Case Law Update: 2011-2014 Cumulative Edition

Holding: Holding of Maryland v. Shatzer, that 14-day break in custody is required to overcome the presumption of involuntariness of subsequent custodial statements, applied retroactively and required suppression of defendant’s statements because break in custody was only nine days.
State v. King, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 103 (N.M. 4/15/13):

Holding: Defendant’s statement that he did not want to answer Officer’s questions “at the moment” and his refusal to sign a waiver form was an unequivocal invocation of 5^th Amendment right to silence.
State v. Leyva, 88 Crim. L. Rep 636 (N.M. 2/17/11):
Holding: Under New Mexico constitution, police conducting a traffic stop can only ask questions reasonably related to the stop or otherwise supported by reasonable suspicion, and cannot engage in “fishing expeditions” asking about other matters not related to the stop.
People v. Thomas, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 614 (N.Y. 2/20/14):

Holding: Where Police told Defendant (1) that if he did not confess to injuring his baby, doctors would not be able to treat the baby and the baby would die, and (2) if he did not confess, police would arrest his wife and take her away from the dying baby’s bedside, these were “highly coercive deceptions” which rendered Defendant’s confession involuntary.
People v. Cantave, 2013 WL 3185171 (N.Y. 2013):

Holding: Prosecutor violated Defendant’s right against self-incrimination where he cross-examined Defendant at trial about a prior, unrelated conviction that was pending on direct appeal and thus Defendant remained at risk of self-incrimination.
People v. Guilford, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 366 (N.Y. 6/4/13):

Holding: A police tag-team interrogation that totaled 49 hours was so inherently coercive that it not only tainted Defendant’s initial statement, but also a second statement given after an 8-hour break and in the presence of defense counsel; the arrival of a lawyer does not magically neutralize the effect of extensive coercive interrogation before the lawyer’s arrival.
People v. Lopez, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 635 (N.Y. 2/22/11):

Holding: Under New York constitution’s right to counsel, police are required to ask suspects whether they already have counsel if “there is a probable likelihood” that they do on the offense they are being interrogated about; suspect may not be questioned in counsel’s absence.
State v. Graham, 2013 WL 2350440 (Ohio 2013):

Holding: Statements obtained from public employees by an Inspector General were compelled by threat of job loss, and thus, were unconstitutionally coerced and inadmissible in subsequent prosecution of those employees.
State v. Miskell, 2012 WL 1437301 (Or. 2012):

Holding: Police were required to obtain a court order before recording a hotel room conversation between an informant and the defendants.
Com. v. Wright, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 684 (Pa. 2/23/11):

Holding: Even though Defendant’s confession had been held to be voluntary at trial, this did not preclude him from seeking postconviction DNA testing; when a court determines whether a confession is voluntary, it is determining an issue of admissibility at trial, not whether the confession is true.
State v. Perea, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 273 (Utah 11/15/13):
Holding: Scientific evidence on false confessions has advanced to where expert should be permitted to testify about empirical research as to when people give false confessions, including sleep deprivation, presentation of false evidence, questioners’ “minimization” techniques, defendant’s age, defendant’s intelligence, and certain personality traits.
State v. Bevel, 745 S.W.2d 237 (W.Va. 2013):

Holding: Police-initiated interrogation after Defendant requested counsel at his arraignment violated West Virginia Constitution’s right to counsel, even though police obtained a signed wavier from Defendant (disagreeing with U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Montejo).
People v. Westmoreland, 2013 WL 428642 (Cal. App. 2013):

Holding: Defendant’s confession to murder was not voluntary where police falsely told him that he would not receive a life sentence if he admitted to an unpremeditated killing during a robbery.
In re Z.A., 2012 WL 3031086 (Cal. App. 2012):

Holding: Even though Defendant asked how long her boyfriend (co-defendant) was “going to be here” after she had invoked her Miranda right to silence, that was not an implied waiver of her Miranda rights because it concerned routine custodial matters.
People v. Bejasa, 2012 WL 1353122 (Cal. App. 2012):

Holding: A defendant’s estimation of time during a Romberg sobriety test, in which a police officer asked the defendant to close his eyes and estimate when 30 seconds had passed, was testimonial and thus covered by the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination.

