Case Law Update: 2011-2014 Cumulative Edition

Holding: Defendant made sufficient showing under Brady that grand jury transcript of witness may contain exculpatory evidence; hence court was required to to conduct in camera review of transcript.


Amborse v. Booker, 2012 WL 2428803 (6^th Cir. 2012):

Holding: Petitioner showed cause for failure to raise jury selection issue earlier where unbeknownst to Petitioner, a computer glitch caused minorities to be underrepresented in the venire pool.
Hooper v. Ryan, 2013 WL 4779579 (7^th Cir. 2013):

Holding: Habeas petitioner was entitled to evidentiary hearing in federal court on Batson, where State court unreasonably concluded that striking all 7 African-American members of a venire did not make out a prima facie case of discrimination.
Wiston v. Boatwright, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 767 (7^th Cir. 8/19/11):

Holding: Using peremptory challenges against venirepersons in violation of Batson is “structural error” requiring automatic reversal.
U.S. v. Taylor, 2011 WL 799775 (7^th Cir. 2011):

Holding: On remand from appellate court to determine credibility of race-neutral reasons for striking jurors proffered by prosecutor under Batson, trial court is limited to considering the reasons originally offered at trial and cannot consider new reasons offered by the prosecutor on remand.
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 499 (9^th Cir. 1/21/14):

Holding: Striking gay venireperson on basis of sexual orientation in civil trial involving HIV medications violated Batson and Equal Protection Clause.
U.S. v. Cortes, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 85 (9^th Cir. 10/9/13):

Holding: Since the 6^th Amendment requires that juries, not judges, resolve questions of fact that increase a sentence, jury instructions must instruct on issue of “sentencing entrapment,” which occurs when a defendant, although predisposed to commit a minor or lesser offense, is entrapped to commit a greater offense subject to greater punishment; here, Defendant was induced by a Gov’t agent to steal 100 kilograms of cocaine, which carried a harsher mandatory minimum than stealing of lesser amounts.
Ayala v. Wong, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 755, 2013 WL 4865145 (9^th Cir. 9/13/13):

Holding: Habeas relief granted where defense counsel was excluded from Batson hearing at state trial; federal court was not required to give deference to state court’s ruling that this was not prejudicial.
Jamerson v. Runnels, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 179, 2013 WL 1749212 (9^th Cir. 4/24/13):

Holding: Even though federal habeas courts generally cannot hear evidence that wasn’t presented in state court, this did not prohibit federal court in reviewing Batson claim from considering evidence of veniremembers’ race (here, venirepersons’ driver’s license photos) that was not part of the state court record.

U.S. v. Wiggan, 2012 WL 5861808 (9^th Cir. 2012):

Holding: In perjury prosecution, trial court erred in admitting testimony of grand jury foreman before whom Defendant had testified that grand jurors did not find Defendant’s testimony to be credible.
Johnson v. Finn, 90 Crim. L. Rep. 360 (9th Cir. 12/8/11):

Holding: District judge cannot overturn magistrate's Batson finding that turned on prosecutor credibility unless the district judge holds another hearing at which the prosecutor testifies.
Johnson v. Finn, 2011 WL 6091310 (9^th Cir. 2011):

Holding: District court deprived habeas petitioners of due process by failing to conduct evidentiary hearing on Batson issue following a magistrate judge’s proposed finding regarding prosecutor’s lack of credibility.
Love v. Cate, 2011 WL 3874873 (9^th Cir. 2011):

Holding: Race motivated prosecutor’s peremptory strike against the only black venire-member where prosecutor’s stated reason was that he thought she was a social worker and that he did not believe social workers or teachers made good jurors, yet he did not question the venire-member and did not dismiss nonblack teachers.
U.S. v. Evanston, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 646, 2011 WL 2619277 (9^th Cir. 7/5/11):

Holding: Judge’s decision, over defense objection, to allow parties to make supplemental closing arguments after jury had deadlocked was abuse of discretion.
Wilson v. Knowles, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 565 (9^th Cir. 2/8/11):

Holding: Apprendi does not allow state judge to find disputed evidentiary type facts about a prior conviction (such as severity of injury to victim and whether victim was an accomplice) to apply the 3-strikes law, and AEDPA does not required deference to the state judge’s ruling in violation of Apprendi.
Stouffer v. Trammell, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 445 (10^th Cir. 12/26/13):

Holding: Even though State’s evidence against capital Defendant was overwhelming, this did not justify failure to hold a hearing on alleged juror misconduct where Juror’s Husband allegedly signaled to Juror-Wife his opinions about the trial.
U.S. v. McKye, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 692 (10^th Cir. 8/20/13):

Holding: Whether a “note” qualifies as a “security” under 15 USC 78j(b) is a mixed question of law and fact on which Defendant is entitled to a jury determination.
U.S. v. Nash, 91 Crim. L. Rep. 137 (C.A.A.F. 4/13/12):

Holding: Military judge abused discretion in failing to remove a panel member (juror) for bias after juror asked a defense expert witness in a child sex case if she believed pedophiles could ever be rehabilitated, even though the juror said he was impartial.

