Andrew rothstein

However, just as with earlier plans, these results had been attained in circumstances extremely complicated by external difficulties. Again and again during the years from 1933 to 1937 the Soviet Union was reminded of its environment of capitalist States. Summing up the results of the period at the XVIII Congress of the C.P.S.U. in March, 1939, Molotov said:

“We must place on record that, in the Second Five Year Plan as well, the growth of heavy industry proceeded much more rapidly than of industry producing articles for mass consumption. The main cause of this was the fact that during the fulfilment of the second Five Year Plan we had to make important corrections to the plan for the development of industry. Just as in the first Five Year Plan, the international situation obliged us to raise the speed of development of defence industry which we had fixed, and {as you know from the speech of comrade Voroshilov at this Congress) we did quite a lot in this respect. This required a considerable quickening of the expansion of heavy industry, and this to a certain extent at the cost of slowing down the growth of light industry.” ³

In fact, the period of the second Five Year Plan had been that of the establishment of the Nazi Government in Germany, of its open preparations for a war of revenge, of its coalition with the Fascist and aggressive forces of Italy and Japan, and of the successive attacks on Ethiopia, Spain and China which marked the beginning of the Second World War. What complicated the situation particularly, from the point of view of the U.S.S.R., was, on the one hand, that open challenges to the Nazi leaders by Stalin at the XVII C.P.S.U. Congress in 1934, and by Molotov at the VII All-Union Soviet Congress in 1935⁴— to say whether their plans for expansion at Soviet expense still held good—had been ostentatiously ignored. On the other hand, equally ostentatious were the public expressions of the view in Western countries, particularly in Great Britain, that both Hitler and Japan would do well to act as “one-way guns”—i.e., to attack the Soviet Union and leave their other neighbours alone.⁵ This was a period of intense activity by Soviet diplomacy to substitute for such a prospect one of collective resistance to aggression. It was the period of the attempts to conclude an “Eastern Locarno”, in order to normalise Soviet-German relations, and of the Soviet Union’s entry into the League of Nations (1934); of the pacts of mutual assistance concluded by the U.S.S.R. with France and Czechoslovakia (but open to adherence by Germany) and of the Soviet Union’s offer to join in oil sanctions against Italy, in defence of Ethiopia (1935); of the Soviet Union’s pressure for collective support of the Spanish Republic and of China against the aggressors, and of single-handed Soviet support of both victims of the Fascist bloc, with armaments and otherwise, as an encouragement to others (1936-37).

But all these efforts were in vain. The Western countries were ruled by governments who were guided in their international policy at that time by the idea of non-intervention—particularly where proposals put forward by the Soviet Union were concerned. Stalin characterised this policy, at the XVIII Party Congress, as follows:¹

“The policy of non-intervention means conniving at aggression, giving a free rein to war, and consequently transforming the war into a world war. The policy of non-intervention reveals an eagerness, a desire, not to hinder the aggressors in their nefarious work: not to hinder Japan, say, from embroiling herself in a war with China, or better still with the Soviet Union: not to hinder Germany, say, from enmeshing herself in European affairs; from embroiling herself in a war with the Soviet Union: to allow all belligerents to sink deeply into the mire of war, to encourage them surreptitiously in this: to allow them to weaken and exhaust one another: and then, when they have become weak enough, to appear on the scene with fresh strength, to appear of course ‘in the interests of peace’, and to dictate conditions to the enfeebled belligerents.”

Stalin remarked that this was a big and dangerous political game, which might end in a “serious fiasco” for the supporters of the policy of non-intervention. But the Soviet Union, of course, could not take comfort in that prospect.

It is in the light of this international situation, and of the growing menace of attack from without, that one must interpret the serious interference with the constructive aims of the second Five Year Plan expressed in the following table, which shows the rapid growth of the burden of armaments on Soviet finances:

Year.	Amount of defence expenditure (milliard roubles).	Percentage of total Budgetary expenditure.
1933	1.4	3.5
1934	5	9.5
!935	8.2	12.0
!936	14.9	17.2
1937	17-5	17.4

The strength of the Red Army rose during these years from 562,000 in 1933 to 940,000 the following year and to 1,300,000 by 1937.² How much more rapid the progress in economic and cultural development would have been without this unexpected extra burden, everyone in the Soviet Union had ample opportunities and encouragement to realise.

By 1940 the defence expenditure, at 56.1 milliard roubles, exceeded 30% of the Budget, and it was no mere coincidence that that year the seven-hour day in industry, introduced in 1927 to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Revolution, was replaced once more by the eight-hour day.³

The third Five Year Plan, adopted in 1939 but covering the period from 1938 to 1942, was also being largely fulfilled when the German attack came in June, 1941. It is worth quoting the not very well-known summary for this period given in the first section of the Law on the fourth Five Year Plan, adopted in March, 1946:

“Socialist industry was making rapid headway. Industrial output showed an annual average increase of 13%. Big strides were being made in particular in the development of heavy industry. In the first three years of the third Five Year Plan the output of the means of production increased by more than 50%....

“Industry was rapidly developing in the eastern regions of the U.S.S.R. In the Urals, the Volga areas, Siberia, Central Asia and Kazakhstan, industrial output in the first three years of the third Five Year Plan increased by 50%.

“The cereal crop in 1940 amounted to 119,000,000 tons. One of the richest grain-growing areas of the Soviet Union was created in the eastern part of the country....

“Some 3000 State-owned mills, factories, mines, power-stations and other enterprises were put into operation. More than one-third of the capital construction in this period fell to the eastern areas of the U.S.S.R....

