By: Patrick Naagbanton Prelude

The Amnesty Trade and the Caravan of Insecurity in the Niger Delta

By:

Patrick Naagbanton

Prelude:

This working paper is a product of intensive field work throughout the three (3) core states (Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers) of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. It contains interviews with members of the various gangs (whether those who had accepted the presidential amnesty offer or those still in the armed and arms business, and interviews with security officials, government, journalists, NGO workers etc. The Ijaw Council for Human Rights (ICHRC) commissioned Mr. Patrick Naagbanton, an independent journalist, researcher and coordinator of the Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development (CEHRD – www.cehrd.org), to undertake the field work and write this paper. However, this paper remains the property of ICHRC. ICHRC is a policy advocacy, non-governmental organization founded in 1998. The group strives for the promotion and advancement of human rights in the Ijaw areas of the Niger Delta, Nigeria. The paper is about the Federal Government Presidential amnesty programme and while violence persists in spite of it.

Background:

Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country and currently its largest oil producer. But the region of Nigeria where oil is produced, the delta, has been environmentally despoiled by the Transnational Corporations (TNCs), and its people have remained largely in grinding poverty. Some two decades ago, protest against these conditions began to turn violent. Largely peaceful protests and various limited concessions to local needs had only failed to reverse times to government repression and in one famous case the execution of a prominent protest leader (Ken Saro Wiwa). Today, this unrest has grown into a major insurgency, but one made complex, by a mixture of protest, greed, crime and political collusion. It is not easy to understand the motives, nor surely the intrigues, that make this situation seemingly intractable and that has made peace efforts to date, unsuccessful ¹. When a group of western oil workers were kidnapped in the Niger Delta in January, 2006, the immediate hike in prices at gas stations around the world served as a timely reminder of the importance of this unstable region to international oil supplies. A previously-unknown group announced that it was holding the workers. It called itself the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and quickly sparked panic within the oil industry with a second set of kidnappings and a series of attacks on oil facilities. Anxiety reached new heights then; in an email sent to journalists, MEND claimed responsibility ².

Worried by the well-coordinated attacks on oil facilities and kidnappings by MEND and other fringe groups operating in the region, the Nigeria’s President Umaru Musa Yar’ Adua (now dead) as he had once promised at a special Council of States meeting at the Presidential Villa in Abuja, Nigeria’s capital, on Thursday, June 25, 2009, signed the amnesty deal. Sandwiched between his Justice Minister and Attorney-General, Michael Aondoaka (SAN) Godwin Abbe, Rtd, then minister of Interior and Chairman of the Federal Government Panel on Amnesty (later minister of Defence) and Chief of Defence Staff, Air Marshall Paul Dike ³. Also, the then inspector-General of Police, Mike Okiro and others witnessed the signing of the amnesty package for “all militants” in the Niger Delta region. According to the President, the amnesty would

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1. Princeton N. Lyman’s forward to Professor Judith Burdin Asuni’s working paper, “Understanding the Armed Groups in the Niger Delta”, September, 2009

2. Asuni’s paper, Understanding the Armed Groups in the Niger Delta, September, 2009, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), New York, USA.

3. “The Amnesty contract and the future of the Niger Delta Region” CEHRD SCORECARD for 2009, Ogale-Nchia, Eleme, Rivers State, Page 59.

last for 60 days. “This proclamation shall seize to have effect from Sunday, October 4^th, 2009”. The government said it was granting amnesty to the deltaic militants based on section 175 of the Nigerian constitution. The amnesty covers militants in Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, Edo, Akwa-Ibom, Cross River, Abia, Imo and Ondo States who have been directly or indirectly involved in military in the region. In all the states above, arms collection centers were established and later amnesty camps ⁴.

