity of geopolitical reasoning, have developed an alternative critical geopolitics, inspired by postmodernism. (Ó Tuathail, 1996, 2003) It nevertheless seems that a solid argument can be made in support of the idea that geopolitics as an intellectual project, interdisciplinary in its essence, constitutes a valid form of scientific research relevant to policies. A notion of grounding the use of geopolitics as a thinking/non-thinking space can help in this regard, facilitating the positive integration of contributions from various fields of research and defining a common framework for geopolitical research. Exploring a common research agenda seems entirely relevant, which could be based on a common framework. From the point of view of geopolitical analysis, two major avenues seem to be of particular interest. First, the extremely sophisticated systemic geopolitical model developed by Gérard Dussouy offers very interesting possibilities, which deserve to be explored further. Second, the potential synergies between the different approaches and the possibility of bringing them together in an integrating framework are also worth exploring further. For example, the models and methodologies developed by Dussouy, Dijkink and Lacoste, could very well offer an excellent starting point in this regard. Such a framework could combine three complementary modes of analysis, which would consider concomitantly the systemic geopolitical configuration (i.e. the "observed system"), the geopolitical culture of the key agents (i.e. observation systems”), and finally specific geopolitical situations, placing them in a contextual perspective. Crossing theoretical divisions can, however, present serious difficulties, particularly of an epistemological nature. Shouldn't this, however, deter further explorations of what could, or should, be a fruitful research program for geopolitics in the 21st century? Encouraging both empirical research and sustained reflection on theoretical and methodological issues seems to be a way forward.

Reference:
BRZEZINSKI, Z., 1997, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, New York, Basic Books.
BRZEZINSKI, Z., 1986, “Game plan. How to Conduct the American-Soviet Contest,” Boston, The Atlantic Monthly Press.
CLAVAL, P., 2000, “Hérodote et la gauche française”, in Dodds, K. Geopolitical traditions: a century of geopolitical thought, London, Routledge, p. 239-267.
COHEN, S. B., 2003, Geopolitics of the World System, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield.
COHEN, S.B., 1991, “Presidential Address: Global Geopolitical Change in the Post-Cold War Era”, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol. 81, no. 4, p. 551-580.
MACKINDER, H. J., 1919, Democratic Ideals and Reality: a Study in the Politics of Reconstruction, London, Constable.
MACKINDER, H.J., 1904, “The Geographical Pivot of History”, The Geographical Journal, vol. 23, p. 421-444.
Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan, eds., Geopolitics: Geography and Strategy (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 1-11, 161-77.
Geoffrey Parker, Geopolitics: Past, Present, and Future (London: Pinter, 1998), “Chapter 3” 24-57.
K. Haushofer, "Why Geopolitics?" » pg. 33-35.