Case Law Update: 2011-2014 Cumulative Edition

Holding: Even though Officer-Agent did not raise her voice to Defendant, where 16 FBI agents swarmed into Defendant’s house at 6:00 a.m., Defendant would not have felt free to leave and was “in custody” for Miranda purposes.
U.S. v. Sheffield, 2011 WL 5223594 (D.D.C. 2011):

Holding: Defendant was subject to a custodial interrogation, where he was in custody at the police station for a parole warrant and traffic bench warrant and was questioned by two officers regarding an unrelated homicide, in that the questioning escalated the nature and tenor of his interaction with the police.
Al-Yousif v. Trani, 2014 WL 252512 (D. Colo. 2014):

Holding: State court unreasonably applied federal law in finding that Defendant’s Miranda waiver was voluntary where Defendant was foreign national who had limited understanding of English and his perception of rights was colored by his knowledge of the criminal justice system in Saudi Arabia.
U.S. v. Paetsch, 2012 WL 5213011 (D. Colo. 2012):

Holding: (1) Where Defendant said he wanted to speak with an attorney, Officer violated his 5^th Amendment right to counsel by continuing to question him about weapons and whether he would consent to search of his vehicle, and (2) where Defendant was handcuffed and in-custody away from his vehicle, the public safety exception to Miranda did not apply to allow questioning about weapons in his vehicle since there was no realistic risk of Defendant regaining access to any weapons in vehicle.
U.S. v. Ramirez, 2014 WL 105320 (S.D. Fla. 2014):

Holding: Officer’s statement to foreign Defendant that “it would be worse” for him if he did not speak to Officer’s rendered his statement involuntary; Officer directly contradicted Miranda warning, and Defendant’s status as foreign national likely contributed to his lack of understanding that his statements would be used against him.
U.S. v. Corey, 2012 WL 1792634 (S.D. Fla. 2012):

Holding: Where Officer knew Defendant had fled from police and tossed a firearm, Officer was required to give Miranda warning before asking Defendant what he was doing in the area because Defendant would reasonably believe Officer was asking why he was in the area with a firearm.
U.S. v. Cordova, 2011 WL 5325522 (N.D. Ga. 2011):

Holding: Defendant’s statement to police five days after an illegal, warrantless search of his home, was the fruit of an illegal search and must be suppressed.
U.S. v. Cabral, 2013 WL 1684162 (D. Mass 2013):

Holding: Even though Officers offered Defendant a “choice” of waiting at a local mall or accompanying police to barracks while they searched his car after a traffic stop, where he “chose” to go to barracks, Defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes because there was an implied threat of arrest, and police held onto his wallet and only transportation.
U.S. v. Andrews, 2012 WL 744990 (D. Mass. 2012):

Holding: An agent’s false statement to defendant that he could go to jail for the rest of his life if he did not admit that guns were his and the agent’s false promise that he would help the defendant avoid spending the rest of his life in jail rendered the defendant’s confession involuntary.
U.S. v. King, 2012 WL 3248242 (E.D. Mich. 2012):

Holding: For purposes of 6^th Amendment right to counsel, Defendant’s federal drug sales charge was the same as his state sales drug charge since both involved the same pills, same date and same arrest; thus, since right to counsel had attached in the state case, federal agent deprived Defendant of right to counsel by interviewing him without counsel.
U.S. v. Ortiz, 2013 WL 1908897 (S.D. N.Y. 2013):

Holding: Even though Police interrogation of Defendant was relatively brief and at his home, Defendant was “in custody” for Miranda purposes where three Officers were near him, he had been told there were bench warrants for his arrest, and Police threatened to arrest everyone in the apartment unless Defendant provided information about a gun.
U.S. v. Wilson, 2012 WL 6641492 (S.D. N.Y. 2012):

Holding: Even though Defendant, who arrested for threatening someone, told Officers he had fake guns in his apartment, Officers lacked a reasonable basis to believe they faced a dangerous situation, so the public safety exception to the requirements of Miranda did not apply.
U.S. v. Hampton, 2012 WL 406271 (E.D. Pa. 2012):

Holding: After waiving Miranda right to silence and answering one question, defendant’s subsequent silence was not admissible adoptive admission evidence.
U.S. v. Archuleta, 2013 WL 5503186 (D. Utah 2013):

Holding: Defendant, whose car was stopped by police, was in custody for Miranda purposes when Officer returned from running a background check, but instead of issuing a citation, questioned Defendant about his drug use; a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave or refrain from answering Officer’s questions.
U.S. v. Koerber, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 691 (D. Utah 8/15/13):

