hoi polloi. Yet for many Russians, from commoner to general, this sudden, eye-striking
transformation in the appearance among the directors and orators at rallies and meetings, in
command and in government, was overwhelming.
V. Stankevich, the only officer-socialist in the Executive Committee, provided an
example: “this fact of the abundance of Jews in the Committee alone had enormous influence on
the public opinion and sympathies…. Noteworthy, when Kornilov met with the Committee for
the first time, he accidently sat down in the midst of Jews; in front of him sat two insignificant
and plain members of the Committee, whom I remember merely because of their grotesquely
Jewish facial features. Who knows how that affected Kornilov’s attitudes toward the Russian
revolution?” Yet the treatment of all things Russian by the new regime was very tale-telling.
Here is an example from the days of Kornilov in the end of August 1918. Russia was visibly
dying, losing the war, with its army corrupted and the rear in collapse. General Kornilov,
cunningly deceived by Kerensky, artlessly appealed to the people, almost howling with pain:
“Russian people! Our great Motherland is dying. The hour of her death is nigh…. All, whose
bosoms harbor a beating Russian heart, go to the temples and pray to God to grant us the greatest
miracle of salvation for our beloved country!”
In response to that, the ideologist of the February Revolution and one of the leading
members of the Executive Committee, Gimmer-Sukhanov, chuckled in amusement: “What an
awkward, silly, clueless, politically illiterate call … what a lowbrow imitation of Suzdalshchina.”
[Suzdalshchina refers to resistance in Suzdal to the Mongol invaders!]
-111
-
Yes, it sounded pompous and awkward, without a clear political position. Indeed,
Kornilov was not a politician, but his heart ached. And what about Sukhanov’s heart – did he
feel any pain at all? He did not have any sense of the living land and culture, nor he had any urge
to preserve them – he served his ideology only, the International, seeing in Kornilov’s words a
total lack of ideological content. Yes, his response was caustic. But note that he had not only
labeled Kornilov’s appeal an “imitation”, he had also derogatorily referred to Suzdalshchina, to
Russian history, ancient art and sanctity. And with such disdain to the entire Russian historical
heritage, all that internationalist ilk – Sukhanov and his henchmen from the malicious Executive
Committee, steered the February Revolution.
And it was not the ethnic origin of Sukhanov and the rest; it was their anti-national, anti-
Russian and anti-conservative attitudes. We have seen similar attitudes on the part of the
Provisional Government too, with its task of governing all of Russia and its quite Russian ethnic
composition. Yet did it display a Russian worldview or represent Russian interests, if only a
little? Not at all! The government’s most consistent and patriotic activity was to guide the
already unraveling country (the Kronstadt Republic was not the only place which had seceded
from Russia by that time) to the victory in war! To victory at any cost! With loyalty to the Allies!
To be sure, the Allies, their governments, public and financers, put pressure on Russia.
For instance, in May, Russian newspapers cited the Morning Post from Washington: America
made it clear to the Russian government that if Russia makes a separate peace with Germany, the
United States would annul all financial agreements with Russia. Prince Georgi Lvov led the
Russian Provisional Government during the Russian revolution’s initial phase, from March 1917
until he relinquished control to Alexander Kerensky in July 1917 upheld the sentiment: “The
country must determinedly send its army to battle.” They had no concern about consequences of
the ongoing war for Russia. And this mismatch, this loss of sense of national self-preservation,
could be observed almost at every meeting of the Provisional Government cabinet, almost in
every discussion.
There were simply ridiculous incidents. Throwing millions of rubles left and right and
always keenly supporting cultural needs of ethnic minorities, the Provisional Government at its
April 6 meeting had rejected the request of the long-established Geat Russian Orchestra of V. V.
Andreev to continue getting paid as before, from the funds of the former His Majesty’s Personal
Chancellery (the funds were confiscated by the Provisional Government itself). The petition was
turned down despite the fact that the requested sum, 30 thousand rubles per year, was equivalent
to the annual pay of just three minister assistants. “Deny!” (Why not disband your so-called
Great Russian orchestra? – What kind of name is that?) Taken aback and believing that it was
just a misunderstanding, Andreev petitioned again. Yet with an unusual for this torpid
government determination, he was refused a second time too, at the April 27 meeting.