U.S. v. Miller, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 421, 2013 WL 6818391 (D.C. Cir. 12/27/13):

Holding: Judge violated Defendant’s 6^th Amendment right to jury trial when, in response to a jury question, he gave his own view of how to reconcile discrepencies in the charges and evidence by explaining what specific proof supported specific charges.
Fortune v. U.S., 2013 WL 1831695 (D.C. 2013):

Holding: Where in response to jury’s third declaration of deadlock, judge told jurors that he did not agree with them and it was his job to make that kind of decision, this impermissibly coerced the verdict after judge sent jurors back to deliberate more.
Kittle v. U.S., 2013 WL 21021150 (D.C. 2013):

Holding: Trial judges have discretion to consider juror testimony in exceptional circumstances such as claims of racial or ethnic bias amongst jurors.
Wilkey v. U.S., 2010 WL 4340833 (D.C. 2010):

Holding: Defendant seeking to challenge jury selection methods may get discovery of jury materials without a threshold showing that there is a reason to believe discovery will show a statutory or constitutional violation.
Hall v. Thomas, 2013 WL 5446105 (S.D. Ala. 2013):

Holding: White Defendant/Petitioner was entitled to habeas relief on his Batson claim that Prosecutor improperly struck African-Americans from his jury.
Sifuentes v. Brazelton, 2013 WL 6253008 (N.D. Cal. 2013):

Holding: State court unreasonably applied Batson in finding no Batson violation where record did not reflect a clear refusal on juror’s part to impose death penalty or that juror (who was a Minister) was not in a position to judge anyone, and regarding another juror, her statements indicated that her religious beliefs caused her to view death penalty more favorably.
Richardson v. Hardy, 2012 WL 850723 (N.D. Ill. 2012):

Holding: Prosecutor’s striking of black jurors on grounds that they were not crime victims, not homeowners, or not stably employed was pretextual and violated Batson where similarly situated white jurors were not struck.
Woodfox v. Cain, 2013 WL 705394 (M.D. La. 2013):

Holding: In case alleging that judges were racially biased in choice of grand jury forepersons, evidence that the judges allegedly used race-neutral criteria such as employment and education was insufficient to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination where judges had only been given information with names and addresses of potential jurors that did not contain employment or education information, and further, one judge testified that he selected based on persons he personally knew.
Ingram v. Goodwin, 2013 WL 5934498 (W.D. La. 2013):

Holding: Federal habeas relief granted due to juror bias where a Juror shortly before trial committed a crime similar to the crime committed by murder victim before she was killed; Juror was subject to prosecution by the same prosecutor as Petitioner; and jurors discussed the matter about Juror during deliberations.
Com. v. Woods, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 438, 2014 WL 12355 (Mass. 1/2/14):

Holding: Mass. Supreme Court exercises its “supervisory” authority to hold that Witnesses who testify before a grand jury must be advised of their 5^th Amendment right against self-incrimination if they are a “target” or may reasonably become a “target” of the investigation, even though this is not required under constitution.
U.S. v. Sampson, 2011 WL 5022335 (D. Mass. 2011):

Holding: Where juror provided inaccurate responses during voir dire, a new trial was required to determine whether the death penalty was justified.
De Leon v. Hartley, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 444 (N.M. 12/30/13):

Holding: Trial court’s delegation to Prosecutor of selection and excusal of grand jurors required quashing indictment without prejudice.
U.S. v. Morrison, 2013 WL 5933928 (E.D. N.Y. 2013):

Holding: Defendant’s conviction vacated where Juror was approached by someone during deliberations and offered a bribe, and Juror was disturbed and troubled by it but did not report it until after trial; Juror’s failure to report it during trial raised questions about Juror’s fitness to serve.
Coombs v. Diguglilmo, 2012 WL 6562816 (E.D. Pa. 2012):

Holding: Prosecutor’s striking of multiple African-American jurors, one because juror gave him “bad looks,” was not race neutral under Batson.
U.S. v. Southern Union Co., 2013 WL 1776028 (D.R.I. 2013):

Holding: Gov’t’s request for a second jury trial to have a jury determine the number of days Defendant-company stored hazardous waste for purposes of imposing a daily fine was waived because Gov’t failed to request this jury-finding at the original trial; Apprendi requires that a jury determine the number of days because Apprendi applies to fines; thus, the only fine that could be imposed was for a single day that the jury verdict supported.
Wolfe v. Clarke, 2011 WL 3251494 (E.D. Va. 2011):

