A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

Readings in Welfare Economics
(Homewood, Ill., Richard D. Irwin, 1969), p. 1. For further discus-
sion, see Abram Bergson, 
Essays in Normative Economics
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press,
1966), pp. 35–39, 60–63, 68f; and A. K. Sen, 
Collective Choice and Social Welfare
(San Francisco,
Holden-Day, 1970), pp. 56–59.
2. For a discussion of this point and its consequences for political principles, see Brian Barry,
Political Argument
(London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 75–79.
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economy must investigate this problem even if the conclusion reached is
that it is best left to the course of events to decide.
Now it may seem at first sight that the influence of the social system
upon human wants and men’s view of themselves poses a decisive objec-
tion to the contract view. One might think that this conception of justice
relies upon the aims of existing individuals and regulates the social order
by principles that persons guided by these aims would choose. How, then,
can this doctrine determine an Archimedean point from which the basic
structure itself can be appraised? It might seem as if there is no alterna-
tive but to judge institutions in the light of an ideal conception of the
person arrived at on perfectionist or on a priori grounds. But, as the
account of the original position and its Kantian interpretation makes
clear, we must not overlook the very special nature of that situation and
the scope of the principles adopted there. Only the most general assump-
tions are made about the aims of the parties, namely, that they take an
interest in primary social goods, in things that men are presumed to want
whatever else they want. To be sure, the theory of these goods depends on
psychological premises and these may prove incorrect. But the idea at any
rate is to define a class of goods that are normally wanted as parts of
rational plans of life which may include the most varied sorts of ends. To
suppose, then, that the parties want these goods, and to found a concep-
tion of justice on this presumption, is not to tie it to a particular pattern of
human interests as these might be generated by a particular arrangement
of institutions. The theory of justice does, indeed, presuppose a theory of
the good, but within wide limits this does not prejudge the choice of the
sort of persons that men want to be.
Once the principles of justice are derived, however, the contract doc-
trine does establish certain limits on the conception of the good. These
limits follow from the priority of justice over efficiency and the priority
of liberty over social and economic advantages (assuming that serial
order obtains). For as I remarked earlier (§6), these priorities mean that
desires for things that are inherently unjust, or that cannot be satisfied
except by the violation of just arrangements, have no weight. There is no
value in fulfilling these wants and the social system should discourage
them. Further, one must take into account the problem of stability. A just
system must generate its own support. This means that it must be ar-
ranged so as to bring about in its members the corresponding sense of
justice, an effective desire to act in accordance with its rules for reasons
of justice. Thus the requirement of stability and the criterion of discour-
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aging desires that conflict with the principles of justice put further con-
straints on institutions. They must be not only just but framed so as to
encourage the virtue of justice in those who take part in them. In this
sense, the principles of justice define a partial ideal of the person which
social and economic arrangements must respect. Finally, as the argument
for embedding ideals into our working principles has brought out, certain
institutions are required by the two principles. They define an ideal basic
structure, or the outlines of one, toward which the course of reform
should evolve.
The upshot of these considerations is that justice as fairness is not at
the mercy, so to speak, of existing wants and interests. It sets up an
Archimedean point for assessing the social system without invoking a
priori considerations. The long range aim of society is settled in its main
lines irrespective of the particular desires and needs of its present mem-
bers. And an ideal conception of justice is defined since institutions are to
foster the virtue of justice and to discourage desires and aspirations in-
compatible with it. Of course, the pace of change and the particular
reforms called for at any given time depend upon current conditions. But
the conception of justice, the general form of a just society and the ideal
of the person consistent with it are not similarly dependent. There is no
place for the question whether men’s desires to play the role of superior
or inferior might not be so great that autocratic institutions should be
accepted, or whether men’s perception of the religious practices of others
might not be so upsetting that liberty of conscience should not be al-
lowed. We have no occasion to ask whether under reasonably favorable
conditions the economic gains of technocratic but authoritarian institu-
tions might be so great as to justify the sacrifice of basic freedoms. Of
course, these remarks assume that the general assumptions on which the
principles of justice were chosen are correct. But if they are, this sort
of question is already decided by these principles. Certain institutional
forms are embedded within the conception of justice. This view shares
with perfectionism the feature of setting up an ideal of the person that
constrains the pursuit of existing desires. In this respect justice as fairness
and perfectionism are both opposed to utilitarianism.