On August 5, 2009, Dr. Imiebi Koripamo-Agary, an ex-permanent secretary in the Federal Ministry of Information, who was appointed media co-ordinator of the Presidential Committee on Amnesty issued a public statement that was made available to CEHRD, it reads in part, “To take advantage of the amnesty, all such persons covered should go to the nearest screening centre, turn in their arms, register, take oath of renunciation and receive presidential amnesty and unconditional pardon. There after, these persons are to register for the reintegration programme” ⁵.

Some militant leaders told CEHRD then, that Major-General Abbe (Rtd), head of the committee was virtually threatening to attack them if they did not surrender ⁶. The government kept on reassuring the militants that she was sincere about the amnesty programme, though many militant leaders were doubtful about the entire process. In the early part of August, 2009, Col. Rabe Abubakar, the coordinator of the Joint Military Media Campaign (JMMC) told CEHRD on the phone that, “No militant or their leaders will be arrested during or after the amnesty period as long as they surrender their arms and renounce militancy, this we are assuring” ⁷.

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4. ibid

5. ibid

6. Ibid. CEHRD’S SCORECARD for 2009

7. ibid.

The Amnesty Merchandising

Forty eight hours (48) after the presidential proclamation of the amnesty deal, the Yar’ Adua government announced a whooping sum of N50 billion as take off grant for the amnesty programme. On July 30, 2009, the Senate approved a budget of N10 billion only for the Abbe committee. This money was approved at a time the governors of the affected states were threatening to pull out of the amnesty process. Fired by the money at hand, the committee started her work by making all sorts of frivolous promises of building houses in different choice areas in major cities for the militants in Nigeria. They also promised them cash etc ⁸. Instead of a careful execution of the project, the whole programme was reduced to a money making and taking venture. Committee members adopted hide and seek tactics and a whole web of un-clarity riddled the entire process.

Members of the sub-committees were trading words over how a whooping sums of N600 million out of the N10 billion could not be accounted for ⁹. There were also scandals of embezzlement here and there. A whooping sum of N175 million was said to have been spent on lunch alone for militants. Major-General Abbe was accused of taking crucial decisions unilaterally without consulting others including various committees they have constituted. Funds were disbursed in improper ways etc ¹⁰.

State governors who had threatened to pull out of the process started privatizing some of the militant luminaries and kept them on their payrolls with the aim of using them as election militants to snatch ballot boxes and do other of their biddings in future elections. And some of the militants were asking the government to pay them N300, 000 naira per AK 47 rifles surrendered

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8. Patrick Naagbanton, interview with a member of one of the amnesty sub- committees in Asaba, Delta State, February 2, 2011

9. ibid

10. ibid

and construct a 3-bedroom flat for each of them at a place of their choice within the Niger Delta region ¹¹. The Joint Task Force (JTF) through its media spokesperson, openly expressed concerns at the way and manner weapons were surrendered at the various centres ¹². Then, there was palpable tension between the military and civilian amnesty committee members.

The amnesty deadline expired on Sunday, October 4, 2009, and the government refused to extend it in spite of pleas that it should be extended. On October 8, 2009, Air Vice Marshall, Lucky Ararile, coordinator of the Federal Government amnesty panel issued a public statement and said that so far 8, 299 militants had surrendered arms and accepted amnesty excluding the followers of Tompolo, Dagogo Farah and Tom Ateke, and that the number could rise to between 14, 000 to 15, 000 ¹³. Ararile also revealed that his committee never received N50 billion naira the presidency announced, that his committee’s budget was N10 billion, but his committee had only received N9, 858.7 million ¹⁴. Most of the committee members were deeply frustrated due to the lack of funds and lack of clear direction by the amnesty panel. The earlier enthusiasm displayed by members of the panel later faded away due to the above factors ¹⁵.

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11. CEHRD’s CORECARD for 2009

12. ibid

13. CEHRD’s SCORECARD for 2009, page 63

14. ibid

15. ibid

Where Good Tradition is Lacking

One of the fallouts of the fraudulent and violent 2003 polls was the deterioration in the security situation in the region. Those who were used as election militias later became a huge problem on society, as the election ended; the weapons given to them by politicians were not recovered. Armed groups mostly around the Rivers State erupted in mindless and sporadic struggle for supremacy, killings, maiming and proliferations of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) ¹⁶.

