Arabic philosophy

classics in translation.10 They knew such treatises as the so-called

Theology of Aristotle along with the other material derived from

Plotinus’ Enneads. Some version of the Liber de Causis and the other

Arabic versions of Proclus11 had likely reached them as well. In these

cases, however, the connection is not (at least not thus far) textually

explicit but rather implicit in the use of shared language and technical

terms and concepts.

For two other crucially important pseudo-epigraphic texts the link

is, by contrast, more obvious. One is now known as the Pseudo-

Ammonius, a collection of opinions, in the main Neoplatonic, said

to have been advocated by various ancient Greek philosophers on

several topics such as creation ex nihilo and the identification of

God with being.12 Traces of this work show up in Arabic discussions

of the history of Greek thought. It is quoted in passages from al-

Nasafı¯ and Abu¯ Tamma¯m and is certainly the source for Abu¯ H. a¯ tim

al-R¯az¯ı’s chapters that purport to prove the failure of the philosophers

to attain the truth on their own. Lacking the sure guidance of

the divinely inspired prophets, says Abu¯ H. a¯ tim, they flounder about

in error, each asserting an opinion and nothing more. There is therefore

little doubt that Abu¯ H. a¯ tim used this work and that it served

as a basis for Ism¯a‘¯ıl¯ı knowledge of Neoplatonic doctrine. The one

manuscript of it available now,13 moreover, begins with a statement

to the same effect. The Arabic work that we have now may thus

have been a product of the Ism¯a‘¯ıl¯ı da‘wa, perhaps a collection of

notes taken by a da¯ ‘ı¯ (such as Abu¯ H. a¯ tim or al-Nasafı¯) from one or

more translations of an ancient author (one possibility would be the

Ammonius mentioned near the beginning of it). For the Ism¯a‘¯ıl¯ıs its

primary purpose was to invalidate the work of philosophers, and it

is therefore less a source in itself than evidence of other sources of

theirs.

The other text is equally problematic. In the Longer Version of

the Theology of Aristotle, which incorporates all of the shorter version,

but adds many passages that appear in it alone, there are sections,

mostly quite brief, that match portions of some Ism¯a‘¯ıl¯ı works

in both wording and in doctrine.14 The additions in question do

not go back to Plotinus. The doctrines expressed in them are, or

rather become, however, characteristic of the Ism¯a‘¯ıl¯ıs in the F¯at.imid

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The Ism¯a‘¯ıl¯ıs 77

period. Yet they surely also come from an older, possibly ancient,

source and are not in themselves a product of Ism¯a‘¯ıl¯ı interests.

Because so much of his writing survives, al-Sijist ¯an¯ı, who died

not long after 971, is for us the major representative of the earliest

Ism¯a‘¯ıl¯ı philosophy. Until the beginning of the eleventh century, the

da‘wa produced no other important figures, unless it is appropriate

to place in this interval the Brethren of Purity (Ikhw¯an al-S. af ¯a’) and

to accept them as being somehow Ism¯a‘¯ıl¯ı. Their famous encyclopedia,

the Epistles (Rasa¯ ’il), displays certain affinities with Isma¯ ‘ı¯lı¯

Neoplatonic doctrine and it is commonly supposed that this secretive

society was connected to the Ism¯a‘¯ıl¯ı movement. There is, however,

dispute about both the dates of their activities and their affiliation.

The best evidence places them about this time and various

statements in their Epistles closely match certain doctrines of the

Ism¯a‘¯ıl¯ıs. However, what they advocate in regard to the im¯amate does

not; they cannot have been supporters of the F¯at.imids. Instead they

represent vaguely on this one issue the position of the Qarmatians.15

Strictly within the F¯at.imid context the next great authority

chronologically isH. am¯ıd al-D¯ın al-Kirm¯an¯ı, a towering figure whose

writings dominate the era of the caliph al-H. ¯akim(reigned 996–1021).

As is typical for all of these Isma¯ ‘ı¯lı¯ da¯ ‘ı¯s, there exists little information

about al-Kirm¯an¯ı’s life, except that he lived and worked in Iraq

and visited Cairo. He dedicated all of his writings to al-H. ¯akim, the

last of them in the year 1021 when this ruler disappeared.16

Al-Kirm¯an¯ı belonged to a philosophical tradition different from

the others; themajor influence on himis not the Neoplatonism of the

Theology and related texts, but al-F ¯ar¯ab¯ı. Accordingly, al-Kirm¯an¯ı’s

own approach is much more Aristotelian. For example, he adopted a

version of the scheme of multiple intellects that correspond each in

turn to the heavenly spheres – a doctrine favored by his contemporary

Avicenna, as well. He speaks of the active intellect and not the

universal intellect; he has little or no real notion of a universal or

world soul. Needless to say, his views on many issues were in conflict

with those of al-Sijist ¯an¯ı and the other earlier figures. In fact

he wrote an important treatise precisely to analyze and then recast

previous Ism¯a‘¯ıl¯ı doctrine in a mode more in tunewith his own. That

work, the Riy ¯ ad.