Holding: Even though venirepreson said initially that he couldn’t impose death, where he later said there were times he could impose it and he’d follow the law and listen to the facts, he should not have been struck by the court under Witherspoon/Witt.
Ex parte Lightfoot, 2013 WL 3481945 (Ala. 2013):

Holding: Apprendi occurred where trial court enhanced Defendants’ sentence for drugs based on a finding that Defendant possessed a firearm during the crime; this finding had to be made by a jury; error was not harmless even though the enhancement did not increase Defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum for the offense.
Ex parte T.D.M., 90 Crim. L. Rep. 202 (Ala. 10/28/11):

Holding: Even though as jury was leaving courtroom the foreperson told the judge that he had read the wrong form of “not guilty,” double jeopardy barred the judge from re-calling the jurors to announce a guilty verdict because the jury had already been discharged.
Dimas-Martinez v. State, 2011 WL 6091330 (Ark. 2011):

Holding: Defendant was denied a fair trial where juror posted comments on a blog during trial in violation of a court order not to do so.
People v. Riccardi, 2012 WL 2874237 (Cal. 2012):

Holding: Trial court erred in striking death penalty venireperson based solely on written questionnaire which answers were ambiguous as to whether the venireperson could consider death penalty; court should have conducted actual voir dire of venireperson.
People v. Pearson, 2012 WL 34145 (Cal. 2012):

Holding: Automatic reversal of the death penalty was required, where prospective juror was erroneously excused for cause based on her indefinite views on the merits of the death penalty.
Knox v. State, 2011 WL 4713229 (Del. 2011):

Holding: Juror who was alleged victim of robbery in separate and pending criminal trial involving the same prosecutor’s office was biased.
Matarranz v. State, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 34, 2013 WL 5355117 (Fla. 9/26/13):
Holding: Fla. Supreme Court holds that the partiality of venirepersons who express bias based on their unfamiliarity with the judicial system can be rehabilitated; venirepersons who express bias based on their personal life experience cannot. Such a rule will prevent venirepersons from expressing bias under examination by one counsel, only to recant bias when questioned by opposing counsel or the judge and embarrassed “to produce a socially and politically correct recantation.” “When a juror expresses his or her unease and reservations based upon actual life experiences, as opposed to stating such attitudes in response to vague or academic questioning, it is not appropriate for the trial court to attempt to ‘rehabilitate’ a juror into rejection of those expressions – as occurred here.” “[T]rial courts must take great care to ensure that prospective jurors are not pressured or embarrassed by counsel or the court in an attempt to ‘rehabilitate’ them when they have expressed sincere doubt about their ability to be fair when their doubt stems from actual adverse past personal experiences.” Here, in this burglary case, appellate court holds that trial court erroneously refused to strike venireperson for cause who had had her family’s Christmas ruined by a burglary, even though she said she would keep an “open mind” and overcome her negative feelings.
Hazuri v. State, 2012 WL 1947979 (Fla. 2012):

Holding: Even though trial transcripts are not allowed in jury room, where jury requested trial transcripts during deliberations, trial court was required to tell jury that it had a right to a “read back” of testimony it wished to review, and should not have merely told them to rely on their collective recollection of the evidence.
State v. Fleming, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 597 (Fla. 2/3/11):

Holding: Apprendi is retroactive to cases that are reversed and remanded for resentencing.
Dennis v. State, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 436, 2010 WL 5110231 (Fla. 12/16/10):

Holding: Under “Stand Your Ground” law (which provides immunity from prosecution for justifiably using force to resist certain arrests), the trial judge is to resolve factual questions via pretrial motion as to whether to grant immunity, and not deny the motion and let the jury decide the factual questions.
Ellington v. State, 2012 WL 5833566 (Ga. 2012):

Holding: Defendant charged in death penalty case had right to ask venirepersons if they would automatically impose death if the victims were young children.
Ward v. State, 2011 WL 680213 (Ga. 2011):

Holding: Trial court’s removal of juror after closing argument without Defendant’s presence violated Defendant’s right to be present at trial.
Addison v. State, 2012 WL 560081 (Ind. 2012):

Holding: State’s race-neutral reason for striking African American prospective juror was pretext for race discrimination, requiring new trial, in that the State did not seek to strike non-African American jurors who gave similar answers to voir dire question.
State v. Mootz, 2012 WL 246093 (Iowa 2012):

Holding: Automatic reversal of defendant’s conviction is required when the trial court’s erroneous ruling on a reverse-Batson challenge leads to the denial of one of the defendant’s peremptory challenges.