Milyukov, a Russian historian and minister of the Provisional Government, did not utter a
single specifically Russian sentiment during that year. Similarly, the key figure of the revolution,
Alexander Kerensky, could not be at any stage accused of possessing an ethnic Russian
consciousness. Yet at the same time the government demonstrated constant anxious bias against
any conservative circles, and especially – against Russian conservatives. Even during his last
speech in the Council of the Russian Republic (Pre-Parliament) on October 24, when Trotsky’s
troops were already seizing Petrograd building after building, Kerensky emphatically argued that
the Bolshevik newspaper Rabochy Put (Worker’s Way) and the right-wing Novaya Rus (New
Russia) – both of which Kerensky had just shut down – shared similar political views.
-112
-
* * *
The darned incognito of the members of the Executive Committee was, of course, noticed
by the public. Initially it was the educated society of Petrograd that was obsessed with this
question, which several times surfaced in newspapers. For two months, the Committee tried to
keep the secret, but by May they had no other choice but reveal themselves and had published
the actual names of most of the pseudonym-holders (except for Steklov-Nakhamkis and Boris
Osipovich Bogdanov, the energetic permanent chair of the council; they managed to keep their
identities secret for a while; the latter’s name confused the public by similarity with another
personality, Bogdanov-Malinovsky). This odd secrecy irritated the public, and even ordinary
citizens began asking questions. It was already typical in May that if, during a plenary meeting of
the Soviet, someone proposed Zinoviev or Kamenev for something, the public shouted from the
auditorium demanding their true names.
Concealing true names was incomprehensible to the ordinary man of that time: only
thieves hide and change their names. Why is Boris Katz ashamed of his name, and instead
calling himself “Kamkov”? Why does Lurie hide under the alias of “Larin”? Why does
Mandelshtam use the pseudonym “Lyadov”? Many of these had aliases that originated out of
necessity in their past underground life, but what had compelled the likes of Shotman, the
Socialist Revolutionary from Tomsk, (and not him alone) to become “Danilov” in 1917?
Certainly, the goal of a revolutionary, hiding behind a pseudonym, is to outsmart
someone, and that may include not only the police and government. In this way, ordinary people
as well are unable to figure out who their new leaders are. Intoxicated by the freedom of the first
months of the February Revolution, many Jewish activists and orators failed to notice that their
constant fussing around presidiums and rallies produced a certain bewilderment and wry glances.
By the time of the February Revolution there was no popular anti-Semitism in the internal
regions of Russia; it was confined exclusively to the areas of the Pale of Settlement. (For
instance, Abraham Cogan had even stated in 1917: “We loved Russia despite all the oppression
from the previous regime because we knew that it was not the Russian people behind it but
Czarism.”)
But after just a few months following the February Revolution, resentment against Jews
had suddenly flared up among the masses of people and spread over Russia, growing stronger
with each passing month. And even the official newspapers reported, for instance, on the
exasperation in the waiting lines in the cities. “Everything has been changed in that twinkle of
the eye that created a chasm between the old and the new Russia. But it is queues that have
changed the most. Strangely, while everything has moved to the left, the food lines have moved
to the right. If you would like to hear Black Hundred propaganda then go and spend some time in
a waiting line. Among other things you will find out that there are virtually no Jews in the lines,
they don’t need it as they have enough bread hoarded.” The same gossip about Jews who tuck
away bread rolls from another end of the line as well; the waiting line is the most dangerous
source of counterrevolution.” The author Ivan Nazhivin noted that in the autumn in Moscow
anti-Semitic propaganda fell on ready ears in the hungry revolutionary queues: “What rascals! …
They wormed themselves onto the very top! … See, how proudly they ride in their cars…. Sure,
not a single Yid can be found in the lines here…. Just you wait!”