,17 attempts to reconcile the positions espoused by,

first, Abu¯ H. a¯ tim al-Ra¯zı¯ in his critique of al-Nasafı¯ and, second,

those of al-Sijist ¯an¯ı, who had tried to come to the aid of al-Nasaf¯ı.

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78 paul e. walker

The points of contention are largely philosophical: for example, is

universal soul perfect from its inception or does it need to acquire

perfection in the course of time? Inadvertently, al-Kirm¯an¯ı provides,

in this instance, a rare internal view of the development of Ism¯a‘¯ıl¯ı

philosophical doctrine.

Al-Kirm¯an¯ı’s attempt to readjust the course of Ism¯a‘¯ıl¯ı thought

failed in the short run. Nevertheless, his work constitutes one of the

high points of Ism¯a‘¯ıl¯ı philosophical interest. Subsequent F¯at.imid

era authorities ignored him and preferred instead the doctrines of al-

Sijist ¯an¯ı. The two prime examples are N¯as.ir-i Khusraw (d. ca. 1077)

and al-Mu’ayyad fı¯ al-Dı¯n al-Shı¯ra¯zı¯, the former a da¯ ‘ı¯ who wrote

exclusively in Persian but who often seems to be translating passages

from al-Sijist ¯an¯ı, and the latter the head of the da‘wa from 1058 to

1077, whose massive output of sermons and doctrinal lessons has

yet to be studied in detail.

With the end of the F¯at.imid dynasty in 1171, the main center of

Ism¯a‘¯ıl¯ı activity moved either to Alamut in northern Iran or to the

Yemen. The T.

ayyib¯ı da‘wa in the Yemen maintained throughout

the later medieval period a vigorous scholarly tradition of collecting,

studying, and writing. The survival of nearly all earlier Ism¯a‘¯ıl¯ı texts

depended on the T.

ayyib¯ıs; and scholars in this da‘wa continued to

produce new works that build on the older philosophical doctrines.

In them the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity assume an important

place, as do the writings of al-Kirm¯an¯ı, who was much favored by

the later Yemenis.

the philosophical doctrines of the

major figures

Muh. ammad al-Nasaf¯ı

A major concern of al-Nasaf¯ı18 was to define the transcendence of

God in such a way that he, the Originator, stands totally outside his

creation. To do so al-Nasaf¯ı relied on a special vocabulary, which

he shared with others of his time. The verb abda‘a (to originate)

yields the active participle Mubdi‘, God as Originator, who brings

into being both thing (al-shay‘) and not-thing (al-la¯ -shay‘). He originates

from nothing (la¯ min shay‘); beforehand he is and there is

nothing else, no knowledge or form. All knowledge and forms are

originated; they cannot be other than originated being; and they are

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The Ism¯a‘¯ıl¯ıs 79

not in God’s being (huwiyya) in any sense. Non-being and nothingness,

like being, follow being; they are negations of an existent.

God’s command (amr), which is also called the word (kalima) and

is the very originating itself, causes originated being, which is intellect.

The command thus serves as an intermediary between him

and first originated being – that is, between God and intellect. But,

although the act of the agent here is prior ontologically to its effect,

from the perspective of the effect, the action is the effect. The command

is intellect. This notion appears to derive from a passage in

the Pseudo-Ammonius that states that the agent (mu’aththir) produces

an effect (athar) that becomes the patient (mu’aththar). Thus

the command of God, which is this effect, has no separate identity

other than the being it brings into being.

Originated being (the mubda‘) is intellect. The Creator has given

existence to the universe all at once by the origination of intellect

as a whole and by seeding in it the forms of the world. Intellect like

its cause is eternal; in intellect the forms are also eternal. If this

were not so, they would not endure and there would be no possibility

of reverting to this eternity. If intellect were not perfect and

eternal, the order in the world would cease and it would perish. Intellect

in turn emanates the forms to what follows after and below it.

Intellect becomes thus the intermediary between its own cause and

the world. Its immediate effect is soul, which, unlike intellect, is

not perfect. Soul requires the benefit of intellect in order to acquire

perfection in the future. One result is time. In its search for these

benefits, soul produces motion; in finding them it rests. These two

tendencies result from soul’s relationshipwith intellect; they in turn

generate prime matter and specific form, which together provide the

foundation of the compound, material world.

Mankind, the first thing formed in the soul, is the fruit of soul’s

endeavor to master intellect. Knowledge was hidden in the rational

human soul, which is a part of universal soul, in the same way a

tree is concealed in its seed. Just as the seed cannot develop without

water, likewise this knowledge in the human – its rationality – will

not sprout or grow without the water of prophecy.