State v. Halstead, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 370, 2010 WL 5129875 (Iowa 12/17/10):

Holding: Iowa rejects majority rule on inconsistent verdicts and holds that when Defendant is acquitted of the underlying predicate crime, the conviction for other crime cannot stand; thus, where Defendant was convicted in a single trial of assault while participating in a felony but acquitted of the predicate felony of theft, the assault conviction was inconsistent and could not stand.
McAtee v. Com., 94 Crim. L. Rep. 35 (Ky. 9/26/13):

Holding: Jurors should not receive “testimonial” statements in the jury room; thus, trial court erred in allowing jury to privately view a witness’ videotaped statement because this is akin to sending a witness back to the jury room, allowing the jury to give undue weight to the testimony; testimonial exhibits must be viewed in public.

State v. Nelson, 2012 WL 798767 (La. 2012):

Holding: After one defendant improperly used peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors due to purposeful racial discrimination, the trial court’s decision to regard the two co-defendants as a single entity and not to allow either one to use his remaining peremptory challenges on any of the re-seated prospective jurors violated each defendant’s constitutional and statutory right to use his peremptory challenges.
State v. Chinn, 2011 WL 414360 (La. 2012):

Holding: Due to a state constitutional provision prohibiting a noncapital defendant’s waiver of a jury trial later than 45 days prior to the scheduled trial date, the trial court’s sole course of action, when the state requested a trial date for the noncapital trial only 43 days away, was to consider the waiver, and if the waiver was accepted, to set a trial date beyond the 45-day period.
State v. Allen, 90 Crim. L. Rep. 200 (Md. 10/28/11):

Holding: Where Defendant’s felony-murder conviction but not the underlying robbery had been reversed, it violated his 6^th Amendment right to a jury trial for the judge to instruct jury at retrial of the felony-murderthat Defendant had already been convicted of robbery; this use of “collateral estoppel” against Defendant was prohibited.
Valonis v. State, 2013 WL 2150507 (Md. 2013):

Holding: For a waiver of jury trial to be valid, court must strictly comply with rule requiring waiver to be on the record.
Grade v. State, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 51 (Md. 4/13/13):
Holding: Where court substituted a regular juror with an alternate without notifying defense counsel, this violated Defendant’s right to be present at trial.
Perez v. State, 2011 WL 2421029 (Md. 2011):

Holding: Court erred in not disclosing jury notes to counsel before court answered the questions because this deprived Defendant of opportunity to have input in answering jury notes.
State v. Shim, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 510 (Md. 1/25/11):

Holding: Court must allow defense counsel to ask if venirepersons have such strong feelings about the crime that they could not be fair.
Hardison v. State, 2012 WL 3211614 (Miss. 2012):

Holding: Trial court erred in failing to properly apply Batson where it failed to require the State to show that Defendant’s reason for striking white juror was pretext for discrimination; defense counsel had struck a white juror who expressed disappointment that a previous jury he sat on had not reached a verdict due to prosecutorial error.
State v. Pangborn, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 585 (Neb. 7/26/13):

Holding: Demonstrative exhibits should not be sent to the jury during deliberations unless the court first weighs their potential prejudice against usefulness and gives a limiting instruction to avoid prejudice; here, jury sought to see an exhibit prepared by the prosecutor that was a chart that outlined various charges against Defendant, various dates and injuries; “use of limiting instructions that advise a jury of the limited purpose [of such] demonstrative exhibits should be employed.”
State v. Smith, 90 Crim. L. Rep. 303 (Neb. 11/18/11):

Holding: Even though a killing was intentional, it can still constitute sudden-quarrel manslaughter.
Rugamas v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct. ex rel. County of Clark, 2013 WL 336674 (Nev. 2013):

Holding: Statute that allows admission of statements made to others of a child under age 10 about sexual abuse does not apply in grand jury proceedings.
Saletta v. State, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 644 (Nev. 7/7/11):

Holding: Judge’s questioning a juror about reasons why they disavowed the guilty verdict during post-verdict polling of the jury was an undue intrusion into the deliberative process and plain error; after the polling, the jury had deliberated again and found Defendant guilty.
State v. Town, 2012 WL 2913193 (N.H. 2012):

Holding: Even though juror said she would “try” to be fair and not consider personal experience as a sexual abuse victim, where she also said she was “not sure” if she could be fair, trial court erred in failing to strike her for cause.
State v. Soto, 90 Crim. L. Rep. 302 (N.H. 11/22/11):

Holding: Where Defendant presents some evidence that he caused the death at issue under influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance caused by extreme provocation, the State must prove the absence of provocation beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v. Extale, 2012 WL 995213 (N.Y. 2012):

Holding: A prosecutor did not have unilateral power to dismiss a count of a grand jury indictment over the defendant’s objection.
People v. Credle, 90 Crim. L. Rep. 166 (N.Y. 10/25/11):

Holding: Where a grand jury deadlocks, prosecutors must get court approval to resubmit the charges to another grand jury.
People v. Steward, 2011 WL 2183309 (N.Y. 2011):

Holding: 5 minute limit on voir dire was abuse of discretion in case involving well-known victim.
People v. Steward, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 601 (N.Y. 6/7/11):