People v. Tom, 2012 WL 899572 (Cal. App. 2012):

Holding: The prosecution violated a defendant’s right to remain silent by presenting evidence of his post-arrest pre-Miranda failure to ask about the victims’ condition as proof of his guilt of vehicular manslaughter.
People v. Manzo, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 575 (Cal. Ct. App. 1/31/11):

Holding: Defendant’s 8-second silence followed by “I am doing my right” after police had given him Miranda warnings was an unambiguous invocation of right to silence.
People v. Ruch, 2013 WL 3480249 (Colo. App. 2013):

Holding: Revocation of Defendant’s probation for his refusal to admit the offense during court-ordered treatment (which was a probation condition) while his direct appeal was pending violated his 5^th Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Murdock v. State, 2013 WL 2494175 (Fla. App. 2013):

Holding: Defendant did not voluntarily and knowingly waive his Miranda rights during a second interview where he had been misinformed at the first interview that he was not entitled to counsel until after he had been charged, and the misinformation was not corrected at the second interview when he was read his Miranda rights.
Com. v. Ortiz, 2013 WL 5273074 (Mass. App. 2013):

Holding: Defendant’s confession was not voluntary where Defendant was 19 years old; police misrepresented statements given by witnesses in getting him to confess; told him it was his “last chance” to tell his story; and made assurances to him that he would not be culpable if he had given the gun for a purpose other than to rob or kill someone.
State v. Olivas, 2011 WL 1563199 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011):

Holding: Even though Defendant initially voluntarily agreed to be questioned, where police handcuffed him, took him to the prosecutor’s office, kept him escorted at all times, accused him of murder, directed him to confess, and never told him he was free to leave, Defendant was “in custody” for Miranda purposes.
People v. Rivera, 2013 WL 781793 (N.Y. Sup. 2013):

Holding: Even though Defendant was told he was not under arrest, Defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes since a reasonable person would not have believed he did not have to accompany police to the station, he was kept handcuffed and was placed in a locked interview room.
People v. Dunbar, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 516 (N.Y. App. 1/30/13):

Holding: Where police prior to giving Miranda warnings read Defendant a prosecutor-prepared script cautioning him that this would be his last chance to tell his side of the story, this rendered the Miranda warnings and subsequent waiver ineffective.
People v. Zouppas, 2012 WL 3538232 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2012):

Holding: Miranda warnings were insufficient where police failed to advise that any statement could be used against Defendant.
People v. Perez, 2012 WL 1322887 (N.Y. Sup. 2012):

Holding: Where prior to Miranda warnings, Prosecutor interviewed Defendant and falsely told him that the State would investigate his side of the story if he told it at that time and that he would have no other opportunity to do so, this ethical violation warranted suppression of Defendant’s statements.
People v. Harris, 2012 WL 89637 (N.Y. App. 2012):

Holding: Defendant’s statement, “I think I want to talk to a lawyer,” was an unequivocal invocation of his state right to counsel.
People v. Borukhova, 931 N.Y.S.2d 349 (App. Div. 2011):

Holding: Defendant’s right to counsel attached when attorney retained by sister called the stationhouse and asked that no questioning take place until he had seen his client, even though, after being informed about the phone call, defendant indicated that she did not know the attorney and had not retained him.
Brown v. Blumenfeld, 90 Crim. L. Rep. 102 (N.Y. App. Div. 10/4/11):

Holding: Judge may consider whether prosecutor violated professional conduct rules in deciding whether to suppress Defendant’s statements; prosecutor had prepared script to use to interrogate arrested people telling them that if they have a different story to tell, this is their only opportunity and that that this is the only opportunity they will have to tell something they would like law enforcement to investigate.
People v. Tucker, 2011 WL 4389681 (N.Y. App. 2011):

Holding: Defendant’s denial of his involvement in a shooting did not amount to a waiver of his Miranda rights.
Com. v. Melvin, 2013 WL 6096222 (Penn. Super. 2013):

Holding: Sentencing condition requiring Defendant to write apology letters while his case was pending on appeal violated right against self-incrimination.
Rubalcado v. State, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 763 (Tex. App. 3/19/14):

Holding: Defendant’s invocation of counsel at a bail proceeding is enforceable against investigators from another county, even though they may not have actually been aware of the invocation; one set of state actors (the police) cannot claim ignorance of Defendant’s unequivocal request for counsel from another state actor (the court); the 6^th Amendment requires imputation of knowledge from one State actor to another because it protects a person’s encounter with the State.
State v. Ackerman, 2012 WL 2870568 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012):

Holding: Where Mother, at behest of police, called Defendant-Father and got him to confess to a child sex offense, Mother was a “state actor” for purposes of 5^th Amendment and Defendant’s confession must be suppressed.

Ex parte Dangelo, 2010 WL 5118650 (Tex. App. 2010):

Holding: Defendant on probation had 5^th Amendment right against self-incrimination not to answer questions on polygraph about whether he had sex with minor and other similar questions about criminal activity while on probation.
State v. Gallup, 2011 WL 6091688 (Utah Ct. App. 2011):

Holding: Evidence that defendant hung up on trooper without asking trooper for reason for the telephone call violated defendant’s right to remain silent.
State v. Hunley, 2011 WL 1856074 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011):

Holding: Sentencing reform statute which provided that Defendant’s silence in the face of State’s presentation of a written summary was an acknowledgement of Defendant’s criminal history violated due process.