Abu¯ H. a¯ tim al-Ra¯ zı¯

Like his contemporary, Abu¯ H. a¯ tim gave great importance to terms

based on abda‘a: God is the Mubdi‘, the Originator. He originates all

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80 paul e. walker

existing being at once; the first of them is the sum of existing being(s).

Also, aswith al-Nasafı¯, the originating (ibda¯ ‘) isGod’s command and

his word. Once originated, it and all aspects of it are one and the same

being; they are first intellect. Hence no aspect or attribute of the

originating or what it creates applies in any way to the Originator;

he cannot be described with any termthat pertains to created beings.

To this point Abu¯ H. a¯ tim’s doctrine of God and creation is much

like that of al-Nasaf¯ı, or for that matter al-Sijist ¯an¯ı, or even the

Longer Theology.His concept of time, however, is new. In his system

time and intellect are one being. Since there is no time prior to origination

and since origination and intellect are the same being, time

and intellect, he argues, are the same. Soul proceeds from intellect

(he uses the verb inba‘atha); intellect then bestows beingness in its

entirety on soul. Soul receives all and also time. Although its reality

requires time, soul is nevertheless perfect. For Abu¯ H. a¯ timits discursive

mode of being is not a defect, nor is its subservience to intellect.

The two are together in a higher, spiritually pure realm, uncontaminated

by any portion of, or contact with, the physical heavens or the

mundane world. They are alike in the sense that male and female are

both one species even though one is above the other. Intellect and

soul are both of the highest rank and nobility; there is no nobility

higher. As the foundation of the higher, spiritual world, they are the

source of perfect nobility, light, mercy, knowledge, the ultimate in

all ways, containing no darkness or murkiness at all.

The foundation of the lower world is prime matter and form,

whose temporal mode of being is not connected to that higher world.

Nonetheless, an effect (athar) of that lofty world does govern this

one, like the effect of a craftsman on his product. The kinds of soul

are vegetative, animal, rational, and, only in man, a fourth that is

not of this world but is an effect of that other higher world. Thus

human soul is not a part of universal soul, nor does it participate in

that soul. Nothing of this world is directly connected to the world

of intellect and soul. However, humans, for the sake of whom the

mundane world exists, accept the effect of the higher realm. And

man is the fruit of this world. The world and all that is in it was

originated for his sake. It reaches completion and its end is when

man is complete. At that point the world will disappear.

Despite some differences, both al-Nasafı¯ and Abu¯ H. a¯ tim offered

a fairly clear Neoplatonic interpretation of the issues just outlined.

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The Ism¯a‘¯ıl¯ıs 81

Unfortunately, beyond this brief sketch, the evidence for the full

range of either man’s doctrines is at present missing. What we know

about what they said is tantalizing, but it remains only that.

Abu¯ Ya‘qu¯ b al-Sijista¯nı¯

Whereas the material for al-Nasaf¯ı and al-R¯az¯ı is slight and any picture

of their ideas must, by the nature of the evidence, remain superficial,

for al-Sijist ¯an¯ı19 it is relatively abundant.20 It is true, nonetheless,

that even he never composed a complete work of philosophy.

Instead there are individual chapters and sections in his works –

many in fact – that are by themselves treatises of philosophy. Frequently,

within a single composition, he provides a discussion of a

philosophical issue in one chapter followed by another on a topic

that can only be classed as Ism¯a‘¯ıl¯ı doctrine.21

Al-Sijist ¯an¯ı’s philosophical teachings range over a descending and

ascending scheme – from the simple and universal to the complex

and particular, from the one to the many, and back again. For him

the study of creation reveals the structure of the universe: the perpetual

stability of the higher and the constant flux of the lower worlds.

Human soul is entangled in the latter; its salvation and eventual

eternity resides in the former. Creation proceeds from God to the

foremost among created beings, the intellect, which is the first to

have existence and is nearest to God himself. Next is soul, followed

by nature, the latter in reality only a lower formof soul. After nature

there is a shift from the sublime and spiritual to the mundane and

corporeal. Nature generates the physical world, the earthly habitat

of plants, animals, and above all of humans. For al-Sijist ¯an¯ı, as for

the Ism¯a‘¯ıl¯ıs in general, the upward return is of even greater concern.

They see it as a historical process, the collective salvation of

mankind. A second hierarchy, parallel to intellect, soul, and nature,

provides the law and the truth that lead humans away from this

world into the next, from the physical and sensate to the sublime

and spiritual, in reverse back to pure intellect.

In al-Sijist ¯an¯ı’s statements about this process there are several

doctrines that are characteristic of him. His doctrine of the One is

primarily concerned to preserve its absolute unqualified transcendence.

God is not the first in any sense; he is not the outer limit.