Any revolution releases a flood of obscenity, envy, and anger from the people. The same
happened among the Russian people, with their weakened Christian spirituality. And so the Jews
– many of whom had ascended to the top, to visibility, and what is more, who had not concealed
-113
-
their revolutionary jubilation, nor waited in the miserable lines – increasingly became a target of
popular resentment. Many instances of such resentment were documented in 1917 newspapers.
Below are several examples.
When, at the Apraksin market on Sennaya Square, a hoard of goods was discovered in
possession of Jewish merchants, people began shout “plunder Jewish shops!” because “Yids are
responsible for all the troubles.” And this word Yid is on everyone’s lips. A stockpile of flour and
bacon was found in the store of a merchant (likely a Jew) in Poltava. The crowd started
plundering his shop and then began calling for a Jewish pogrom.
Later, several members of the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies, including Drobnis, arrived
and attempted to appease the crowd; as a result, Drobnis was beaten. In October in Ekaterinoslav
soldiers trashed small shops, shouting “Smash the bourgeois! Smash the Yids!” In Kiev at the
Vladimirsky market a boy had hit a woman, who tried to buy flour out her turn on the head
Instantly, the crowd started yelling “the Yids are beating the Russians!” and a brawl ensued.
(Note that it had happened in the same Kiev where one could already see the streamers “Long
live free Ukraine without Yids and Poles!”) By that time “Smash the Yids!” could be heard in
almost every street brawl, even in Petrograd, and often completely without foundation. For
instance, in a Petrograd streetcar two women called for disbanding of the Soviet of Workers’ and
Soldiers’ Deputies, filled, according to them, exclusively by “Germans and Yids.” Both were
arrested and called to account.
The newspaper Russkaya Volya (Russian Freedom) reported: “Right in front of our eyes,
anti-Semitism, in its most primitive form re-arises and spreads…. It is enough to hear to
conversations in streetcars in Petrograd or in waiting lines to various shops, or in the countless
fleeting rallies at every corner and crossroad … they accuse Jews of political stranglehold, of
seizing parties and Soviets, and even of ruining the army, of looting and hoarding goods.”
Many Jewish socialists, agitators in the front units, enjoyed unlimited success during the
spring months when calls for a democratic peace were tolerated and fighting was not required.
Then nobody blamed them for being Jewish. But in June when the policy of the Executive
Committee had changed toward support and even propaganda for the offensive, calls of “smash
the Yids!” began appearing and those Jewish persuaders suffered battering by unruly soldiers
time and time again.
Rumors were spreading that the Executive Committee in Petrograd was “seized by Yids.”
By June this belief had taken root in the Petrograd garrison and factories; this is exactly what
soldiers shouted to the member of the Committee Voitinsky who had visited an infantry regiment
to dissuade the troops from the looming demonstration conceived by Bolsheviks on June 10.
V. D. Nabokov, hardly known for anti-Semitism, joked that the meeting of the foremen
of the Pre-Parliament in October 1917 “could be safely called a Sanhedrin. Its majority was
Jewish; of Russians, there were only Avksentiev, me, Peshekhonov, and Chaikovsky….” His
attention was drawn to that fact by Mark Vishnyak who was present there also.
By autumn, the activity of Jews in power had created such an effect that even Iskry
(Sparks), the illustrated supplement to the surpassingly gentle Russkoe Slovo (Russian Word)
that would until then never dare defy public opinion in such a way, had published an abrasive
anti-Jewish caricature in the October 29 issue, that is, already during fighting of the October
coup in Moscow.
The Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies actively
fought against anti-Semitism. I cannot rule out that the harsh refusal to accept the well-deserved
Plekhanov into the CEC in April 1917 was a kind of revenge for his anti-Bund reference to the
-114
-
“tribe of God,” which was mentioned in Lenin’s publications. Indeed, I cannot provide any other
explanation. On July 21 the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets had issued a proclamation
about a struggle against anti-Semitism (about the only resolution approved by the Congress
unanimously, without any objections or arguments.)