Joinder/Severance
U.S. v. McRae, 2012 WL 6554691 (5^th Cir. 2012):

Holding: (1) Even though police officer-Defendant burned a car with dead victim’s body inside, the evidence was insufficient to convict of denying victim’s relatives access to the courts to seek legal redress, since there was no evidence that the relatives were denied access to sue; and (2) Defendant’s trial should have been severed from other codefendants where gruesome evidence was admissible solely against the other codefendants and it would have been impossible for jurors to compartmentalize that.
U.S. v. Mathison, 2012 WL 6585203 (N.D. Iowa 2012):

Holding: Defendant charged only with possession of short-barrel shotgun would be prejudiced if his trial weren’t severed from co-defendants who were charged with robbery and possession of firearms in furtherance of crime of violence.
U.S. v. Rajaratnam, 2010 WL 4907625 (S.D.N.Y. 2010):

Holding: Count charging Defendant with conspiracy was improperly joined with count charging co-defendant with different conspiracy.
State v. Paiz, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 637 (N.M. 2/17/11):

Holding: Murder and drug trafficking charges which had no logical relationship between each other were improperly joined.
People v. Hunter, 2012 WL 638069 (Ill. App. Ct. 1^st Dist. 2012):

Holding: A cannabis charge and gun-related charges were based on the same act of constructive possession, requiring the State to comply with the compulsory joinder-speedy trial rule.

Judges – Recusal – Improper Conduct – Effect On Counsel – Powers
Anderson v. State, 2013 WL 2630992 (Mo. banc June 11, 2013):

Holding: Rule 29.15 judge should have sustained a motion to disqualify him where he had extrajudicial information about the jury foreperson (whom he had spoken to) about how the jury viewed mental health evidence at Defendant/Movant’s trial, and where he had read a magazine article about an expert witness in the case and questioned the expert’s credibility based on the article; these facts raised an appearance of prejudgment of Movant’s postconviction claims about mental health and the expert, even though the judge expressly said he did not base his denial of postconviction relief on these matters.
Moore v. State, 2014 WL 1597633 (Mo. App. E.D. April 22, 2014):

Movant was entitled to evidentiary hearing on claim that counsel was ineffective for withdrawing motion for automatic change of judge and not moving for change of judge for cause, where judge had previously prosecuted Movant.

Facts: Movant, who was convicted of various offenses at trial and sentenced to the maximum possible sentence by Judge, filed 29.15 motion alleging his counsel was ineffective in failing to move for change of judge. Judge had previously prosecuted Movant when Judge was a prosecutor. Counsel had filed a motion for automatic change of judge, but then withdrew it. Counsel failed to file a motion for change of judge for cause. The motion court (who was also the trial court Judge) denied relief without a hearing.

Holding: Here, there was a motion for automatic change of judge under Rule 32.07 filed, but then it was withdrawn by counsel. The motion court found that this withdrawal was done in Movant’s “presence” and “with his consent” in open court, but the record does not indicate that Movant was even aware that the motion was withdrawn much less that it was done with his “consent.” The motion court further found that Movant failed to allege prejudice sufficient to trigger postconviction relief, and that just because a trial judge received knowledge of facts through prior court hearings does not justify disqualification for cause. However, Movant’s motion alleges that counsel lacked a strategic purpose for not pursuing a change of judge, and that Movant wanted a change of judge. Movant argues that Judge was biased against him, because she prosecuted him in another case before she became a judge. And Movant contends that a reasonable person would doubt Judge’s impartiality where she had prosecuted him previously, and sentenced him to the maximum possible sentence here. All of this sufficiently alleged facts not refuted by the record which warrant an evidentiary hearing before a different judge.
State v. Williams, No. ED99399 (Mo. App. E.D. 6/28/13):

Trial court does not have authority to dismiss a criminal case with prejudice in the absence of a speedy trial violation.

Facts: In early 2012, Defendant was charged with a drug offense. Later in 2012, he entered in a plea bargain with the State. However, on the day of the scheduled plea, the State failed to appear. Defense counsel moved to dismiss for failure to prosecute. The trial court dismissed the charge with prejudice. The State appealed.

Holding: Only the prosecutor has the authority to voluntarily dismiss or nolle prosequi a felony charge, because the prosecutor has more knowledge about all the circumstances of the cases. While a trial court has authority to dismiss a case without prejudice for failure to prosecute in certain circumstances, it has no inherent authority do so with prejudice absent a speedy trial violation, and no such violation was alleged here.
State ex rel. Deutsch v. Thornhill, NO. ED96430 (Mo. App. E.D. 4/12/11):

Where Plaintiff met the requirements for change of judge under Sec. 517.061, judge was required to recuse.