For al-Sijist ¯an¯ı God is not a substance; he is not intellect, he has no

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82 paul e. walker

being, he is not a cause, he has no that-ness (inniyya). All such attributions

are false in his case. Al-Sijist ¯an¯ı devoted separate chapters in

his works to refute carefully those who hold to any of these propositions.

Among his opponents are both the philosophers and the vast

majority of Islamic theologians. He comments that the philosophers

claim that God is a substance that is somehow related to something

else. But one cannot say, for example, that God is a thing

not like other things. Al-Sijist ¯an¯ı’s point is that denying all physical

attributes of God is but one step toward distinguishing him from all

created being. Attempting to understand God by intellectual means,

even approximations, is also, despite its abstract theoretical form,

a kind of anthropomorphism. The intellect, human or otherwise,

simply cannot know God.

Most Neoplatonists assume that the intellect’s role is, in part, to

contemplate the One and to realize some apprehension of it (possibly

to attempt a unionwith it). But these Ism¯a‘¯ıl¯ı philosophers insist that

intellect is incapable of attaining this goal. To express his doctrine

al-Sijist ¯an¯ı advocated the use of a double negation, a kind of via

negativa duplex. One must say that God is not a thing, not limited,

not describable, not in a place, not in time, and so on; but then add to

these negations a second set. Thus one also states that God is not not

a thing, not not limited, not not describable, not not in a place, not

not in time. He aims to remove God from intelligibility altogether.

Simple negation is an understandable act that yields an intellectual

result; double negation is not.

Yet curiously al-Sijist ¯an¯ı next insists that creation, or more precisely

“origination” – he also uses the Arabic verb (abda‘a) – occurs

in response to the “will” of God. God thus “commands” that the universe

exist. His concern here to preserve the act of God’s originating

the world from any comparison with other types of agency is not

surprising. In relying exclusively on the term “originate” (abda‘a)

for God’s creating something from nothing, he joins both his predecessors

in the Ism¯a‘¯ıl¯ı da‘wa and others such as Isaac Israeli and

al-Kind¯ı. He is careful to call all other creating by another name. Soul,

for example, gushes (inbajasa) or proceeds (inba‘atha) from intellect.

Emanation is not the same as origination. But even so he stands out

in his attempt to insert an intermediary between God and intellect

and to label it in such a way as to emphasize both its distinctness

and its connotation of will and purpose. It is also the word, the logos

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The Ism¯a‘¯ıl¯ıs 83

(al-kalima). Yet its real status is that of a nonexistent and, once the

command is issued by God, that very command thereafter is intellect

and nothing more. Once the world has come into being, the order

that gave it existence is an aspect of intellect itself. Moreover, there

cannot andwill not be another command; the first is eternal and outside

of time and sequence. God’s origination determined that there

should be cosmos rather than chaos. If God exists the cosmos can

never be chaos.

The object of the command is, in the first instance, intellect,

which is the sum and principle of all being, the formof all things, both

manifest and hidden. It is the wellspring of all spiritual and physical

light. Al-Sijist ¯an¯ı also employs the peculiarly Ism¯a‘¯ıl¯ı term, “the preceder”

(al-sa¯biq), to indicate that intellect precedes all other beings.

Yet some aspect of intellect enters all subsequent being as well. Soul

gushes from it when intellect turns upon itself in contemplation;

soul in turn engenders nature within itself. Whereas intellect is perfect,

soul is not. Rather it needs the benefit of intellect to attain a

degree of that possible perfection. Soul is in motion, intellect at rest.

As soul moves it creates time. However, insofar as soul is unmindful

of its own mentor, it sinks, often becoming enthralled with the natural

world it has made within itself. It must be reminded of its origin;

its forgetfulness requires a revelation that corrects its orientation,

turning its attention upward again rather than downward.

Most aspects of al-Sijist ¯an¯ı’s doctrine of intellect and soul follow

Neoplatonic precedent. Significantly, he resolutely maintains the

indivisibility of both. For him there are no separate intellects, such

as, for example, show up on the planetary scheme of al-F ¯ar¯ab¯ı and

Avicenna. His intellect is universal and individual human mind participates

in it. Likewise the soul is universal and our souls are a part

of that universal.

A key problem is prophecy. Prophecy is not philosophy and

philosophers are not prophets. In fact the major lawgiving prophets

all belong to the same lineage. They share a similar extraordinary

faculty that is not available to other humans. But, at the same time,

they are, as al-Sijist ¯an¯ı puts it, men who are “the deputies of intellect

in the physical world.” Based on their perfect access to the realm of

intellect, their role is to convert reason into language and to convey

it to other humans. This function requires that such prophets

have unrestricted and unencumbered benefit of intellect, that their

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84 paul e. walker

physical selves be so harmoniously undisturbed by worldly desire