Holding: Where federal prosecutors directed FBI and IRS agents to go interview a Defendant-businessman suspected of running a Ponzi scheme without notifying Defendant’s attorney, this violated ethical rules regarding contact with represented persons and warranted suppression of Defendant’s statements; this was true even though this occurred before Defendant was indicted.
U.S. v. Pacheco, 2011 WL 1832815 (D. Utah 2011):

Holding: Defendant’s confession to bank robbery during police interrogation was involuntary where officer told defendant the other robbery suspect had made a deal with the police, told defendant that the officer had the authority to make a deal with defendant if defendant confessed and indicated that he would be the one deciding how defendant would be charged.
U.S. v. Robinson, 2011 WL 2604773 (D. Vt. 2011):

Holding: Defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes even though she was interviewed at her apartment complex where more than one officer questioned defendant, the interview occurred in a small room with the door closed, defendant was not permitted to go to the bathroom, and defendant was accompanied by an officer when she left to smoke a cigarette.
Kalmakoff v. State, 2011 WL 3241860 (Alaska 2011):

Holding: Where Juvenile was removed from school by police, had no prior contact with law enforcement, was never told he was free to leave and was told that he had to tell the truth, Juvenile was “in custody” for Miranda purposes.
Adams v. State, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 853 (Alaska 9/16/11):

Holding: Prosecutor should not have been permitted to ask Defendant about his pre-Miranda refusal to talk to police because under Fed. Rule Evidence 403 this had low probative value but its risk of prejudice was high.
State v. VanWinkle, 2012 WL 1149345 (Ariz. 2012):

Holding: A police officer’s testimony regarding the defendant’s post-arrest pre-Miranda silence, coupled with the prosecutor’s comment on that silence, violated the defendant’s right to remain silent.
Porta v. State, 2013 WL 3070389 (Ark. 2013):

Holding: Even though forensic mental health examiner had warned Defendant about the nonconfidential nature of his competency exam, trial court erred in allowing his inculpatory statements made during the exam to be admitted at trial, because this violated his constitutional right not to incriminate himself and forced him to choose between one constitutional right in order to claim another.
People v. Ramadon, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 364 (Colo. 12/9/13):

Holding: Even though Miranda warnings had been given, Police Officer’s statement to legal-alien-Defendant that he would likely be deported if he did not tell the truth (about an alleged sexual assault) rendered Defendant’s subsequent inculpatory statements involuntary; Officer told Defendant he should realize he “needed” to tell the truth because his “being in this country is in jeopardy;” the U.S. had previously brought Defendant to U.S. for his safety after assisting U.S. in Iraq.
State v. Mangual, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 673, 2014 WL 726724 (Conn. 3/4/14):

Holding: Where police ordered Defendant to sit on her living room sofa while seven gun-toting officers executed a search warrant of her home, Defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes because a reasonable person would have believed they were in custody.
Taylor v. State, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 594 (Del. 6/22/11):

Holding: Where a state statute required that witness statements be voluntary to be admissible in court, then Miranda applies to the witnesses, even though they aren’t defendants.
Deviney v. State, 2013 WL 627140 (Fla. 2013):

Holding: Defendant with limited mental abilities unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent during police questioning (rendering his confession involuntary) where he said six times that was “done” with questions, even though he said after one of them that he wanted police to “show me that I did do it;” Defendant also said he wanted to go home, asked to leave, and was blocked by police when he attempted to leave the interview room.
Jackson v. State, 2012 WL 5514937 (Fla. 2012):

Holding: Court erred in admitting lengthy video of interrogation of Defendant in which Officers stated their personal opinion that Defendant was guilty and stated positive things about victim, where Defendant did not confess, and even though Officers may have been using this as a technique to try to elicit a confession.
Wheeler v. State, 2011 WL 2671305 (Ga. 2011):

Holding: Even though Defendant originally waived his right to counsel, where he later said he needed to discuss his situation with his attorney due to the seriousness of the charges, this was an unequivocal invocation of right to counsel and interrogation should have ceased, even though Defendant also said he was not trying to be hard to get along with.
State v. McKnight, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 443 (Haw. 12/31/13):

Holding: Where Defendant had been given Miranda warnings and invoked his right to counsel, Officer improperly reinitiated questioning when Defendants asked to call his mother and asked “what would happen next” and Officer said police were seeking a search warrant for his home; Defendant’s inquiry “what would happen next” did not evidence a desire to reinitiate a discussion and the statement about seeking a search warrant was “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response” and therefore constituted interrogation.
State v. I.T., 94 Crim. L. Rep. 747 (Ind. 3/12/14):

Holding: Indiana Juvenile statute which bars statements made to a mental health evaluator “in the evaluator’s official capacity” from being used “as evidence against the child” on whether they committed a delinquent act provides both use immunity and derivative use immunity for Juvenile’s statements.
Kelly v. State, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 307 (Ind. 11/21/13):