The violence, fear of insecurity and killings generated by the budding gangs compelled the Dr. Peter Otunaya Odili and Olusegun Obasanjo, Rivers Governor and President of the country respectively to embark on moves aimed at containing the ugly situation. Government forces made up of the navy, army, air force, mobile police and other security officials under the aegis of the Joint Task Force (JTF) also called Operation Restore Hope (ORH) launched series of attacks on the non-state armed gangs. The state government under Odili alleged to have benefited politically from the gangs violence initiated the Arms-For-Cash programme, to mop up arms. Monetary rewards and general amnesty were given to those who voluntarily returned their arms ¹⁷.

The public perception then was that the raids by government forces were targeted at Alhaji Mujahid Asari Dokubo who had left the leadership of the Ijaw Youth Committee (IYC) and formed the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), who was enjoying public support because of his anti-government and radical rhetoric. Angered by

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16. See CEHRD’s reports – “A Harvest of Guns”, August, 2004, Report No. 1 and “Guns Every Where; No one is safe”, October, 2004, Report No. 2

17. CEHRD’s report, “The Big Disarmament Gamble, The Comeback of the Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)”, September, 2005

the raids on his camps in a forest in Ogbakiri community at the Emuoha Local Government Area of Rivers State and killing of his top fighter, Asari increased the ferocity of his counter-violence, and threatened to blow up oil installations in any part of the Niger Delta ¹⁸. Asari and his arch-rival then, Tom Ateke of the Icelander Confraternity/Niger Delta Vigilante Services (NDVS) said to be enjoying Odili’s support, were invited to ASO ROCK in Abuja, in October, 2004. Asari and Ateke were granted presidential amnesty by President Obasanjo. At the Abuja meeting with the militia and cult leaders, the president set up a committee headed by the Chief of Staff at the presidency, Major-General Abdullahi Muhammed to work with an amnesty/disarmament sub-committee constituted by Odili at the state level ¹⁹. Bary Mpigi, then Odili’s Commissioner for Youths Affair led the state level committee. By December, 2004, the Odili/Mpigi sub-committee claimed that it had collected about 1, 100 various types of gun, including 200 from Asari’s NDPVF. However, Asari revealed that he surrendered to the sub-committee 3, 000 ²⁰.

A member of the Muhammed/Federal Government Committee, Ambassador Musa Kwakwanso, then Minister of Defence, while addressing some newsmen, gave a total number of weapons recovered and destroyed 2, 204 firearms and 2437 ammunitions. The inconsistency in the figure being quoted by government officials as the number of weapons recovered and destroyed by burning makes it difficult to ascertain the actual number of weapons mopped up. Transparency is a key component of any amnesty and disarmament process ²¹.

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18. ibid

19. ibid

20. ibid

21. ibid

The Mpigi committee is the second disarmament initiative of the Rivers State government. When the Mpigi committee was formed, NGOs such as the Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development (CEHRD) openly criticized the choice, because Mpigi as the former chairman of his Tai Local Government Area council in his Ogoni enclave, Rivers State had been implicated severally in bloody electoral violence in his area: and should be allowed to preside over a disarmament process ²². Whether the first or second disarmament committee, most of the guns displayed were malfunctioned and in terrible conditions, and therefore, would not have been the weapons used to terrorize the state. It was also noted that the heat to disarm was more on Asari who was estranged with the government than Ateke. Like other projects of the government, the Arms-for-cash programme turned out to be a big business for the gangsters and the officials involved in the disarmament ²³.