Facts: Civil plaintiff filed a petition on February 1, 2010. The initial return date was March 22, 2010. The case was originally set for trial on March 14, 2011. On February 10, 2011, the trial court reset the trial for March 21, 2011. This order setting the trial date was more than 15 days before a scheduled trial. On March 9, 2011, Plaintiff filed a motion to change judge. When the judge overruled it, Plaintiff sought a writ of prohibition.

Holding: Sec. 517.062 states that a change of judge shall be filed not later than five days before the return date, but if the case is not tried on the return date but continued and if all parties are given 15 days advance notice of trial, then the motion shall be made not later than five days before trial. Here, the motion was filed more than five days before trial, so Plaintiff complied with the statute. Judge had to recuse. Writ of prohibition granted.
Snellen by Snellen v. Capital Region Medical Center, 2013 WL 5614115 (Mo. App. W.D. Oct. 15, 2013):

Trial judge’s sua sponte questioning and strike of nursing-mother venireperson was improper because such venirepersons are not disqualified, even though she would need breaks every three or four hours.

Facts: During voir dire, Venireperson said she was a nursing mother and would need breaks every three or four hours. The trial judge then said, “Waah. Mama. Starving. I couldn’t take the guilt,” and asked counsel to agree to strike her, which counsel did. Later, Appellant raised this as plain error on appeal.

Holding: Although this does not rise to level of plain error since counsel failed to object to the court’s action, “[w]e do not condone the actions of the trial judge…. This juror did not request to be excused for hardship; she merely informed the trial court of a need for a break every three to four hours so she could pump breast milk. Such limitation is not itself disqualifying” under Sec. 494.425. It would be a rare trial which did not stop every three or four hours for everyone to take a break. The trial court’s actions may have brought inappropriate attention to Venireperson and embarrassed her or caused her stress.
Charron v. Missouri Bd. of Probation & Parole, No. WD74844 (Mo. App. W.D. 7/31/12):

Holding: Where petitioner filed his motion for change of judge within 60 days of service of process, judge had to grant it under Rule 51.05(b) and could not rule on any motions which had not been taken under submission at the time of filing of the motion for change of judge, even if the other pending motions were filed before the change of judge motion; once a timely change of judge motion is filed, judge lacks authority to rule on other motions not previously taken under submission; failing to grant timely change of judge motion can never be “harmless error.”
Sampson v. State, 2013 WL 3828663 (1^st Cir. 2013):

Holding: Federal judge in habeas case had duty to recuse under Due Process Clause where judge had previously been a state court judge and had previously disqualified himself from an unrelated state court trial against Defendant wherein judge acknowledged bias against Defendant in light of prior dealings with him.
In re Bulger, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 757 (1^st Cir. 3/14/13):

Holding: Trial judge should have been disqualified from hearing murder case where judge had previously been a high Justice Department official who had supervisory authority over prosecutors when they had promised Defendant immunity if he worked as an FBI informant.
U.S. v. Ottaviano, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 425 (3d Cir. 12/24/13):

Holding: Even though federal judges are authorized to question witnesses, judge erred in questioning pro se Defendant-Witness in such a way that highlighted weaknesses in his defense; a judge cannot “take over the cross-examination” or allow his questioning to “reach the point where it appears clear to the jury that the court believes the accused is guilty.”
U.S. v. Pena, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 450 (5^th Cir. 6/18/13):

Holding: Federal judge improperly participated in plea negotiations when he suggested at a status conference that the agreement being negotiated should be linked to resolution of other pending charges against Defendant.
Weddington v. Zatecky, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 615, 721 F.3d 456 (7^th Cir. 8/1/13):

Holding: Federal habeas judge who had presided over the first of two state trials when she was a state trial court judge must recuse herself from hearing the federal habeas case on the second trial, since she effectively would be reviewing issues on which she had already passed judgment in state court since she had denied a motion to suppress applicable to both cases.
U.S. v. Kyle, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 175 (9^th Cir. 10/30/13):

Holding: Trial judge impermissibly participated in plea negotiations under Rule 11(c)(1) when he rejected a plea agreement as too lenient and then hinted that the Defendant would get a life sentence if he didn’t accept a different plea deal.
Hurles v. Ryan, 2013 WL 21922 (9^th Cir. 2013):

Holding: Petitioner would be entitled to habeas relief on his claims, if true, that judge was biased because judge had contacted Attorney General’s office during case and commissioned or authorized a responsive pleading or provided input to the prosecution of the case, so evidentiary hearing was warranted.

U.S. v. Harris, 2012 WL 1889782 (9^th Cir. 2012):