Beyond the democratic state: anti-authoritarian interventions in democratic theory

CHAPTER THREE
 
THE DEMOCRATIC POTENTIAL OF DIRECT ACTION 
I. The “Occupy” in Occupy: Direct Action and Democracy 
In the her American Political Science Association Presidential Address, published in 
Perspectives on Politics
, Carol Pateman (2012) argues that participatory democracy is an 
increasingly relevant and plausible alternative to the deliberative model, which is dominant in 
political theory. She discusses, in particular, the growth of participatory budgeting processes in a 
number of municipalities around the world as exemplary of the contemporary potential of 
participatory democracy. Interestingly, though, the photograph on the cover of that issue of 
Perspectives
was not of a participatory budgeting meeting or a similar formal assembly, but 
rather a raucous confrontation between protesters and police during the height of the Occupy 
Wall Street movement in New York City. While there is much to be desired about participatory 
budgeting, it is not at all synonymous with the form of democracy that is practiced during a street 
protest. In other words, there are important differences between participatory budgeting and an 
Occupy Wall Street protest – differences that are significant enough that they should not equated 
under the moniker of “participatory democracy.” While they are both surely participatory, they 
are not the same model of democracy. Indeed, the concept of participatory democracy does not 
adequately distinguish what is unique about the model of democracy practiced throughout the 
2011 occupation movements. A major aim of the second half of this dissertation is to articulate 
and defend a theoretical account of this decentralized, unruly, and anarchistic model of 
democracy. In both this and the next chapter, I present an alternative account of radical 
democracy – based on practices of direct action and networked organization – that is not 

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synonymous with common understandings of either participatory democracy or direct 
democracy. 
Indeed, while much attention has been paid to the general assemblies that characterized 
the Occupy movement, less attention has been paid to the direct actions – in this case, the 
unauthorized takings of space and the militant efforts required to hold them – that made the 
ongoing assemblies possible. Moreover, while the direct and deliberative forms of democracy 
that characterize the general assembly can be relatively easily folded into the discourse of 
democracy, the practice of direct action constitutes a greater challenge for democratic theory.
Because, as I will discuss in more detail, direct action is not primarily or exclusively a dialogical 
act (at least not in the same way as is a protest, rally or assembly), it necessarily upsets the 
communicative focus of much democratic theory. I argue that direct action exposes the 
problems with seeing democracy in primarily (or exclusively) communicative terms. Thus, I use 
the practice of direct action to intervene in democratic theory, calling into question the emphasis 
placed on deliberation over action and communication over power. 
In this chapter, I use the practice of direct action to challenge two reductions in 
democratic theory, one characteristic of mainstream communicative democrats and the other 
characteristic of radical democrats. Allow me to briefly outline both in turn. First, as I have 
already suggested, I challenge the reduction of democracy to deliberation and communication.
This is not an effort to entirely displace communication nor is it an attempt to characterize 
communication as irrelevant to democratic politics. Rather, I intend to highlight important acts 
that are not simply communicative, and certainly not deliberative in the sense of fostering an 
inclusive conversation oriented toward mutual understanding. I want to show that the practice of 
direct action in particular can be simultaneously democratic and not reducible to a 

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communicative act. As such, I contend that democracy itself is not reducible to communication 
but, as I will argue, involves enactments of collective power. I hope to shift our view of 
democracy, such that deliberation and communication are backgrounded, while action and power 
are foregrounded.
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This is not to deny or even downplay the significance of communication, 
both for democracy generally and for direct action in particular – both are necessarily 
communicative, but they are not 
just
about communication. Using the practice of direct action to 
intervene in democratic theory will help expose the 
communicative bias
in democratic theory – 
that is, a tendency to view democracy in terms of an exchange of ideas and/or the transmission of 
messages – while opening the door to a reconsideration of the role of power in a vibrant 
democratic politics. 
However, securing a place within democratic theory for the practice of direct action may 
lead to another reduction I also want to challenge: the reduction of democratic politics to a 
politics of resistance. Though I take much inspiration from theorists of radical democracy such 
as Jacques Ranciere and Sheldon Wolin, too often these perspectives highlight acts of resistance 
to the social order, but neglect attempts to actually remake that social order by constructing an 
alternative society. While direct action is most assuredly a practice that intervenes and disrupts, 
it is not just a politics that resists, but also one that creates and prefigures. I will show through an 
analysis of the double-sided character of direct action a way to theorize a radical democratic 
politics that transcends resistance and is capable of articulating and building an alternative 
society. 
To pursue this line of argument, I begin with a brief critique of the Habermasian 
emphasis on communication and deliberation in contemporary democratic theory. Through a 
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I am indebted to Michaele Ferguson’s (2012, 13) 
Sharing Democracy
for the notion of “shift[ing] our way of 
seeing” to reveal elements of democracy, which are occluded by dominate conceptions of democracy that prioritize 
commonality (in her case) and communication (in mine). 

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critical engagement with Jodi Dean’s work, I show this emphasis has turned democracy into a 
neoliberal fantasy, but that this should not lead us to surrender democracy. Instead, I argue that 
the practice of direct action can overcome deliberation’s weaknesses, without entirely 
abandoning democracy as a normative framework. To make this argument, I first define the 
practice of direct action and locate it within broader anarchist politics. I contend that there are 
two dimensions or sides to direct action (which sometimes, but not always, overlap): one side of 
direct action focuses on the disruption of existing power inequities, while the other side 
emphasizes the prefigurative creation of a free and egalitarian society. I argue that both 
disruptive and prefigurative forms of direct action have democratic potential. Through an 
engagement with Iris Marion Young, France Fox Piven and Jacques Ranciere, I build an account 
of the democratic potential of disruptive direct action insofar as such actions challenge or upset 
power inequalities and make real the political equality upon which democracy depends. Then, 
through an engagement with Hannah Arendt, I argue that prefigurative direct action has 
democratic potential insofar as it enables people to practice political freedom – that is, to shape 
the conditions of their lives and, in association with others, build our shared world. If disruptive 
direct action is about 
reconfiguring
power vertically, prefigurative direct action is about 
creating
power horizontally. Ultimately, I provide a democratic defense of the anarchist practice of direct 
action, arguing that it plays crucial democratic roles, if we are able to shift our view of 
democracy away from talking and towards doing. Let me be clear at the outset that my aim is 
not to defend all direct action as democratic, but to defend the democratic 
potential
of direct 
action. Not all direct actions are democratic. Conversely, direct action, as both a disruptive and 
prefigurative force, can play a vital role in bolstering a vibrant democratic politics. My goal in 
this chapter is to highlight this potential of direct action, while acknowledging that such actions 

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may at times be prone to anti-democratic tendencies. I conclude the chapter by articulating a set 
of guidelines or criteria by which we might evaluate and/or amplify the democratic potentials of 
direct action.