Dilemmas of (re-)Integration: Multilateralising Uzbekistan’s relations with Russia
A germane policy dilemma has been faced by Mirziyoyev and his associates in their endeavours to
modulate the intensity of Uzbekistan’s engagement with the Russian Federation, an interactive
framework that continues to represent a complex problem for Uzbek foreign policymakers.
To all intents and purposes, the reconciliation of the regime’s globalisation agenda with the neo-
imperial policies that the third Putin Administration is supposedly pursuing across Eurasia presents a
similar structural challenge to the one faced by Karimov in the early-to mid-1990s, when
Uzbekistan’s early steps as a newly independent state were somewhat constrained by the agenda of
post-Soviet re-integratsiya underpinning CIS multilateralism. Karimov and his associates claimed to
be following a strict policy of mustaqillik (self-reliance) to justify their explicit disengagement from
many of the multilateral initiatives led by Russia in the 1990s and 2000s.
517
A declared policy of self-
reliance became in this sense the official vehicle for a progressive withdrawal to nearly total
international isolation—Uzbekistan’s default foreign policy position for much of the Karimov era.
The isolationist option is not available to the Mirziyoyev regime, which is actively pursuing the
reinsertion of Uzbekistan in the international community while attempting to enhance the degree of
516
Commercial data revealed that Chinese imports from Uzbekistan decreased by 35 per cent across January-March 2020. See: Yau Tsz
Yan, Chinese business briefing: Force majeure. Eurasianet, April 2020, https://eurasianet.org/chinese-business-briefing-force-majeure
517
On Karimov’s foreign policy legacy, see: Teles Fazendeiro, Bernardo. (2017). Uzbekistan’s Defensive Self-Reliance: Karimov’s Foreign
Policy Legacy. International Affairs 93 (2): 409–427.
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domestic economic integration with processes and collaborative frameworks operating at global
level. A very similar objective—controlled distance from the influences emanated by the Kremlin—
has to be therefore pursued through an opposite policy strategy, namely one that presents
Uzbekistan as a dynamic player in regional and international arenas.
The core of this foreign policy dilemma intersects with the opportunity to formalise Uzbekistan’s
accession to the EAEU, the multilateral organisation that is allegedly embodying Putin’s neo-imperial
agenda in the former Soviet space. Before delving further into the Uzbek debate on EAEU accession,
it may be worth to offer a snapshot of the multifaceted linkages currently connecting Uzbekistan
with the EAEU.
518
The Mirziyoyev years witnessed a substantive intensification of economic interaction between the
parties: in 2016-2018, total commodity circulation with the economies integrating in the EAEU
increased by 52 per cent to US$9.65 billion. At the end of 2019, about 40 per cent of Uzbek exports
is directed to the EAEU area while approximately 80 per cent of Uzbekistan’s foreign trade cargo
transits through the EAEU. People-to-people contacts feature heavily in the relationship’s equation:
no fewer than 2.5 million Uzbek citizens are currently living in the EAEU area, with the largest
community being located in Russia. The strengthening of Uzbekistan’s presence in the EAEU area
occurred at a time wherein Tashkent’s partnership with Russia had entered a more positive juncture,
characterised by the emergence of powerful private interests pushing for closer ties between the
parties and, at a broader level, the intensification of bilateral economic cooperation.
519
Moreover,
Uzbekistan’s partnerships with the Union’s Central Asian members—Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan—
greatly benefited from Mirziyoyev’s attempts to re-centre Uzbekistan at the core of intra-Central
Asia cooperation—a policy line that contributed directly to the improvement of regional relations in
the most recent years.
This cursory survey suggests that, ultimately, Uzbekistan and the economies integrating in the EAEU
have never been closer. The rapprochement captured in the preceding paragraph sat at the core of
the official announcement made by government in Tashkent in early March 2020, when Uzbekistan
formally acquired observer status in the EAEU. The benefits of full accession are intimately
connected with the Union’s capacity to develop a common economic area; easier access to a larger
market with fewer trade obstacles, entry into the regulatory framework developing in the EAEU and,
most importantly, regularisation of the immigration status of the large community of Uzbek
economic migrants working and living in Russia.