Now it may appear that since utilitarianism makes no distinctions
between the quality of desires and all satisfactions have some value, it has
no criteria for choosing between systems of desires, or ideals of the per-
son. From a theoretical point of view anyway, this is incorrect. The utili-
tarian can always say that given social conditions and men’s interests as
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they are, and taking into account how they will develop under this or that
alternative institutional arrangement, encouraging one pattern of wants
rather than another is likely to lead to a greater net balance (or to a higher
average) of satisfaction. On this basis the utilitarian selects between ide-
als of the person. Some attitudes and desires, being less compatible with
fruitful social cooperation, tend to reduce the total (or the average) happi-
ness. Roughly speaking, the moral virtues are those dispositions and
effective desires that can generally be relied upon to promote the greatest
sum of well-being. Thus, it would be a mistake to claim that the principle
of utility provides no grounds for choosing among ideals of the person,
however difficult it may be to apply the principle in practice. Neverthe-
less, the choice does depend upon existing desires and present social
circumstances and their natural continuations into the future. These initial
conditions may heavily influence the conception of human good that
should be encouraged. The contrast is that both justice as fairness and
perfectionism establish independently an ideal conception of the person
and of the basic structure so that not only are some desires and inclina-
tions necessarily discouraged but the effect of the initial circumstances
will eventually disappear. With utilitarianism we cannot be sure what will
happen. Since there is no ideal embedded in its first principle, the place
we start from may always influence the path we are to follow.
By way of summing up, the essential point is that despite the individu-
alistic features of justice as fairness, the two principles of justice are not
contingent upon existing desires or present social conditions. Thus we are
able to derive a conception of a just basic structure, and an ideal of the
person compatible with it, that can serve as a standard for appraising
institutions and for guiding the overall direction of social change. In order
to find an Archimedean point it is not necessary to appeal to a priori or
perfectionist principles. By assuming certain general desires, such as the
desire for primary social goods, and by taking as a basis the agreements
that would be made in a suitably defined initial situation, we can achieve
the requisite independence from existing circumstances. The original po-
sition is so characterized that unanimity is possible; the deliberations of
any one person are typical of all. Moreover, the same will hold for the
considered judgments of the citizens of a well-ordered society effectively
regulated by the principles of justice. Everyone has a similar sense of
justice and in this respect a well-ordered society is homogeneous. Politi-
cal argument appeals to this moral consensus.
It may be thought that the assumption of unanimity is peculiar to
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the political philosophy of idealism.
3
As it is used in the contract view,
however, there is nothing characteristically idealist about the supposition
of unanimity. This condition is part of the procedural conception of the
original position and it represents a constraint on arguments. In this way
it shapes the content of the theory of justice, the principles that are to
match our considered judgments. Hume and Adam Smith likewise as-
sume that if men were to take up a certain point of view, that of the
impartial spectator, they would be led to similar convictions. A utilitarian
society may also be well-ordered. For the most part the philosophical
tradition, including intuitionism, has assumed that there exists some ap-
propriate perspective from which unanimity on moral questions may be
hoped for, at least among rational persons with relevantly similar and
sufficient information. Or if unanimity is impossible, disparities between
judgments are greatly reduced once this standpoint is adopted. Different
moral theories arise from different interpretations of this point of view, of
what I have called the initial situation. In this sense the idea of unanimity
among rational persons is implicit throughout the tradition of moral phi-
losophy.
What distinguishes justice as fairness is how it characterizes the initial
situation, the setting in which the condition of unanimity appears. Since
the original position can be given a Kantian interpretation, this concep-
tion of justice does indeed have affinities with idealism. Kant sought to
give a philosophical foundation to Rousseau’s idea of the general will.
The theory of justice in turn tries to present a natural procedural render-
ing of Kant’s conception of the kingdom of ends, and of the notions of
autonomy and the categorical imperative (§40). In this way the underly-
ing structure of Kant’s doctrine is detached from its metaphysical sur-
roundings so that it can be seen more clearly and presented relatively free
from objection.
There is another resemblance to idealism: justice as fairness has a cen-
tral place for the value of community, and how this comes about depends
upon the Kantian interpretation. I discuss this topic in Part Three. The
essential idea is that we want to account for the social values, for the
intrinsic good of institutional, community, and associative activities, by a
conception of justice that in its theoretical basis is individualistic. For
reasons of clarity among others, we do not want to rely on an undefined
3. This suggestion is found in K. J. Arrow,