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Party official, made an outspokenly anti-Moscow speech in Baku on 8 January,
as the trouble was beginning. This was the cue for several members of the
Popular Front to propose that he should replace Vezirov—perhaps at Aliev’s
instigation, if this supposition is correct. In the event, Hasanov was defeated in
a straight vote against Mutalibov, although he later became Aliev’s foreign
minister. After the bloodshed, Aliev also welcomed Etibar Mamedov at the
Azerbaijani representative’s office in Moscow, shortly before Mamedov was
arrested. For some who have plotted Aliev and Mamedov’s strange history of
opposition and collaboration, this marked the beginning of an alliance be-
tween them.
27. Interview with Hajizade, 15 November 2000.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 7
1. Turan News Agency, 31 March 2000, as reported by BBC Monitoring.
2. Henry, Baku, An Eventful History, 173.
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N OT E S TO C H A P T E R 7
3. Hopkirk, On Secret Service East of Constantinople, 357.
4. Richards, Epics of Everyday Life, 144–145.
5. All of these conversations are from 14 December 2000.
6. Interview with Orujev, 24 November 2000.
7. Sharg News Agency 1 February 2000, as reported by BBC Monitoring.
8. Interview with Asadov, 29 March 2000.
9. Bechhofer, In Denikin’s Russia, 309–310.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 8
1. Interview with Mirzoyev, 12 April 2000.
2. Interview with Horton, 2 January 2001.
3. Zulfugarov, NKAO, 38. Interview with Gukasian, 7 October 2000.
4. The acronym OMOR stands for the Russian name Otryady Militsii
Operativnogo Reagirovaniia, or “Operative Response Police Units.” OMON
stands for Otryady Militsii Osobogo Naznacheniia, or “Special Designation Po-
lice Units.” I am very grateful to Robin Bhatty for his insights on this and the
whole issue of paramilitaries and the formation of armed forces.
5. Report of the Delegation of the First International Andrei D. Sakharov
Congress, which visited Azerbaijan and Armenia 13–16 July 1991.
6. Interview with Byrkin, 1 June 2000.
7. Interview with Manukian, 5 May 2000.
8. Interview with Eiramjiants, 28 September 2000. Vladimir Kiselyov,
“Doroga v Nikuda” [The road to nowhere], Moskovskiye Novosti 35, 2 September
1990.
9. Interview with Avsharian, 18 May 2000.
10. Balayan, Between Heaven and Hell, 270.
11. Russian Archives Project, Fond 89, Reel 1.989 89/4/17.
12. Interview with Mutalibov, 30 May 2000.
13. Interview with Manucharian, 4 May 2000.
14. As reported by the Sakharov Congress in July 1991.
15. Shaumian region was renamed Geranboi Region by Azerbaijan in Jan
uary 1991.
16. Details on the Getashen operation are taken from the reports by Memo-
rial and the Sakharov Congress, and Murphy, “Operation ‘Ring,’” 86.
17. According to Major General A. Zaitsev, commander of Soviet Internal
Forces in Nagorny Karabakh,
It became clear that the Internal Forces would not retreat one step from
the law and a firm barrier would be placed against the looting carried
out by the OMONites. Then the 23rd Motorized Division of the Soviet
Ministry of Defense, consisting 80 percent of Azerbajianis, was called
N OT E S TO C H A P T E R 9
309
in to carry out acts of forced deportation of Armenians. After that the
situation radically changed: the Azerbaijani leadership resorted to a
new tactic. Before the beginning of a deportation the state of emer
gency was canceled in the given region. We were forced to withdraw
our units, after which the Azerbaijani side carried out ‘special opera
tions’ about which we were not even informed.
“Voennye v Karabakhe—Posredniki ili zalozhniki?” [The military in Karabakh
—mediators or hostages?], Argumenty i Fakty, 7 February 1992.
18. Interview with Shabad, 7 December 2000.
19. Shakhnazarov, Tsena Svobody [The price of freedom], 220–221; inter-
view with Mirzoyev.
20. Interview with Shabad.
21. Cvetana Paskaleva, Vysoty Nadezhdy [The heights of hope], 1991. Reis
sued on Rany Karabakha [Wounds of Karabakh], TS Film, Yerevan, 1996.
22. Melander, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Revisited,” 70.
23. Ibid., 71.
24. Report of the Delegation of the First International Andrei D. Sakharov
Congress on Events in Nagorny Karabakh, 13–16 July 1991, 3.
25. Interview with Sarkisian, 4 May 2000.
26. Interview with Sarkisian.
27. Interview with Miller, 9 January 2001.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 9
1. Interview with Gambar, 7 April 2000.
2. Interview with Kocharian, 25 May 2000.
3. Laitin and Suny, “Karabakh: Thinking a Way out,” 145.
4. Thomson has been rather demonized by Armenian historians for im
posing a de facto Azerbaijani rule over Karabakh, which then carried over into
the Communist era. The archives suggest that he was acting more out of an in
stinct for stability than any Armenophobia: while believing that it was best to
keep Azerbaijan’s control over Karabakh, Thomson also cabled London, argu
ing that the Armenians should be given territory in eastern Turkey.
5. For Britain’s role the Caucasus in 1919–1920, see Artin H. Arslanian,
“Britain and the Transcaucasian Nationalities during the Russian Civil War,”
in Transcaucasia, Nationalism and Social Change, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1983).
6. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia, III, 133.
7. Bechhofer, In Denikin’s Russia, 283.
8. Mutafian, The Caucasian Knot, 134.
9. Istoricheskaya Spravka, 33.
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N OT E S TO C H A P T E R 9
10. Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan, 104–105; Pipes, The USSR, 46;
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