The present case The present case is exceptional. The context is
employment as a member of the security and
intelligence services. Secret information is the
lifeblood of these services. In the 1950s Blake
deliberately committed repeated breaches of his
undertaking not to divulge official information gained
as a result of his employment. He caused untold and
immeasurable damage to the public interest he had
committed himself to serve. In 1990 he published
his autobiography, a further breach of his express
undertaking. By this time the information disclosed
was no longer confidential. In the ordinary course of
commercial dealings the disclosure of non-confidential
information might be regarded as venial. In the present
case disclosure was also a criminal offence under the
Official Secrets Acts, even though the information was
no longer confidential. Section 1 of the Official Secrets
Act 1989 draws a distinction in this regard between
members of the security and intelligence services and
other Crown servants. Under section 1(3) a person
who is or has been a Crown servant is guilty of an
offence if without lawful authority
*287 he makes
"a damaging disclosure" of information relating to
security or intelligence. The offence is drawn more
widely in the case of a present or past member of
the security and intelligence services. Such a person
is guilty of an offence if without lawful authority
he discloses "any information" relating to security or
intelligence which is or has been in his possession by
virtue of his position as a member of those services.
This distinction was approved in Parliament after
debate when the legislation was being enacted.
Mr Clayton submitted that section 1(1) is drawn
too widely and infringes article 10 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (1953) (Cmd 8969) . Section
1(1) criminalises disclosure of information when
no damage results. It focuses on the status of the
individual who makes the disclosure, rather than on
the nature of the information itself. A non-damaging
disclosure by a member of the security and intelligence
services is criminal, but the identical non-damaging
disclosure by a Crown servant is not.
This argument was raised for the first time in this
House. Your Lordships are not equipped with the
material necessary to decide the point. In the event
this does not matter, because there is in the present