Fortunes were amassed from the arms trade. They sourced for guns from anywhere, and submitted to government in exchange of the N250, 000 cash the government was paying for an AK47 assault rifle. The money realized from the “disarmament” process later became a source of internal riff amongst leaders and combatants of the various groups. Combatants accusing their leaders of pocketing all monies without bothering about to settle them, the riff led to splitting of the NDPVF and the emergence of new ones ²⁴. Boma George and Dagogo Farah, both Asari’s top commanders once issued an ultimatum to Asari to pay them N500 million naira from the arms-for-cash deal so that they would rehabilitate other groups that fought with them ²⁵.

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22. CEHRD’S The Big Disarmament Gamble

23. ibid

24. CEHRD’S Big Disarmament Gamble

25. ibid

When asked how they want to be settled, Boma George said, “it is give- and-take, he is our leader (Asari), we know he cannot account for all the guns. But for the sake of peace, if he comes up with N500 million we will share it to the various groups like Deebam etc who joined us to form the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF)” ²⁶.

Boma estimated the total amount collected by their leader (Asari) at N1.3 billion, saying that they submitted over 3, 000 rifles and rocket launchers. He based his estimation on what the government was paying for each weapons (600 AK47s-N250, 000; 900 G3 rifles – N150, 000 each, 60 General multi-purpose machine guns (GMPMG) – N1.2million each). It was not known whether Asari was paid or not. This could not be confirmed independently. Boma and Asari later resolved their differences and reunited, though other combatants broke away to continue with the arms business ²⁷. Government officials who participated in the “disarmament” process also benefited immensely from the cash bazaar.

Any good disarmament process should reduce violence, gangs and arms proliferation but the case of Rivers State was different. They were strengthened and conferred on them some degree of impunity. The failure of this process resulted into further violence that consumed the region and beyond subsequently.

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26. ibid

27. See CEHRD’S Big Disarmament Gamble

Will Amnesty Curb Violence, Arms and Insecurity?

The amnesty programme of President Yar’ Adua/Dr. Goodluck Jonathan is a failure. There was no proper planning before the amnesty was announced. The government was more interested in “the end to attacks on oil facilities” rather than addressing the basic social, economic and political issues that led to the crises. The crises have not been resolved ²⁸. One of the demands by the militant leaders before they accepted the amnesty offer was that Henry Okah, leader, of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) who was arrested in Angola, sent to Nigeria, and was standing secret trial on 62 counts charges of terrorism, treason, illegal possession of fire arms, arms trafficking etc should be released. Okah benefited from the amnesty offer, he was released.

On Thursday, August 6, 2009, Jomo Gbomo, the MEND’s spokespersons in an online statement disowned its top commanders in the central delta axis (Bayelsa State) who had in company of their governor: Timipre Sylva visited Aso Rock, Abuja, to reaffirm their support for the amnesty programme. Gbomo said they will not surrender arms ²⁹. In response, Mr. Ebikabowei Ben Victor, popularly called General Boyloaf, described Henry Okah as an ingrate, “he is owing me N170 million. I fought for his release and have told myself that immediately Okah is released I will quit arms struggle. He owes me. He should pay me. I knew him through Dokubo Asari in those days of NDPVF ³⁰.

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28. Patrick Naagbanton, interview with Chief (Dr.) Bello Oboko, President of the Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), Warri, 1^st February, 2011.

29. Jomo Gbomo’s, online press statement Thursday, August 6, 2009

30. CEHRD’s SCORECARD for 2009, page 62

Throughout the entire Delta region, several militia groups, warlords, cult groups etc surrendered their weapons and accepted amnesty, but it was more of a media show rather than credible and acceptable disarmament process. One of the biggest defects of the process was to allow state governments in the region to take control of the process.

It should have remained a federal government process. State governors as noted earlier, cornered the various militants of their state origins and “empowered” them with cash and contracts so that they could prosecute their biddings. They were made powerful and stupendously wealthy while the followers groaned in penury and want ³¹. The militant leaders gambled with the process of registering their members who had reportedly accepted amnesty. Some included the names of their relatives and friends who were not involved in the armed violence at all. Their names were included so that they will benefit from the monthly payment of N65, 000 to each of them ³². The money goes through the various camp leaders to their followers. Some of the camp leaders either take some substantial part from it and pay some pittance to them, or refused to pay for several months. This has resulted into several bloody protests by the militants across the region ³³.

