Attorney General V Blake House of Lords

Attorney General v Blake, [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (2000)
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case another consideration which is sufficient for the
purposes of the Attorney General. When he joined the
Secret Intelligence Service Blake expressly agreed in
writing that he would not disclose official information,
during or after his service, in book form or otherwise.
He was employed on that basis. That was the basis
on which he acquired official information. The Crown
had and has a legitimate interest in preventing Blake
profiting from the disclosure of official information,
whether classified or not, while a member of the
service and thereafter. Neither he, nor any other
member of the service, should have a financial
incentive to break his undertaking. It is of paramount
importance that members of the service should have
complete confidence in all their dealings with each
other, and that those recruited as informers should have
the like confidence. Undermining the willingness of
prospective informers to co-operate with the services,
or undermining the morale and trust between members
of the services when engaged on secret and dangerous
operations, would jeopardise the effectiveness of the
service. An absolute rule against disclosure, visible to
all, makes good sense.
In considering what would be a just response to a
breach of Blake's undertaking the court has to take
these considerations into account. The undertaking,
if not a fiduciary obligation, was closely akin to a
fiduciary obligation, where an account of profits is
a standard remedy in the event of breach. Had the
information which Blake has now disclosed still been
confidential, an account of profits would have been
ordered, almost as a matter of course. In the special
circumstances of the intelligence services, the same
conclusion should follow even though the information
is no longer confidential. That would be a just response
to the breach. I am reinforced in this view by noting
that most of the profits from the book derive indirectly
from the extremely serious and damaging breaches
of the same undertaking committed by Blake in the
1950s. As already mentioned, but for his notoriety as
an infamous spy his autobiography would not have
commanded royalties of the magnitude Jonathan Cape
agreed to pay.
As a footnote I observe that a similar conclusion,
requiring the contract breaker to disgorge his profits,
was reached in the majority decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Snepp v United States (1980)
444 US 507 . 
*288
The facts were strikingly similar.
A former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency,
whose conditions of employment included a promise
not to divulge any information relating to the agency
without prepublication clearance, published a book
about the agency's activities in Vietnam. None of the
information was classified, but an agent's violation of
his non-disclosure obligation impaired the agency's
ability to function properly. The court considered and
rejected various forms of relief. The actual damage
was not quantifiable, nominal damages were a hollow
alternative, and punitive damages after a jury trial
would be speculative and unusual. Even if recovered
they would bear no relation to either the government's
irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain. The court
considered that a remedy which required Snepp "to
disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness", was swift
and sure, tailored to deter those who would place
sensitive information at risk and, since the remedy
reached only funds attributable to the breach, it could
not saddle the former agent with exemplary damages
out of all proportion to his gain. In order to achieve
this result the court "imposed" a constructive trust on
Snepp's profits. In this country, affording the plaintiff
the remedy of an account of profits is a different means
to the same end.