Contents: Introduction I. Neologisms in English

The structure of the course work
The paper consists of the Introduction, three chapters and the Conclusion. The introductory part gives why this topic should be studied with its possible objectives outlining the framework of the whole paper. It also includes justification of the choice of the topic and presents the research aims and the hypothesis. Chapter I, which is the theoretical part of the paper, provides background theoretical information about language and thought, the overall picture of the historical context, their usage, types, cultural acceptance and formation. In Chapter II, different types of language and thought are discussed. The following Chapter III focuses on the practical analysis and provides the description of the results obtained. On the basis of such results a summary of the linguistic analysis is presented in the Conclusion, which also comments on the aims and the hypothesis of the course work.

I. An Investigation into the Relationship between Language and Thought
1.1 Language is sketchy. Thought is rich
There are several reasons to believe that thought processes, while perhaps influenced by the forms of language, are not literally definable over representations that are isomorphic to linguistic representations. One is the pervasive ambiguity of words and sentences. Bat, bank, and bug all have multiple meanings in English and hence are associated with multiple concepts, but these concepts themselves are clearly distinct in thought, as shown inter alia by the fact that one may consciously construct a pun¹. Moreover, several linguistic expressions, including pronouns ( he, she) and indexical ( here, now ), crucially rely on context for their interpretation, while the thoughts they are used to express are usually more specific. Our words are often semantically general, that is, they fail to make distinctions that are nevertheless present in thought: uncle in English does not semantically specify whether the individual comes from the mother’s or the father’s side or whether he is a relative by blood or marriage, but usually the speaker who utters this word (my uncle . . .) possesses the relevant information. Indeed, lexical items typically take on different interpretations tuned to the occasion of use (He has a square face; The room is hot) and depend on inference for their precise construal in different contexts. For example, the implied action is systematically different when we open an envelope/a can/an umbrella/a book or when an instance of that class of actions is performed to serve different purposes: open the window to let in the evening breeze/the cat. Moreover, there are cases where linguistic output does not even encode a complete thought/proposition (Tomorrow, Maybe). Finally, the presence of implicates and other kinds of pragmatic inference ensures that—to steal a line from the Mad Hatter—while speakers generally mean what they say, they do not and could not say exactly what they mean.
From this and related evidence, it appears that linguistic representations underdetermine the conceptual contents they are used to convey: Language is sketchy compared to the richness of our thoughts. In light of the limitations of language, time, and sheer patience, language users make reference by whatever catch-as-catch-can methods they find handy, including the waitress who famously told another that “The ham sandwich wants his check”. In this context, the ham sandwich, and the man seated are communicatively equivalent. What chiefly matters to talkers and listeners is that successful reference be made, whatever the means at hand. If one tried to say all and exactly what one meant, conversation could not happen; speakers would be lost in thought. Instead, conversation involves a constant negotiation in which participants estimate and update each other’s background knowledge as a basis for what needs to be said versus what is mutually known and inferable².
In limiting cases, competent listeners ignore linguistically encoded meaning if it patently differs from (their estimate of) what the speaker intended, for instance, by smoothly and rapidly repairing slips of the tongue. Oxford undergraduates had the wit, if not the grace, to snicker when Reverend Spooner said, or is reputed to have said, “Work is the curse of the drinking classes.” Often the misspeaking is not even consciously noticed but is repaired to fi t the thought, evidence enough that the word and the thought are two different matters. The same latitude for thought to range beyond established linguistic means holds for the speakers, too. Wherever the local linguistic devices and locutions seem insufficient or overly constraining, speakers invent or borrow words from another language, devise similes and metaphors, and sometimes make permanent additions and subtractions to the received tongue. It would be hard to understand how they do so if language were itself, and all at once, both the format and the vehicle of thought.
If this is right, then the study of diff erent linguistic systems may throw light onto the diverse modes of thinking encouraged or imposed by such systems. Th e importance of this position cannot be overestimated: Language here becomes a vehicle for the growth of new concepts— those which were not theretofore in the mind, and perhaps could not have been there without the intercession of linguistic experience. At the limit it is a proposal for how new thoughts can arise in the mind as a result of experience with language rather than as a result of experience with the world of objects and events.
The possibility that language is a central vehicle for concept formation has captured the interest of many linguists, anthropologists, philosophers, and psychologists and led to a burgeoning experimental exploration that attempts to find the origins and substance of aspects of thought and culture in the categories and functions of language. Before turning to these specifics, however, we want to emphasize that most modern commentators fall somewhere between the extremes—either that language simply “is” or “is not” the crucial progenitor of higher order cognition. To our knowledge, none of those who are currently advancing linguistic-relativistic themes and explanations believe that infants enter into language acquisition in a state of complete conceptual nakedness, later redressed (perhaps we should say “dressed”) by linguistic information. Rather, infants are believed to possess some “core knowledge” that enters into the fi rst categorizations of objects, properties, and events in the world³.
The viable question is how richly specified this innate basis may be; how experience refines, enhances, and transforms the mind’s original furnishings; and, finally, whether specific language knowledge may be one of these formative or transformative aspects of experience.