Holding: Where (1) Officers told Defendant before Miranda warnings that cocaine had been found in a hollowed-out screw driver in her car, and Defendant made incriminating remarks, and then (2) after Miranda warnings, when Defendant denied being part of a drug deal, Officers “reminded” her of her previous incriminating statements to the contrary, Seibert required suppression of all the incriminating statements; the reminder references “inevitably diluted the potency of the Miranda warning such that it was powerless to cure the initial failure to warn, even if the failure was a … good faith mistake.”
Hartman v. State, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 358 (Ind. 5/31/13):

Holding: Where Defendant had requested counsel, but then police used a ruse to tell him that they were required to read a search warrant to him, after which they asked him if he had any questions and he talked, Defendant’s statements weren’t voluntary, even though the “warrant reading” wasn’t done until the next day; Defendant did not voluntarily reinitiate interrogation.
In re Prosecutor’s Subpoena Regarding S.H. and S.C., 93 Crim. L. Rep. 11 (Ind. 3/27/13):

Holding: Where Prosecutor has not filed a charge or initiated a grand jury proceeding, Prosecutor may not compel a person to testify under a grant of use immunity when that person is the primary target of the investigation and has asserted a right against self-incrimination.
Jewell v. State, 90 Crim. L. Rep. 323 (Ind. 11/30/11):

Holding: Indiana Const. prohibits police from interrogating a person about an uncharged offense that is inextricably intertwined with a charged offense on which defendant has counsel.
State v. Washington, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 359 (Iowa 6/7/13):

Holding: Where judge imposed additional community service on Defendant after he refused to answer a question at sentencing about drug use, this violated Defendant’s 5^th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
State v. Howard, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 356 (Iowa 12/21/12):
Holding: Officer’s talk to Defendant about getting psychological treatment for whoever sodomized his girlfriend’s infant was a promise of leniency that rendered Defendant’s confession inadmissible.
State v. Madsen, 2012 WL 1366607 (Iowa 2012):

Holding: A police officer’s statement during interrogation that a confession would keep the defendant’s name out of the newspapers impermissibly promised the defendant leniency on sexual abuse charges.
State v. Rodriguez, 90 Crim. L. Rep. 454 (Iowa 12/23/11):
Holding: Privilege against self-incrimination limits use of incriminating statements made during psychiatric examination to determine competency to waive Miranda rights.
State v. Polk, 91 Crim. L. Rep. 103, 2012 WL 1138270 (Iowa 4/6/12):

Holding: Police made improper promise of leniency when they told Defendant that their child needed a father and that if he cooperated he would be viewed favorably by the prosecutor and be away from his children for less time.

State v. Garcia, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 188 (Kan. 4/26/13):

Holding: Where Defendant repeatedly asked police to take him to get medical treatment for a gunshot wound and they did not do so, Defendant’s subsequent confession was not voluntary.
State v. Lawson, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 46, 2013 WL 1365342 (Kan. 4/5/13):

Holding: Defendant’s post-Miranda confession during a police interrogation was not admissible where Defendant had already been arraigned and invoked his state statutory right to have a lawyer appointed to represent him; once the Defendant asserted his statutory right to counsel in open court, he could not waive it unless he returned to court and satisfied the judge on the record that he was making a knowing and intelligent waiver.
State v. Swindler, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 619 (Kan. 2/15/13):

Holding: Where police told Defendant he could halt an interview and leave whenever he wanted to, this rendered his subsequent confession involuntary.
State v. Stafford, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 364 (Kan. 12/17/12):

Holding: Even though Officer told Defendant he was investigating whether Defendant touched a minor child and Defendant did not deny it until much later in the interview, Prosecutor could not argue Defendant’s initial silence as evidence of guilt.
State v. Bogguess, 2012 WL 167334 (Kan. 2012):

Holding: Defendant did not waive privilege against self-incrimination by testifying at suppression hearing, where the hearing was for the purpose of determining the voluntariness of defendant’s statements and his testimony was only regarding the voluntariness of his statements, not their truthfulness.
Dye v. Com., 2013 WL 3122823 (Ky. 2013):

Holding: Where police told a juvenile that he would get the death penalty and suffer violence in prison unless he confessed to his sister’s murder, his subsequent confession was coerced, and evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant that was based on the confession was fruit of the poisonous tree.
Buster v. Com., 2013 WL 4607605 (Ky. 2013):

Holding: Social Worker was a state actor for Miranda purposes when Social Worker went to a prison and interviewed Defendant, where Social Worker was an investigator for DFS and was cooperating with police, turned over the interview information to police, and the Social Worker’s investigation was likely to result in disclosure of information that would lead to prosecution.
Dunlap v. Com., 93 Crim. L. Rep. 454 (Ky. 6/20/13):