When in the end of June (28th and 29th) the re-elected Bureau of the CEC had
assembled, they had heard a report on the rise of anti-Semitic agitation, mainly in the
northwestern and southwestern guberniyas; a decision was made immediately to send a
delegation of 15 members of the CEC with special powers there, subordinating them to the
direction of the Department on the Struggle against Counter-Revolution.
On the other hand, Bolsheviks, who advanced their agenda under the slogan “Down with
the minister-capitalists!” not only did nothing to alleviate this problem, they even fanned its
flames (along with the anarchists, despite the fact that the latter were headed by one Bleikhman.)
They claimed that the Executive Committee was so exceptionally lenient toward the government
only because capitalists and Jews control everything. Isn’t that reminiscent of Narodnaya Volya
[the People’s Will terrorist organization] of 1881? And when the Bolshevik uprising of July 3-4
broke out (it was in fact targeted not against the already impotent Provisional Government but
against the Bolshevik’s true competitor – the Executive Committee), the Bolsheviks slyly
exploited the anger of soldiers toward Jews by pointing them to that very body – see, there they
are!
But when the Bolsheviks had lost their uprising, the CEC had conducted an official
investigation and many members of the commission of inquiry were Jews from the presidium of
the CEC. And because of their “socialist conscience” they dared not call the Bolshevik uprising a
crime and deal with it accordingly. So the commission had yielded no result and was soon
liquidated.
During the garrison meeting, arranged by the CEC on October 19, just before the decisive
Bolshevik uprising, one of representatives of 176th Infantry Regiment, a Jew, warned that “those
people down on the streets scream that Jews are responsible for all the wrongs.” At the CEC
meeting during the night of October 25, Gendelman reported that when he was giving a speech
in the Peter and Paul Fortress earlier that afternoon he was taunted: “You are Gendelman! That is
you are a Yid and a Rightist!” When on October 27 Gotz and his delegation to Kerensky tried to
depart to Gatchina from the Baltiysky Rail Terminal, he was nearly killed by sailors who
screamed that “the Soviets are controlled by Yids!” And during the wine pogroms on the eve of
the glorious Bolshevik victory, the calls “Slaughter Yids!” were heard also.
And yet there was not a single Jewish pogrom over the whole year of 1917. The infamous
outrageous pogroms in Kalusha and Ternopol were in fact the work of frenzied drunken
revolutionary soldiers, retreating in disorder. They smashed everything on their way, all shops
and stores; and because most of those were Jewish-owned, the word spread about Jewish
pogroms. A similar pogrom took place in Stanislavov, with its much smaller Jewish population,
and quite reasonably it was not labeled a Jewish pogrom.
Already by the mid-summer of 1917 the Jews felt threatened by the embittered
population (or drunken soldiers), but the ongoing collapse of the state was fraught with
incomparably greater dangers. Amazingly, it seems that both the Jewish community and the
press, the latter to a large extent identified with the former, learned nothing from the formidable
experiences of 1917 in general, but narrowly looked at the isolated manifestations of pogroms.
And so time after time they missed the real danger. The executive power behaved similarly.
When the Germans breached the front at Ternopol in the night of July 10, the desperate joint
-115
-
meeting of the CEC of the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies and the Executive
Committee of the Soviet of Peasants’ Deputies had taken place. They had acknowledged that
should the revolution perish, the country crumbles down (in that exact order), and then named a
Government for Salvation of the Revolution, and noted in their appeal to the people that “dark
forces are again prepared to torment our longsuffering Motherland. They are setting backward
masses upon the Jews.”
On July 18 at a panel session of the State Duma, in an extremely small circle, Rep.
Maslennikov spoke against the Executive Committee and among other things spelled out the real
names of its members. On the very same evening at the factional meeting of the CEC they beat
an alarm: “This is a case of counterrevolution, it must be dealt with according to the recently
issued decree of the Minister of Internal Affairs Tsereteli on suppression of counterrevolution!”
