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Karabakh (London: Institute for Religious Minorities in the Islamic World, 1993);
“Tragediya Maragi: Chetyre Goda Spustya” [The tragedy of Maraga: Four years
later], Golos Armenii, 9 April 1996.
36. Mekhtiev himself says that only seventeen men died in the Karintak/
Dashalty operation.
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37. Many of the details on Shusha come from Sügüt [The fall], a film shown
by ANS in Baku in 1997.
38. Interview with Agayev, 13 April 2000.
39. Interview with Ter-Tatevosian, 28 September 2000.
40. Interview with Orujev, 29 November 2000.
41. Interview with Husseinov, 12 April 2000.
42. The commander of the Shusha tank was Albert Agarunov, a Baku Jew,
who was killed a few days later on the Shusha-Lachin road. Thomas Goltz ob
served his funeral at Alley of the Martyrs in Baku.
43. Interview with Husseinova, 12 April 2000.
44. Ter-Tatevosian estimates Armenian losses at 58 men and Azerbaijani
losses at 200. Orujev says that more Armenians died and that he lost 159 men
killed and 22 missing.
45. Interview with Mamedov, 14 November 2000.
46. This is the view of Ashot Manucharian, then Ter-Petrosian’s national
security adviser.
47. ANS television interview with Basayev, 17 July 2000, as reported by
BBC Monitoring.
48. Goltz, Azerbaijan Diary, 185–186; David Ljunggren, “Azerbaijanis Say
Armenians Attack Town near Karabakh,” Reuters, Baku, 12 May 1992; Elif
Kaban, “Azeri Strongman Says War Makes Elections Futile,” Reuters, Ankara,
11 May 1992.
49. Interview with Pashayev, interpreted from Azeri, 13 November 2000.
50. Interview with Ohanian, 16 May 2000.
51. Heç Kim va Heç na Unudulmayacag [No one and nothing will be forgot-
ten], ANS, 1992. Jengiz Mustafiev was killed less than a month later, on 15 June
1992, near Aghdam.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 12
1. The Karabakh Armenian leader Arkady Gukasian says that under a just
peace agreement, he would have no objections to Azerbaijanis returning to
Shusha, but in the same breath he suggests that in practice it is unlikely to hap-
pen. In an interview on 30 March 2001, he said: “We believe that refugees have
the right to return to their homes, irrespective of nationality. That concerns both
Armenian and Azerbaijan refugees. Another matter is ‘Will the refugees want
that, when there is no stable peace, there is a risk of a resumption of war?’”
2. Kurban Said, Ali and Nino, 44. None of Murat’s biographers even men
tion an Armenian connection. A 1905 biography of Murat relates, for example,
that he was born in La Bastide-Fortuniere, a small village in Guyenne, and that
“his family’s roots there went back several centuries.” Jules Chavanon and
Georges Saint-Yves, Joachim Murat (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1905), 3.
N OT E S TO C H A P T E R 1 3
315
3. Shushinsky, Shusha, 134–135; Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan, 10.
Swietochowski notes that Shiite volunteers also fought with the Russians
against Sunnis in the Russo-Turkish war of 1853–1855.
4. Shushinsky, Shusha, 135. Pushkin’s description of the Karabakh regi
ment is in his Journey to Erzerum.
5. Lisitsian, Armyane Nagornogo Karabakha [The Armenians of Nagorny
Karabakh], 44.
6. Keppel, Personal Narrative of a Journey, 188.
7. Ibid., 194.
8. Villari, Fire and Sword in the Caucasus, 199.
9. Snark news agency, 25 December 1992, quoted in Harutiunian, Sobytiya
[Events], IV, 301.
10. Interview with Gabrielian, 15 December 2000.
11. Interview with Archbishop Parkev, 12 May 2000.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 13
1. From the film by Cvetana Paskaleva, Dorogiye Moi, Zhivye ili Myortviye
[My dears, alive or dead], 1993, re-released by TS Films, Yerevan, 1996.
2. Interview with Ali, 4 April 2000.
3. Pavel Felgenhauer, “Nakanune ‘Reshayushchikh’ Srazhenii” [On the
eve of “decisive” battles], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 July 1992.
4. Interview with Western diplomat; Goltz, The Hidden Russian Hand, 112.
5. Interview with Kocharian, 25 May 2000.
6. Interview with Sarkisian, 15 December 2000.
7. Human Rights Watch, Azerbaijan, Seven Years of Conflict, 87.
8. Interview with Levon Eiramjiants, 28 September, 2000.
9. In part, this discrepancy was the Armenians’ own fault. Armenian pol
iticians had objected strongly to the opening of a large new ammunition depot
next to Lake Sevan in 1989, and the depot was therefore placed instead near
Aghdam in Azerbaijan. For a detailed background on the weapons inherited by
both sides, see Petrosian, “What Are the Reasons for Armenians’ Success?”
10. Interview with Yunusova, 20 November 2000.
11. Interview with Hajizade, 28 March 2000.
12. Dmitry Danilov, “Russia’s search for an international mandate in Tran
scaucasia,” in Coppieters, Contested Borders in the Caucasus, note 161.
13. Interview with Ter-Petrosian, 24 May 2000.
14. Rokhlin estimated the cost of the weapons alone at $720 million. The
figure of one billion dollars includes transportation costs, spare parts, and fuel.
Pavel Felgenhauer says he believes the Armenians paid for some of the costs.
In July 1992, Felgenhauer also wrote that the Armenians were handed the
weapons of the Yerevan Division of the 4th Army; op. cit. For the most detailed
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breakdown of the weaponry, see Lev Rokhlin, “Spetsoperatsia ili komerche
skaya afera?” [A special operation or a commercial deal?], Nezavisimoye Voen
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