There are naturally downsides to full EAEU accession. Recent works on the integration of the Central
Asian economies in the EAEU revealed that, ultimately, current integration patterns are
strengthening each member’s economic linkages with Russia rather than facilitating the
establishment of a genuinely working common market area.
520
A similar scenario may arise after
Uzbekistan’s accession, with higher quality consumer goods from Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan
inundating the so far protected Uzbek domestic market, continuous monetary depreciation diluting
518
The statistical sketch that follows has been provided to the authors by the Embassy of the Republic of Uzbekistan to the United
Kingdom.
519
Rafael Sattarov, On the way to the oligarchy. Why is the new leadership of Uzbekistan moving closer to Usmanov, Carnegie Moscow
Commentary, November 2017, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/74600\; In 2018 alone, trade and investments deals between the parties
exceeded US$28 billion. See: Paul Stronski, Will Mirziyoyev’s Plodding Reforms Be Enough for Uzbekistan?, World Politics Review, January
2020, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28471/will-mirziyoyev-s-plodding-reforms-be-enough-for-uzbekistan
520
On Kazakhstan’s EaEU membership, see: Anceschi. Analysing Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy. Regime neo-Eurasianism in the Nazarbaev
Era. For a wider reflection on the dynamics regulating Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the EaEU, see: Dergousoff, Deborah. 2017. Kyrgyzstan’s
Accession to the EEU: Why Do Apples Matter Anyway? World Review of Political Economy, 8 (2): 203-220.
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the benefits of trade liberalisation and, most importantly, compounding in the medium-run the
imbalances already existing in Uzbek-Russian trade.
521
The post-pandemic economic downturn, in our view, has the potential to accelerate Uzbekistan’s
accession to the EAEU. Full membership may offer a readily available solution to address the likely
shrinkage in the labour markets of Russia and Kazakhstan, legalising the residency status of more
than 2 million Uzbek economic migrants who operate in the EAEU area. Most importantly, the
formalisation of membership may grant Uzbekistan full access to any post-pandemic Union-wide
scheme to upstart production and revitalise trade across the Eurasian common market.
To our mind, the geopolitical implications of Uzbekistan’s EAEU membership have to be toned down.
Our understanding of Mirziyoyev’s multilateral strategy intends to de-contextualise Uzbek foreign
policy from analytical lenses somewhat related to Great Game narratives. Any rapprochement with
forms of Russian-led multilateralism—and, correspondingly, the intensification of Uzbekistan’s
economic ties with China that we described in the preceding segment of the essay—have to be seen
as strategies supporting the globalising vector of Mirziyoyev’s foreign policy, rather than as
indicators that a wider process of foreign policy realignment is currently at play in Tashkent. The
COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the consequent global economic crisis, increased the relevance of
arguments supporting regional integration across the post-Soviet space, somewhat reinforcing the
essentially economic nature of the benefits associated with Uzbekistan’s entry into the EAEU. In any
case, Uzbekistan’s foreign policy framework—and its incessant pursuit for independence on the
international scene in particular—remained relatively unchanged since the new leadership rose to
power; they only have to be achieved with a different strategy.
522
521
A first-class discussion of these issues is featured in: Fabrizio Vielmini, Uzbekistan and the Eurasian Economic Union: Pros and Cons,
CPRO Policy Brief, March 2019, http://www.wiut.uz/images/FV_EAEU_PB03.pdf
522
Sherzodkhon Kudrathodjaev, Uzbekistan Does Not Drift Among Great Powers, The Diplomat, June 2018,
https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/uzbekistan-does-not-drift-among-great-powers/
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15. Conclusion and recommendations: A road map for
future reforms in Uzbekistan
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