“In 1940 there were produced in our country 15 million tons of iron, or nearly four times as much as in 1913; 18.3 million tons of steel, or four-and-a-half times as much as in 1913; 166 million tons of coal, or five-and-a-half times as much as in 1913; 38.3 million tons of marketed grain, or 17 million tons more than in 1913; and 2.7 million tons of raw cotton, or three-and-a-half times as much as in 1913. With the help of Socialist industry, the reconstruction of the railway system was undertaken.

“This was accompanied by a continual improvement of the living and cultural standards of the peoples of the U.S.S.R...”

It is hardly necessary to emphasise the point that the progress of this third Plan, which embraced about 200 branches of industry, no less than the terrible consequences of its interruption by war, only sharpened the lessons which all the preceding history of the U.S.S.R. had taught.¹

4. The War and After

Peace-time plans were abandoned when the U.S.S.R. was attacked, and a “Mobilisation Economic Plan” for the third quarter of 1941 was adopted. It provided for a reduction of building works anticipated in 1941 to one-third of what had been planned; for the concentration of resources in materials, finance and man-power on defence construction; for an immense increase in the output of special machine-tools, presses, high-quality steel, high-octane petrol, uniforms and other equipment for the fighting forces; for the rapid expansion of works and power-stations in the Urals, the Volga regions and Western Siberia; and for the building up of fuel reserves by the winter. This plan was succeeded, in August, 1941, by a “War Economy Plan” for the eastern regions, extending this time far into Asia, which it was proposed to develop rapidly as a seat of large-scale war industry. The plan covered the fourth quarter of 1941 and the whole of 1942, and included the transfer of war plants and their auxiliary factories from areas menaced by the enemy.²

More than 1360 large industrial plants were evacuated in this way (1,200,000 railway truckloads of machinery), and in the main were already at work again during the first half of 1942. As a result of these plans, and of their successors adopted in the following years, industrial output in the eastern areas of the U.S.S.R. was twice as great at the beginning of 1945 as it had been in the first half of 1941, while the output of the war industries was more than five-and-a-half times as great. The change brought about by the revolution can-perhaps be illustrated even more strikingly by the following fact.

During the war with Germany of 1914-17 the Tsarist Army had depended on foreign imports for 60% of its rifles and cartridges, 72% of its guns and 75% of its shells, 97% of its lorries and 100% of its caterpillar tractors.³ It was as a consequence of this situation that the Russian soldiers were in the dreadful condition of the autumn of 1916, without supplies, with one rifle between three or four men and with one or two shells per gun per day.

During the second war with the Germans, from 1941 to 1945, the Soviet Union received from its Allies—Great Britain, the United States and Canada—a total of 9214 tanks in three years, while manufacturing over 90,000 tanks itself; 12,258 planes, while producing 120,000 itself; 31,265 anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns (no other artillery), while producing over 360,000 guns of all types itself. In all, the Soviet Union received from its Allies in three years just over 40 million shells; it produced in its own factories 240 million shells during 19.44 alone. Similarly, in the same year it produced 7400 million cartridges, while from its Allies it received throughout the war a total of just over 1316 million cartridges.⁴ These and similar figures mark the profound economic change which enabled the U.S.S.R. victoriously to withstand a shock far greater than that which had laid Tsardom low.

No Soviet publication during the later war years and since, no conversation with any Soviet citizen, but reveals legitimate pride in these achievements. Yet the pride is always accompanied by regretful thoughts of what might have been achieved in more peaceful and humane fields, but for the war imposed on the U.S.S.R. In this respect there is absolute continuity in Soviet thought, from the very first days after the revolution. The regret is all the more real because of one special aspect of the interrupted third Five Year Plan and of its successor, the fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50), which has not yet been noticed. Voznesensky, the chairman of the State Planning Commission, said in his report at the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on 15th March, 1946:

“The Five Year Plan, while providing for the restoration and development of the national economy of the U.S.S.R., at the same time marks a resumption of the path of development of Soviet society which was outlined at the XVIII Congress of the C.P.S.U., but which was temporarily interrupted by Hitler Germany’s treacherous attack on the U.S.S.R. This envisages the completion of the building of a classless Socialist society, and the gradual transition from Socialism to Communism. It envisages the accomplishment of the basic economic task of the U.S.S.R., namely, to overtake and surpass the main capitalist countries economically, as regards the volume of industrial production per head of the population."¹

This problem had already been put squarely by Stalin in 1939. The U.S.S.R., as we have seen, had successively solved the problems of reaching pre-war levels in output, of building up on that basis an industry capable of transforming all economy, and then of actually carrying out that transformation by eliminating all except publicly-owned enterprise from agriculture, industry and trade, with corresponding improvements in standards of living, culture and attitude to work itself. But this was not enough.²

“We have outstripped the principal capitalist countries as regards technique of production and rate of industrial development. That is very good, but it is not enough. We must outstrip them economically as well. We can do it, and we must do it. Only if we outstrip the principal capitalist countries economically can we reckon upon our country being fully saturated with consumers’ goods, on having an abundance of products, and on being able to make the transition from the first phase of Communism to its second phase.”

The economic power of a country’s industry, Stalin explained, was not expressed by the volume of industrial output as a whole, irrespective of the size of the population, but by the volume of industrial output per head of the population. He illustrated this by several comparisons with Great Britain. In 1938 the U.S.S.R. had produced more than twice as much pig-iron as Great Britain; but Soviet output per head was only three-fifths of British. Again, Soviet output of steel was nearly 70% more than that of Great Britain in the aggregate, but less than half the British output per head; and output of electricity totalled 39 milliard kilowatt-hours in the U.S.S.R. and 29 milliards in Great Britain, but only 233 kw.h. per head in the U.S.S.R., as against 620 kw.h. in Great Britain.³