We will try to draw out aspects of these issues within several domains in which commentators and investigators are currently trying to disentangle cause and effect in the interaction of language and thought. But two kinds of general consideration, sketched in the next section, are worth keeping in mind as a framework for how far language can serve as a central causal force for cognitive growth and substance.
In the aspect of the connection between language and thinking, the term logic has a double meaning. Thinking reflects reality. Understanding logic is connected with the concept of dialectic logic, reflecting the objective dialectics of things. The external forms of logical thinking, the laws of development of all material things, are the doctrine of nature and spirituality, of the development and understanding of the specific content of the world.
The ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle (the 4th century BC) suggested that grammar is based on thinking. For the ancient Greeks, the logos was used simultaneously with words, consciousness, thinking, and speech. His followers, the abbots of the Por-Royal Monastery, the French scholars Arnault and
Lanslo, in the “General Rational Grammar”, stated that the goal of linguistics is to study logical principles based on all languages, since the laws and categories of thinking are the same for all thinkers people, but one grammar. Thus, logical and language categories are similar. Based on logic, there is a form of thinking that denies or confirms what is. The subject of thinking consists of S (subject of thinking) and the predicate P (relation or singularity), binders and quantum (all A and some E). The subject is the called subject, and the predicate is the action of the called subject. S is the singular, and P is universal.
According to the grammar of Por-Royal, ideas coincide with sentences. For example, the sentence “Man runs” is based on a thought. So everything in language is connected with logic. The remnants of such ideas are also reflected in the modern grammatical terminology of European languages. For example, in logical terms related to subject and predicate (English predicate, German Prädikat, fr. Prédicat).
The great German linguist Humboldt, his comrades-in-arms Leo Weisberger and American ethnologists Edward Sepir and Benjamin Wharf put forward the theory of linguistic relativity. According to this theory, people who speak different languages look at the world differently, so each language has its own logical thinking. Proof of this should be considered in scientific literature.
Humboldt notes that “language is a unique world between people and the objective world that surrounds it”. Each language covers a certain circle of people, and then it can leave this circle to enter another circle. Imagination and activity of a person depend on his impressions, and his attitude to objects is fully reflected in the language.
Imagination and activity of a person depend on his impressions, and his attitude to objects is fully reflected in the language. Thinking is usually dependent from language. In different languages the same subject is not a different sign, but a different appearance⁴. More vivid examples are associated with words that define colors in different languages: sinii [blue] and goluboi [sky blue] in Russian, blue, Blau, bleu in English, German and French. Some African tribes have two words for colors: the word for “hot” (red, orange, yellow) and the word for “cold” (blue, purple, green).
Tarasov, specifying the basic functions of the language, highlights: 1) language as a means of organizing the process of using existing knowledge to form new knowledge in the perceptual perception of reality; 2) language as a means of describing cultural objects in communication to distribute them, as a result of which the translation of culture occurs. The function of semantic contents assigned to linguistic signs in the memory of native speakers is to activate images of consciousness in communication, as well as in perceptual perception of reality, where the language organizes knowledge to categorize sensory information entering the brain.
Modern formal logic is far from the structure of natural thinking with axiomatic structures and does not accept the structure of theoretical thinking as its subject; the latter is an object of interest in logic
Einstein also states: “Pure logical thinking does not provide any knowledge about the world of facts; perception of the real world is born from experience and ends with it. A purely logical situation does not say anything about reality”. “We comprehend thoughts of already framed language frameworks”. Thinking can freely specify its categories, introduce new ones, while the categories of the language, being part of the system that each native speaker receives and retains, “cannot be changed at the will of the speaker”. The language expresses not only knowledge about the world, but our attitude to the external world, to other people and to ourselves, as well as our emotions and strong-willed motives⁵.
Nowadays, the problem of logic has become urgent for the development of cybernetics and logic, and it is widely discussed at various symposia. In particular, the importance of synthesis logic is discussed. From this point of view, it is impossible to contrast mathematical logic of content with forms of logic.
The relationship of word and concept is also one of the most controversial issues in logic and linguistics. The basis of the discussion is the relationship of meaning and concept. Summarizing the above, two main points can be emphasized: 1) the meaning of a word is a synonym for a concept; 2) the meaning of the word is interpreted as the linguistic catechism of the content plan. The second view seems more correct. It is important to note that the concept of the relationship between the meaning of a word and a concept is accepted not only by linguists, but also by logicians and philosophers.
There are three main questions of language and logical thinking: 1. words and understanding, 2. sentence and judgment, 3. relationship between grammatical and logical categories.
Researchers point out that the creation and existence of the concept of a word is based on the opposition of language and thinking. The interaction of words and concepts is formed in minds. Materialistic philosophy teaches us that the concept reflects the objects and events of the objective world in human minds. According to the general opinion, “we see the image of the real thing in human understanding, and not the image of the absolute concept, which is at a certain stage of development. Before people could come to understand figures and compare their forms, they had to be formed into an image from consciousness”
Thinking is closely related to imagination. But the imagination cannot create a complete, comprehensive and accurate understanding of the objects and events of the objective world. Thinking correctly and accurately reflects the objects and events of the objective world. Such a reflection, or rather a verbal expression of objective reality, is called a concept.