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The Impact of Cotton Clusters on Farmers 
The cotton cluster system has brought with it a whole new set of problems. Farmers, for example, 
have long been at the mercy of the whims of the state. They do not own their land but lease it from 
the government usually for a period of between 30 and 49 years. Since privatisation began, farmers 
have been reporting that unscrupulous methods have been used to transfer their land to private 
operators with little or no compensation.
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 Numerous ‘land optimisations’ in recent years have seen 
farmers have their land confiscated for ‘failure to fulfil the cotton quota’. 
 
Historically, farmers have had little freedom to choose what products to cultivate and, given the 
intense effort required to grow cotton profitably, many would prefer to cultivate fruit and 
vegetables which may be more suited to their soil and bring higher yields. Farmers claim that they 
are often pressured by hokims to sign contracts obliging them to deliver unrealistically high amounts 
of cotton, forcing them again to choose cotton over more profitable crops to meet the production 
target or lose their land.
429
 Others reported this year that they had still not received payment for 
cotton they delivered in 2018. Some have alleged that they have been forced to sign contracts 
without the name of the private operator and the production targets left blank. In one case, farmers 
complained that they did not even know who the director of the cluster was or to whom they should 
direct their complaints. Uzbekistan’s agriculture sector looks increasingly precarious for those trying 
to make a living from it. The vulnerability of farmers to exploitative practises is compounded by the 
concentration of entire districts in the hands of one cluster, a pattern that comes dangerously close 
to regional monopolies.
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 A number of these new clusters have gone to considerable lengths to 
conceal their ownership structures and many are registered as Limited Liability Companies in the 
United Kingdom (UK), a preferred method for those wishing to veil owners, beneficiaries and most of 
all taxes.
431
 
                                                           
425
 Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, Just Like Old Times: Ministry of Internal Affairs Continues to Meddle in the Lives of Farmers, August 
2019, https://www.uzbekforum.org/just-like-old-times-ministry-of-internal-affairs-continues-to-meddle-in-the-lives-of-farmers/ 
426
 Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, Spanish-Owned Chemical Company Implicated in Forced Labour with Tragic Consequences, December 
2018, https://www.uzbekforum.org/spanish-owned-chemical-company-implicated-in-forced-labour-with-tragic-consequences/ 
427
 REGUM, In Uzbekistan, starting from 2020, cotton will be grown only by the cluster method, Regnum News, December 2019, 
https://regnum.ru/news/2800903.html 
428
 Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, Farmers’ Land Transferred to Privately-Owned Clusters, May 2019, https://www.uzbekforum.org/vse-
izmeneniya-sohraneny-uzbek-farmer-my-land-was-unexpectedly-transferred-to-a-cotton-cluste/ 
429
 Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, Cotton Clusters and the Despair of Uzbek Farmers: Land Confiscations, Blank Contracts, and Failed 
Payments, April 2020, https://www.uzbekforum.org/cotton-clusters-and-the-despair-of-uzbek-farmers-land-confiscations-blank-contracts-
and-failed-payments/ 
430
 Ron Synovitz and Sadriddin Ashur, Uzbek Farmers Get 'Cluster' Bombed By Reforms, RFE/RL, December 2019, 
https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbek-farmers-get-cluster-bombed-by-reforms/30328781.html 
431
 The Tashkent Times, Agricultural cluster reform - a failure by design?, December 2019,  https://tashkenttimes.uz/economy/4750-
agricultural-cluster-reform-a-failure-by-design 

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Spotlight on Uzbekistan 
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The government may be heading towards eschewing the responsibility for forced labour in the 
cotton sector and will no doubt declare victory if in future the blame can be laid at the feet of 
private operators. Indeed, Uzbek Forum has found evidence of forced labour at a number of 
privately-operated clusters.
432
 In 2019, the government still imposed state quotas for cotton 
production for which local authorities have the responsibility to deliver, including cotton produced 
by private clusters. Again, the responsibility of hokims to either meet those quotas or face 
consequences such as dismissal, coupled with regional shortages of labour, meant that cluster 
operators knowingly or otherwise had their cotton harvested by people under coercion. Even 
companies which were consciously making an effort to avoid the use of forced labour found 
themselves caught between the competing priorities of local officials to meet their targets and avoid 
penalties, and farmers who were unable to attract enough voluntary labour at the end of the season 
when weather conditions are harsh and earning potential is low.  
 
These prevailing challenges have nonetheless failed to dampen the Uzbek government’s enthusiasm 
to have the ban on its cotton lifted - notably supported by the ILO which itself confirms the 
persistent widespread use of forced labour. PR campaigns proclaiming that ‘Uzbekistan is open for 
business’ and that the boycott is preventing job creation in a country with rampant and growing 
unemployment, have been ubiquitous both at home but more noticeably abroad. The argument for 
lifting the boycott was sharpened as soon as COVID-19 reached Uzbekistan. In an open letter issued 
together with a press release, the Minister of Labour urged the Cotton Campaign to show its 
solidarity with the people of Uzbekistan, in a sleight of hand reversal of the understanding of 
solidarity.
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