Zbigniew brzezinski

4. Politiken Sondag, August 2, 1996, Italics added. 
Europe would then cease to be the Eurasian bridgehead for American power and the potential springboard for 
the democratic global system's expansion into Eurasia. This is why unambiguous and tangible American 
support for Europe's unification must be sustained. Although both during Europe's economic recovery and 
within the transatlantic security alliance America has frequently proclaimed its support for European unification 
and supported transnational cooperation in Europe, it has also acted as if it preferred to deal on troubling 
economic and political issues with individual European states and not with the European Union as such. 
Occasional American insistence on a voice within the European decision-making process has tended to 
reinforce European suspicions that America favors cooperation among the Europeans when they follow the 
American lead but not when they formulate Europe's policies. This is the wrong message to convey. 
American commitment to Europe's unity—reiterated forcefully in the joint American-European Madrid 
Declaration of December 1995—will continue to ring hollow until America is ready not only to declare 
unambiguously that it is prepared to accept the consequences of Europe becoming truly Europe but to act 
accordingly. For Europe, the ultimate consequence would entail a true partnership with America rather than the 
status of a favored but still junior ally. And a true partnership does mean sharing in decisions as well as 
responsibilities. American support for that cause would help to invigorate the transatlantic dialogue and would 
stimulate among the Europeans a more serious concentration on the role that a truly significant Europe might 
play in the world. 
It is conceivable that at some point a truly united and powerful European Union could become a global 
political rival to the United States. It could certainly become a difficult economic-technological competitor, 
while its geopolitical interests in the Middle East and elsewhere could significantly diverge from those of 
America. But, in fact, such a powerful and politically single-minded Europe is not likely in the foreseeable 
future. Unlike the conditions prevailing in America at the time of the formation of the United States, there are 
deep historical roots to the resiliency of the European nation-states and the passion for a transnational Europe 
has clearly waned. 
The real alternatives for the next decade or two are either an expanding and unifying Europe, pursuing—
though hesitantly and spasmodically—the goal of continental unity; a stalemated Europe, not moving much 
beyond its current state of integration and geographic scope, with Central Europe remaining a geopolitical no-
man's-land; or, as a likely sequel to the stalemate, a progressively fragmenting Europe, resuming its old power 
rivalries. In a stalemated Europe, it is almost inevitable that Germany's self-identification with Europe will 
wane, prompting a more nationalist definition of the German state interest. For America, the first option is 
clearly the best, but it is an option that requires energizing American support if it is to come to pass. 
At this stage of Europe's hesitant construction, America need not get directly involved in intricate debates 
regarding such issues as whether the EU should make its foreign policy decisions by majority vote (a position 
favored especially by the Germans); whether the European Parliament should assume decisive legislative 
powers and the European Commission in Brussels should become in effect the European executive; whether the 
timetable for implementing the agreement on European economic and monetary union should be relaxed; or, 
finally, whether Europe should be a broad confederation or a multilayered entity, with a federated inner core 
and a somewhat looser outer rim. These are matters for the Europeans to thrash out among themselves—and it 

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is more than likely that progress on all of these issues will be uneven, punctuated by pauses, and eventually 
pushed forward only by complex compromises. 
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume that the Economic and Monetary Union will come into being by the 
year 2000, perhaps initially among six to ten of the EU's current fifteen members. This will accelerate Europe's 
economic integration beyond the monetary dimension, further encouraging its political integration. Thus, by fits 
and starts and with an inner more integrated core as well as a looser outer layer, a single Europe will 
increasingly become an important political player on the Eurasian chessboard. 
In any case, America should not convey the impression that it prefers a vaguer, even if broader, European 
association, but it should reiterate, through words and deeds, its willingness to deal eventually with the EU as 
America's global political and security partner and not just as a regional common market made up of states 
allied with the United States through NATO. To make that commitment more credible and thus go beyond the 
rhetoric of partnership, joint planning with the EU regarding new bilateral transatlantic decision-making 
mechanisms could be proposed and initiated. 
The same principle applies to NATO as such. Its preservation is vital to the transatlantic connection. On this 
issue, there is overwhelming American-European consensus. Without NATO, Europe not only would become 
vulnerable but almost immediately would become politically fragmented as well. NATO ensures European 
security and provides a stable framework for the pursuit of European unity. That is what makes NATO 
historically so vital to Europe. 
However, as Europe gradually and hesitantly unifies, the internal structure and processes of NATO will have 
to adjust. On this issue, the*French have a point. One cannot someday have a truly united Europe and yet have 
an alliance that remains integrated on the basis of one superpower plus fifteen dependent powers. Once Europe 
begins to assume a genuine political identity of its own, with the EU increasingly taking on some of the 
functions of a supranational government, NATO will have to be altered on the basis of a 1 + 1 (US + EU) 
formula. 
This will not happen overnight and all at once. Progress in that direction, to repeat, will be hesitant. But such 
progress will have to be reflected In the existing alliance arrangements, lest the absence of such adjustment 
itself should become an obstacle to further progress. A significant step in that direction was the 1996 decision 
of the alliance to make room for the Combined Joint Task Forces, thereby envisaging the possibility of some 
purely European military initiatives based on the alliance's logistics as well as on command, control, 
communications, and intelligence. Greater U.S. willingness to accommodate French demands for an increased 
role for the Western European Union within NATO, especially in regard to command and decision making, 
would also betoken more genuine American support for European unity and should help to narrow somewhat 
the gap between America and France regarding Europe's eventual self-definition. 
In the longer run, it is possible that the WEU will embrace some EU member states that, for varying 
geopolitical or historical reasons, may choose not to seek NATO membership. That could involve Finland or 
Sweden, or perhaps even Austria, all of which have already acquired observer status with the WEU.5 Other 
states may also seek a WEU connection as a preliminary to eventual NATO membership. The WEU might also 
choose at some point to emulate NATO's Partnership for Peace program with regard to would-be members of 
the EU. AH of that would help to spin a wider web of security cooperation in Europe, beyond the formal scope 
of the transatlantic alliance.