(The decree was issued in response to the Bolshevik uprising, though it was never used against
Bolsheviks.) In two days Maslennikov made excuses in an article in the newspaper Rech
[Speech]: indeed, he named Steklov, Kamenev, and Trotsky but never intended to incite anger
against the entire Jewish people, and “anyway, attacking them, I had absolutely no wish to make
Jewish people responsible for the actions of these individuals.”
Then, in mid-September, when the all gains of the February Revolution were already
irreversibly ruined, on the eve of the by now imminent Bolshevik coup, Ya. Kantorovich warned
in Rech about the danger that: “The dark forces and evil geniuses of Russia will soon emerge
from their dens to jubilantly perform Black Masses….” Indeed, it will happen soon. Yet what
kind of Black masses? – “…Of bestial patriotism and pogrom-loving ‘truly-Russian’ national
identity.” In October in Petrograd I. Trumpeldor had organized Jewish self-defense forces for
protection against pogroms, but they were never needed.
Indeed, Russian minds were confused, and so were Jewish ones.
Several years after the revolution, G. Landau, looking back with sadness, wrote: “Jewish
participation in the Russian turmoil had astonishingly suicidal overtones in it; I am referring not
only to their role in Bolshevism, but to their involvement in the whole thing. And it is not just
about the huge number of politically active people, socialists and revolutionaries, who have
joined the revolution; I am talking mainly about the broad sympathy of the masses it was met
with…. Although many harbored pessimistic expectations, in particular, an anticipation of
pogroms, they were still able to reconcile such a foreboding with an acceptance of turmoil which
unleashed countless miseries and pogroms. It resembled the fatal attraction of butterflies to fire,
to the annihilating fire…. It is certain there were some strong motives pushing the Jews into that
direction, and yet those were clearly suicidal…. Granted, Jews were not different in that from the
rest of Russian intelligentsia and from the Russian society…. Yet we had to be different … we,
the ancient people of city-dwellers, merchants, artisans, intellectuals … we had to be different
from the people of land and power, from peasants, landowners, officials.”
And let’s not forget those who were different. We must always remember that Jewry was
and is very heterogeneous, that attitudes and actions vary greatly among the Jews. So it was with
the Russian Jewry in 1917: in provinces and even in the capital there were circles with
reasonable views and they were growing as October was getting closer.
The Jewish stance toward Russian unity during the months when Russia was pulled apart
not only by other nations, but even by Siberians, was remarkable. “All over the course of
revolution Jews, together with Great Russians, were among the most ardent champions of the
idea of Great Russia.” Now, when Jews had gotten their equal rights, what could they have in
common with different peoples on the periphery of the former empire? And yet the disintegration
-116
-
of a united country would fracture Jewry. In July at the Ninth Congress of Constitutional
Democrats, Vinaver and Nolde openly argued against territorial partition of peoples and in favor
of Russian unity. Also in September, in the national section of the Democratic Conference, the
Jewish socialists spoke against any federalization of Russia (in that they had joined the
Centralists.) Today they write in an Israeli magazine that Trumpeldor’s Jewish detachments
backed the Provisional Government and had even foiled the Kornilov’s mutiny. Perhaps.
However, in rigorously studying events of 1917, I did not encounter any such information. But I
am aware of opposite instances: in early May 1917 in the thundering patriotic and essentially
counter-revolutionary Black Sea Delegation, the most successful orator calling for the defense of
Russia was Jewish sailor Batkin.
D. Pasmanik had published the letters of millionaire steamship owner Shulim Bespalov to
the Minister of Trade and Industry Shakhovsky dated as early as September 1915: “Excessive
profits made by all industrialists and traders lead our Motherland to the imminent wreck.” He
had donated half a million rubles to the state and proposed to establish a law limiting all profits
to 15%. Unfortunately, these self-restricting measures were not introduced as “rush to freedom.”
Progressives such as Konovalov and Ryabushinsky did not mind making 100% war profits.
When Konovalov himself became the Minister of Trade and Industry, Shulim Bespalov wrote to
him on July 5, 1917: “Excessive profits of industrialists are ruining our country, now we must
take 50 percent of the value of their capital and property,” and added that he is ready to part with
50 percent of his own assets. Konovalov paid no heed.