The militant leaders use the most exotic cars and live in castles while their followers can not afford a day meal. For example, General Boyloaf’s second-in-command, General John Togo got dissatisfied with the payment to him after accepting amnesty and returned to the creeks to flare violence, so that he can get more recognition and money. He is currently in arms fighting under the platform of Niger Delta Liberation Force (NDLF), a new group ³⁴.

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31. Patrick Naagbanton, interview with James Sampson, an ex-militant with Osei Clever camp, Bayelsa State, at Yenagoa, Bayelsa State on February 2, 2011

32. Patrick Naagbanton, interview with a member of Commander Ebi camp follower at a location in Bayelsa State on February 3, 2011. Ebi owes his boys over 7 months.

33. ibid

34. See: CEHRD’S SCORECARD for 2010, page 39.

There were a lot of cases of those who accepted amnesty but returned to violence either in their state of operation or state of origin. A lot of those who had their violent teeth sharpened in the core states of the delta, like the proverbial chicken, returned home to roast. Those from Imo State, Akwa Ibom, Abia, Cross River States etc returned to their states of origin to continue with the arms business in spite of the amnesty.

This explains why the above areas witnessed the upsurge in violence across the board shortly after the amnesty offer. For example, Obioma Nwanko popularly called Osisikankwu, the 40-year-old former Area Mobilization Officer of the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) who had his militant tutelage-ship under Ateke’s Icelander Confraternity who had 300 heavily armed combatants under him; claimed to be fighting to the development of his Ngwaland in Abia State ³⁵. He wanted his state governor, Theodore Orji to pay him like other Niger Delta governors were paying his soul mates ³⁶. He was actively engaged in kidnap for ransom, political brigandage, ritual killings, political assassinations and armed robberies in the Abia State area since amnesty. He was killed on Sunday December 12, 2010 about 1.30pm by soldiers.

About 20, 192 ex-militants embraced the first amnesty proclamation, followed by another 6, 156. Today, there is less than 1, 000 youths parading themselves as ex-militants or cultists. There are no longer organized militancy activities in the Niger Delta.

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35. Patrick Naagbanton, interview with Obioma Nwankwo aka Osisikankwu, in a forest (camp) in Ugwati village, Ukwa West Local Government Area, Abia State, September 21, 2010

36. ibid

Whoever bears arms in the region has a lot to content with. Before the amnesty proclamation by the late President Umaru Yar Adua, the country’s daily oil production dropped to 700, 000 barrel per day. After the proclamation and disarmament, oil production has increased to about 2.3 million barrels per day ³⁷.

Not all the militants are as wealthy as others. While, some are happy and rich, some are unhappy and frustrated with the programme. Ex-militants were trained by experts from Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia State in a week of intensive and rigorous training in non-violent struggle and transformation at the Obubra camp, some 2 hours away from Calabar, Cross River State Capital ³⁸.

Indeed, there is no organized militancy to contend with as we had in 2006, 2007, 2008, and parts of 2009, but the major challenge now is the high level of organized crimes such as kidnap for ransom, ritual murder, assassinations, violence etc. The situation is quite dangerous than we had in the pre-amnesty period, because the gangs now operate secretly and strike surprisingly. Dangerous arms and secret gangs misusing them are still in circulation, and on the prowl. The April poll, 2011 will be decisive as even those who had quit organized violence will be lured into it by the desperate politicians around.

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37. Special Adviser to President Goodluck Jonathan on Niger Delta Matters, Kingsley Kuku was quoted to have said. The Nation newspaper, “Amnesty Curbed militancy”, Damisi Ojo, Friday, February 18, 2011

38. ibid

39. Patrick Naagbanton, interview with Commander Walter Selete, camp commander from Bayelsa State, at a location in Rivers State February 10, 2011.