Step 8: Estimation of decrease in carbon stock and increase in GHG emissions due to leakage
In this step the issue of leakage is addressed by trying to estimate the likely impacts of the project scenario on the defined leakage area. Again it is necessary to do this ex ante in order to help in designing and introducing measures to combat leakage, to identify possible areas where significant leakage will occur and to help in making projections on revenues to be made from carbon emission reductions. Two sources of leakage are considered:
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Displacement of baseline activities from project area to baseline area
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GHG emissions resulting from leakage prevention measures
As a result of the project activities this may cause agents to simply move their activities to other areas and engage in the same destructive practices. It is therefore critical to monitor this. If the carbon stocks in the identified leakage belt decreases more than expected this is a clear indication of leakage due to displacement of baseline activities. In order to estimate the possible impacts of activity displacement on carbon stocks outside the project boundary the following sources of leakage must be estimated and where potentially significant, monitored:
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Displacement of grazing; for this use the CDM EB approved ‘tool for the estimation of GHG emissions related to the displacement of grazing activities in A/R CDM project activities’;
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Displacement of agricultural activities; for this use the CDM EB approved methodology for ‘reforestation or afforestation of land currently under agricultural use (AR – AM0004, section on estimation of leakage due to conversion of land to crop land, based on area of conversion)’;
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Increased use of non-renewable biomass; for this use CDM-EB approved tool for the calculation of GHG emissions due to leakage from increased use of non-renewable woody biomass attributable to an A/R CDM project activity.
If leakage prevention measures are introduced, which includes activities such as agricultural intensification then the GHG emissions associated with these activities need to be estimated ex ante and if significant monitored. The main GHG emissions from leakage prevention measures which are flagged up and which may need to be captured include:
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Nitrous oxide from nitrogen fertilizer which can be estimated using the CDM-EB approved tool ‘estimation of direct nitrous oxide emissions from nitrogen fertiliser’ for A/R CDM project activities;
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Methane and nitrous oxide from livestock intensification. Here various methods are proposed to estimate this;
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Consumption of fossil fuels where the latest CDM-EB approved tool for ‘estimation of GHG emissions related to fossil fuels combustion in A/R CDM project activities’. The information for each of the three possible sources then needs to be tabulated and aggregated.
Finally for those carbon stocks which are deemed significant they should be summed together to produce total decreases in carbon stocks due to activity displacement. These should be put into a table. This information provides an ex ante estimate of leakage due to activity displacement and allows the estimation of total leakage.
In order to monitor ex post activity displacement it is necessary to monitor against the baseline for the leakage belt. This baseline needs to be derived in the same way the baseline was determined for the project area discussed in steps 4 to 6.
Summary of step 8
1
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Estimation of increases in GHG emissions due to leakage prevention measures
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2
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Estimation of decreases in carbon stocks due to displacement of baseline activities
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3
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Estimation of total leakage
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Step 9: Ex-ante net anthropogenic GHG emission reductions
In order to estimate the net GHG emission reduction of a RED project activity, the following equation is used:
Carbon RED = Carbon BASELINE – Carbon ACTUAL – Carbon LEAKAGE
In the absence of regulatory guidance on how to quantify carbon credits based on carbon stock changes and GHG emission reductions in RED project activities no specific methods are provided. Project proponents are encouraged to explore possible approaches.
Appendix II Key Issues in designing pro-poor REDD agreements
1. Provision of information is required at national and local levels to ensure equitable negotiation of REDD agreements. Information should at a minimum contain basic details of how REDD mechanisms work, realistic expectations of benefits and possible implications.
2. Provision of upfront finance and other mechanisms for reducing costs to help improve the equity of benefit distribution in REDD. This may help bridge the gap between project/programme initiation and payments for the delivery of emission reductions.
3. Use of ‘soft’ enforcement and risk reduction measures: ‘Hard’ enforcement measures such as financial penalties are likely to affect the poor disproportionately. Project investors and/or developing country governments should apply ‘soft’ measures such as non-binding emission reduction commitments where possible.
4. Prioritise ‘pro-poor’ REDD policies and measures: Whilst different REDD options may give rise to similar levels of emissions reductions, impacts on the poor will be varied. To ensure social benefits, a strong ‘pro-poor’ political commitment is required from the outset.
5. Provide technical assistance to national and local governments, NGOs and the private sector: technical assistance will be needed to increase investment and the visibility of the poor. Key areas include: establishing reference scenarios/levels for measuring performance; improved data collection on small-scale enterprise and subsistence values; financial systems and verification services for REDD; and landscape planning approaches.
6. Support to strengthen local institutions and improve access to legality: To ensure ‘voice and choice’ in REDD design and implementation, improved access to appropriate legal support will be crucial for poor people. This is especially the case with REDD, where new and unfamiliar legal structures may be required, and where approaches may be experimental.
7. Maintain flexibility in the design of REDD mechanisms: Flexibility, for example, including the use of nationally specific standards or regular review processes, will be crucial to minimise risks such as communities being locked into damaging long-term commitments.
8. Clear definition and equitable allocation of carbon rights: rights to own and transfer carbon will be essential for REDD emissions trading. As these will govern land management over long timescales, consultation will be needed in their formulation. Where national governments retain carbon rights, equitable benefit sharing agreements will be needed.
9. Development of social standards for REDD and application of existing extra-sectoral standards to REDD systems could improve benefits for the poor by ensuring that processes such as public consultation are thoroughly carried out. Standards should also be developed for ongoing social impact assessment at project and national scales.
10. Balance rigour and simplicity: Mandating complex standards can have perverse effects in market systems, such as reduced access to markets by small producers. REDD-related standards need to be simple and accessible but also robust.
11. Ensure broad participation in the design and implementation of REDD, for example, through improving access to international debates by developing countries and NGOs. It will be important to consider the most appropriate level at which to assign decision making powers over REDD to achieve maximum participation of the poor.
12. Measures to improve the equity of benefit distribution: Issues such as risk aversion and cost-effectiveness are likely to lead to highly variable benefit distribution. Use of tools such as taxes to redistribute benefits and strengthening of local institutions may improve equity.
13. Avoid perverse effects of REDD due to limited direct benefits: Incentive schemes where benefits are concentrated can create perverse effects such as in-migration and conflict. Benefits will therefore need to be distributed across wide areas and actors, and combined with strong accountability measures to ensure that beneficiaries are legitimate.
14. Ensure accountability and transparency in REDD processes, for example through third party verification and strengthened democratic processes. This could help reduce perverse effects such as corruption that can adversely affect the poor.
15. Alignment with international and national financial and development strategies, such as Poverty Reduction Strategies. This could help to raise the profile of the poor within REDD and improve sustainability by integrating REDD into wider processes.
16. Ensure longevity in REDD mechanisms: Stable and predictable benefits associated with REDD could provide increased security to the poor. At community and individual levels, benefits need to be distributed over the lifetime of REDD projects and assumptions about the sustainability of alternative livelihood approaches should be critically evaluated.
17. Use of broad definitions for land use types that can be included in REDD systems could help increase overall coverage of REDD, thereby increasing income and growth potential, and could facilitate inclusion of potentially pro-poor activities such as agroforestry.
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