Holding: Police engaged in custodial interrogation where, while executing a search warrant at Defendant’s home, they asked him “do you know why we’re here?”; this interrogation should have been preceded by Miranda warnings because Defendant was in custody and police should have known that their question was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
N.C. v. Com., 93 Crim. L. Rep. 145 (Ky. 4/25/13):

Holding: Where “school resource officer” who assisted police was present when school principal questioned student about sharing prescription pills at school, student-Defendant should have been given Miranda warnings.
Baumia v. Com., 92 Crim. L. Rep. 242 (Ky. 11/21/12):

Holding: Even though Defendant told police that she didn’t want to answer questions because her father told her not to before she was given Miranda warnings, this pre-Miranda invocation of right to silence was not admissible against her at trial.
State v. Wiley, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 763 (Me. 3/14/13):

Holding: Officer’s statement that Defendant would receive a shorter jail sentence if he took advantage of a one-time offer and admitted his crime was promise of leniency that rendered confession involuntary.
Phillips v. State, 90 Crim. L. Rep. 856 (Md. 3/16/12):

Holding: Once an arrestee has invoked his rights under Miranda, an officer’s remark that the arrestee can reinitiate the conversation and tell his side of the story if he wants to constitutes the sort of continued interrogation that is prohibited under Edwards.
Lupfer v. State, 2011 WL 2437379 (Md. 2011):

Holding: Defendant did not open door to presentation of his post-arrest, post-Miranda silence; it was not inconsistent to testify that he at some undetermined point in the future intended to speak with police, and to have remained silent when first read Miranda rights.
Moore v. State, 90 Crim. L. Rep. 157 (Md. 10/25/11):

Holding: Where police intentionally delayed bringing Juvenile before a judge and also refused his requests to talk to his mother, his confession was involuntary.
Lee v. State, 2011 WL 288490 (Md. 2011):

Holding: Where Officer said mid-way through interrogation “this is just between you and me, bud,” this was effectively a promise of confidentiality and vitiated the prior Miranda warning and waiver.
Hill v. State, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 569 (Md. 1/26/11):

Holding: Where police officer told Defendant about an offer from complainant to settle things with an apology, this was an improper inducement that rendered Defendant’s incriminating apology involuntary; Defendant had an objectively reasonable belief, based on officer’s statement, that by making confession and apology to the complaint this would lessen the likelihood of prosecution.


Com. v. Woods, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 438, 2014 WL 12355 (Mass. 1/2/14):

Holding: Mass. Supreme Court exercises its “supervisory” authority to hold that Witnesses who testify before a grand jury must be advised of their 5^th Amendment right against self-incrimination if they are a “target” or may reasonably become a “target” of the investigation, even though this is not required under constitution.
Com. v. Fortunato, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 42, 2013 WL 5451772 (Mass. 10/3/13):

Holding: Under Mass. law, a defendant must have an initial appearance in court within 6 hours of arrest, and any statements made by Defendant after six hours without an initial appearance must be suppressed unless Defendant validly waived initial appearance.
Com. v. Woodbine, 2012 WL 1002763 (Mass. 2012):

Holding: A police officer could not testify at a first degree murder trial as to the unrecorded portion of the defendant’s two-part statement because the defendant’s only meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the officer would involve using the contents of the other portion of the statement, which had been suppressed.
Com. v. Clarke, 2012 WL 89250 (Mass. 2012):

Holding: Federal utmost-clarity standard for invoking right against self-incrimination does not apply under Mass. Constitution.
Com. v. McNulty, 2010 WL 4630695 (Mass. 2010):

Holding: Police violated state constitutional right to counsel by not informing Defendant who was undergoing interrogation that an attorney wanted to speak with him and was telling him not to talk to police.
State v. Heiges, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 809 (Minn. 8/17/11):

Holding: Even though Defendant made certain incriminating statements to friends before police began an investigation, the statements qualified as “confessions” under a state statute that requires corroboration to support conviction.
State v. Brown, 2011 WL 13753 (Minn. 2011):

Holding: Defendant’s statements made at pretrial hearing about a possible guilty plea were statements made in connection with a plea offer and were not admissible at trial.
Benjamin v. State, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 357 (Miss. 6/6/13):

Holding: Police violated Juvenile’s rights under Miranda where Juvenile had invoked his right to counsel, but police then persuaded his mother to convince him to waive his rights and be interrogated.
State v. Stewart, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 392 (Mont. 12/27/12):

Holding: Even though Defendant’s wife could overhear Defendant on his cellphone, Defendant could still challenge his statements under state constitution’s privacy guarantee that forbids warrantless recording of telephone conversations based only on one-party consent where police persuaded a crime victim to telephone Defendant and elicit incriminating statements.
State v. Wessells, 2012 WL 639004 (N.J. 2012):