In August, at the Moscow All-Russian State Conference, O. O. Gruzenberg (a future
member of the Constituent Assembly) stated: “These days the Jewish people are united in their
allegiance to our Motherland, in unanimous aspiration to defend her integrity and achievements
of democracy,” and were prepared to give for her defense “all their material and intellectual
assets, to part with everything precious, with the flower of their people, all their young.” These
words reflected the realization that the February régime was the best for the Russian Jewry,
promising economic progress as well as political and cultural prosperity. And that realization
was adequate.
The closer it got to the October coup and the more apparent the Bolshevik threat, the
wider this realization spread among Jews, leading them to oppose Bolshevism. It was taking root
even among socialist parties and during the October coup many Jewish socialists were actively
against it. Yet they were debilitated by their socialist views and their opposition was limited by
negotiations and newspaper articles – until the Bolsheviks shut down those newspapers.
It is necessary to state explicitly that the October coup was not carried by Jews, though it
was under the general command of Trotsky and with energetic actions of young Grigory
Chudnovsky during the arrest of Provisional Government and the massacre of the defenders of
the Winter Palace. Broadly speaking, the common rebuke that the 170 million people could not
be pushed into Bolshevism by a small Jewish minority is justified. Indeed, we had ourselves
sealed our fate in 1917, through our foolishness from February to October-December. The
October coup proved a devastating catastrophe for Russia. Yet the state of affairs even before it
promised little good to the people. We had already lost responsible statesmanship and the events
of 1917 had proved it in excess. The best Russia could expect was an inept, feeble, and
disorderly pseudo-democracy, unable to rely on enough citizens with developed legal
consciousness and economic independence.
After the October fighting in Moscow, representatives of the Bund and Poale-Zion had
taken part in the peace negotiations – not in alliance with the Junkers or the Bolsheviks — but as
-117
-
a third independent party. There were many Jews among the Junkers of the Engineers School
who defended the Winter Palace on October 25: in the memoirs of Sinegub, a palace defender,
Jewish names appear regularly; I personally knew one such engineer from my prison experience.
And during the Odessa City Duma elections the Jewish bloc had opposed the Bolsheviks and
won, though only marginally.
During the Constituent Assembly elections more than 80% of Jewish population in
Russia had voted for Zionist parties. Lenin wrote that 550 thousand voted for Jewish nationalists.
Most Jewish parties formed a united national list of candidates; seven deputies were elected from
that list, six Zionists and Gruzenberg. The success of Zionists was facilitated by the recently
published declaration of British Minister of Foreign Affairs Balfour on the establishment of a
Jewish national home in Palestine, which was met with enthusiasm by the majority of Russian
Jewry (celebratory demonstrations, rallies and worship services took place in Moscow,
Petrograd, Odessa, Kiev and many other cities.)
Prior to the October coup, Bolshevism was not very influential among Jews. But just
before the uprising, Natanson, Kamkov, and Shteinberg on behalf of the left Socialist
Revolutionaries had signed a combat pact with Bolsheviks Trotsky and Kamenev. And some
Jews distinguished themselves among the Bolsheviks in their very first victories and some even
became famous. The commissar of the famed Latvian regiments of the 12th Army, which did so
much for the success of Bolshevik coup, was Semyon Nakhimson. Jewish soldiers played a
notable role during preparation and execution of the armed uprising of October 1917 in
Petrograd and other cities, and also during suppression of mutinies and armed resurrections
against the new Soviet regime.
It is widely known that during the historic session of the Congress of Soviets on October
27 two acts, the Decree on Land and the Decree on Peace, were passed. But it didn’t leave a
mark in history that after the Decree on Peace but before the Decree on Land another resolution
was passed. It declared it “a matter of honor for local soviets to prevent Jewish and any other
pogroms by dark forces.” (Pogroms by Red forces of light were not anticipated.)
So even here, at the Congress of Workers’ and Peasants’ Deputies, the Jewish question
was put ahead of the peasant one.
-118
-
Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: |